
FUNDACION PARA LA EDUCACION SUPERIOR Y EL DESARROLLO



FORTY YEARS OF DEVELOPMENT

ITS SOCIAL IMPACT

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GLOSSARY OF FREQUENTLY-USED ACRONYMS

ACEP	Asociación Colombiana de Empleados Públicos (Colombian Association of Public Employees).
CCRP	Corporación Centro Regional de Población (Central Regional Population Corporation).
CEDE	Centro de Estudios de Desarrollo Económico (Centre for Studies on Economic Development). Universidad de los Andes.
CEREC	Centro de Estudios de la Realidad Colombiana (Centre for Studies on the Colombian Reality).
CID	Centro de Investigación del Desarrollo (Centre for Development Research). Universidad Nacional.
DANE	Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadística (National Administrative Department of Statistics).
DNP	Departamento Nacional de Planeación (National Department of Planning).
ECLA (CEPAL)	Economic Commission on Latin America (Comisión Económica para América Latina).
ICBF	Instituto Colombiano de Bienestar Familiar (Colombian Institute for Family Welfare).
ICFES	Instituto Colombiano para el Fomento de Educación Superior (Colombian Institute for the Development of Further Education).
OIT	Organización Internacional del Trabajo (International Labour Organization).
PREALC	Programa Regional de Empleo para América Latina y el Caribe (Regional Employment Program for Latin America and the Carribbean).
UNDP (PNUD)	United Nations Development Program (Programa de las Naciones Unidas para el Desarrollo).

CHAPTER I

FORTY YEARS OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN COLOMBIA, 1950-1990

The modern structure of Colombian production: antecedents

The fifties decade represented a period of great importance in terms of the development of the Colombian economy. During these years, important changes appeared in the national economic structure which imparted a new dynamism to the growth and development of the country.

The structural change in the Colombian economy is reflected in the increase in intensity in both industrial activities and the service industry. The dynamism of both these sectors caused the displacement of the agricultural sector as the principal source of growth, at the same time as it was having an impact on the development of different urban activities in the country.

The consolidation of the manufacturing sector and urban activities in the 1950's was a result of this interaction of different factors in earlier decades.

International crises such as the global recession of the 1930's and the Second World War, had a considerable depressing effect on the national economy, requiring state intervention by

means of economic measures designed to stabilize the national economy and isolate it from these external events.

As is known, the Colombian economy at the turn of the century had a purely agrarian structure, in which the coffee industry was the main source of growth, by means of coffee exportation. Being based on a primary - export industry, the economy was highly sensitive to external demand, and the Colombian economy was therefore adversely affected during the world economic crises of the 1930's and the state of war in the 1940's. There was a notable but gradual emergence of a modern state which intervened in the development of economic activity. Different policy measures were employed, which were evidence in a positive form of a marked tendency to generate growth in the domestic economy, thereby guaranteeing a greater stability and solidity. These measures also tried to correct the internal imbalances in different macroeconomic areas which were caused by the external crises.

In Colombia, as in other Latin American countries, the application of different economic policy measures designed to find sources of growth in domestic markets and thereby reduce dependence on external demand was centred around generous support for the manufacturing sector.

Especially after the 1930's, economic policy adopted different adjustment measures compatible with a situation of irregular and

notably low coffee prices in the external sector. The measures also had to deal with subsequent drops in international reserves as well as in terms of exchange determined by the exclusive dependence of this product on the external sector. Another problem which emerged during this period was the advent of a critical situation as regards the ability to pay off external debts accumulated since the beginning of the century for the construction of national infrastructure.

In this sense, government actions began to play a determining role, as much in fiscal, monetary and exchange terms as in the promotion of savings and public and private investment[1]/.

At the beginning of the forties, the global economic perspective offered other possibilities for the Colombian economy, determined fundamentally by the world war.

In these years, a drop in coffee production in the external markets created a favorable situation for both the prices and volume of coffee exports. Futhermore, this period coincided with an expansion in oil and banana exports, which favored, in their turn, the overall expansion of the economy.

1/ For a more detailed discussion of these aspects see Ocampo J.A. (1987 pp.218-224).

The dynamism produced by the exports of these products gave rise to a strong gain in the international reserves, enabling greater purchases of foreign goods. However, the deficit of manufactured goods due to the world conflict impeded an adequate regulation of these reserves, which caused an unmeasured growth of payment measures in the economy, and a consecuent rise in inflation.

Faced with this situation, the central government intervened in economic activity, with an emphasis on fiscal matters and on monetary control, applying fairly drastic measures in both taxation and contractionary terms[2/].

Starting from 1944, the national economic situation took a turn for the better with the stabilization of some internal imbalances. Economic policy focussed especially on the development of industrial activities, creating facilities for the importation of machinery and prime materials. This led to the dimunition of international reserves as well as the reduction of inflationary pressures, and at the same time facilitated the formation of a modern productive apparatus.

At the end of the 1940's, a favorable price situation prevailed in the coffee market. But this time the external situation of coffee prices triggered an increase in overall

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2/ Ocampo, Op.cit., p.225.

internal demand, especially for manufactured products of national origin. The Colombian industrial sector benefited highly from this increased demand, creating, as a result, the conditions necessary for a greater push towards the development of independent activities of the terciary sector in the country's urban areas. From then on, the country was provided with an industrial sector which benefited from increases in demand, and important advances had been made in the process of substitution of imports and in the industrialization of the economy.

The Colombian production structure, 1950-1990

In the 1950's, the Colombian economy underwent a recomposition of its production structure which gave rise to a new model of development, ruled by modern urban activities, in which the industrial sector was a dynamic factor on the overall economy. As was mentioned earlier, different factors affected the modernization of the national economy, permitting the consolidation of industrial activities.

Colombia in these years had a system of interregional communication which, although constructed with the object of joining the national economy around the old primary export outline, became an important element in the formation of regional markets which made industrial sector development possible. In the same way, the growing phenomenon of urbanization which the country

experienced during these years produced greater demands for the service industries.

The secondary sector would lead the way to economic growth by means of changes in inter-sectorial productivity in the Colombian economy[3]/, at the same time as said changes began to contribute to the process of general economic growth, propelling an increase in internal demand, especially for manufactured products, through changes in relative prices[4]/.

Table 1-1 shows an increase in the importance of industrial activities in the generation of national production, as well as a systematic reduction of the participation of the agricultural sector. While in the second half of the 1940's the agriculture and livestock sectors generated 40.5% of GDP, at the end of the 1960's, their contribution had been reduced to a fourth of total production. For its part, the industrial sector increased its participation from 15% to 20% in the same period. Terciary activities, for their part, experienced a dynamism similar to that of the industrial sector, in which activities linked to commerce and financial services particularly stand out. These together

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3/ Echavarría J.J. and others (1983).

4/ Thus for example, a greater supply of foodstuffs caused by increase in production in the primary sector, would permit a lowering of the prices of these products, importing buying power to urban wages which would imply an increase in demand for industrial goods or an increase in private savings.

TABLE I-1

COLOMBIA

PERCENTAGE SHARE - NET GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT ACCORDING TO SECTORS OF ACTIVITY

SECTOR	1945-1949	1950-1954	1955-1959	1960-1964	1965-1969	1970-1974	1975-1979	1980-1984	1987	1988
- AGRICULTURE & LIVESTOCK										
- MINING										
- MANUFAC. INDUSTRY										
- CONSTRUC.										
- COMMERCE										
- FINANC. SERVICES										
- TRANSP.										
- COMMUNIC.										
- ELECTRIC. GAS & WATER										
- GOV'T. SERVICES										
- PROFESS. SERVICES										
- HOUSING RENTAL										
- SUBTOTAL TOTAL										

Source: 1945-1980, Ocampo J. A. (1987) Table 7.2 p.245. 1980-1987 DANE.

increased their contribution to generation of output from 11.6% to 14% during the above period.

In accordance with the adopted model of production, it was expected that the industrial sector would go on increasing its contribution to national production and overtake the agricultural sector as the latter´s participation decreased, since industrial activities impart a greater dynamism to the overall economy by means of the relationship between intersectorial buying and selling. However, this phenomenon only partially came about. The industrial sector has been effectively increasing its contribution to national production, but it has never surpassed the contribution of the agricultural sector.

Graph 1-1 demonstrates a markedly diminishing trend in the participation of the agricultural sector in the GDP and a growing dynamism in the industrial sector until the end of the 1960´s, which stagnates in the following years and does not manage to overtake the agricultural sector´s contribution. In 1989, the contribution of the industrial sector was similar to that which it represented in the 1970´s -21%, and equivalent to that sustained by the agricultural sector in that same year.

The greater dynamism of the industrial sector between the years 1950 and 1970 was due in large part to an increasing trend in overall domestic demand, and also to the elevated elasticities of

GRAPH I-1

COLOMBIA
PARTICPATION IN NET GDP AGRICULTURAL AND INDUSTRIAL SECTORS

(viene el gráfico)

YEARS 45-49

AGRICULTURAL INDUSTRIAL

Source: Table I-1

income in the demand for industrial products, in a period in which internal supply had managed to replace a good number of the products coming in from external markets. Conversely, the stagnation at the beginning of the 1970's was due especially to a fall in effective domestic demand[5]/.

The loss of dynamism in the industrial sector of the production apparatus appears as a general trend in Latin America. However, the industrial stagnation seems more marked in Colombia than in other countries (see table 1-2).

The stagnation of the industrial sector is shown to be a significant obstacle to the model of development of all the Latin American countries since the postwar era. To a large extent, it is due to structural factors which have impeded substantial modification of intersectorial productivity, especially at the end of the 1970's when industrial progress demands the incorporation of new technology.

It should also be noted that the Colombian economic structure is far different from that of developed countries which have followed a similar model of development. These countries show signs of a growing service sector in their economic structures, a relatively low importance of agricultural activities and a

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5/ Echavarria J.J. and others (1983) Op.cit.

TABLE I-2

SECTOR PARTICPATION IN THE GDP
LATIN-AMERICAN AND DEVELOPED COUNTRIES
(%)

	COUNTRIES	1965 AGRIC	1965 INDUS.	1965 SERV.	1965 AGRIC	1965 INDUS.	1965 SERV.	1986 AGRIC	1986 INDUS.	1986 SERV.
	COLOMBIA									
	DOMINICAN REP									
L	HONDURAS									
A	NICARAGUA									
T	EL SALVADOR									
I	GUATEMALA									
N	PARAGUAY									
	PERU									
A	ECUADOR									
M	CHILE									
E	COSTA RICA									
R	BRAZIL									
I	MEXICO									
C	URUGUAY									
A	ARGENTINA									
	VENEZUELA									
	SPAIN									
DEVE-	ITALY									
LOPED	UNITED KINGDOM									
	FRANCE									
COUN-	WEST GERMANY									
TRIES	JAPAN									
	SWEDEN									
	CANADA									
	U.S.A.									

Source: World Bank, "Report on World Development", 1988.

participation of the industrial sector which easily surpasses 30% in generation of production (see table 1-2).

The export sector and economic growth

Contrary to expectation and in a manner consistent with an industrial sector which is low in dynamism, the Colombian economy has not managed to consolidate a strong export sector.

In table 1-3 it can be observed how the participation of exports in the GDP has been steadily dropping. While in the 1940's exports represent 21% of the GDP, in 1988 they represent only 14.6%.

In terms of exports, different attempts have been made by the government to facilitate the placement of different products on the international markets, in an attempt to eliminate the Colombian economy's great dependence on coffee exports.

In effect, by means of exchange rate management and different programs to encourage exports, a greater competetiveness of national goods in the external sector has to a certain extent been achieved. This is demonstrated by the growth in exportation of manufactured goods and minor prime materials. Exports of those products have quintupled their contribution to total exports,

rising from 8% in the period 1945-1949 to 40% during the 1980's (see table 1-3).

However, in spite of the increase in exports other than coffee, this product still holds an important place in the national total. In large measure, the loss in the participation by total exports in the GDP is connected to the shrinking of the relative importance of external coffee sales in total exports, which fell from 72% in 1945-1949 to 48.7% in 1980-84 (see table 1-3).

Thus, despite having made significant gains in terms of diversifying the Colombian export sector, the new products which make up the Colombian export sector do not represent a major source of growth for the GDP. At this point it should again be stressed that the dynamism in the growth of domestic manufactured products has closely depended on the evolution of effective domestic demand[6]/.

The Colombian external sector still relies on coffee exports, and as a result, on trends in international coffee prices. However, recent tendencies have demonstrated less vulnerability on the part of the national economy as regards drops in international coffee prices; this is due to the dynamism which primary products such as oil, and to a lesser extent, coal and other minerals, have

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[6]/ Echavarria J.J. (1983) pp. 181-184.

experienced in the second half of the 1980's. Oil represented 19% of Colombian exports in 1988.

Comparing the Colombian export situation to that of other Latin American countries and some European countries which have followed a similar economic pattern, there are warning signs for an unfavorable situation for our country. Colombia is the only country in which exports have decreased as a percentage of the GDP. In 1950, this coefficient was about 19%, but dropped to 17% in 1985. For their part, countries such as Chile, Ecuador and Uruguay have managed to double this coefficient in the same period (see table 1-4).

In the same manner, Colombia is the country in this group which shows least dynamism in exports per-capita. During the period 1950-1980, Colombian exports per-capita grew at an annual rate of 1.6%, very inferior to that of the Scandinavian countries and Ecuador, which together experienced average annual growth rates of more than 5%. Chile also surpasses Colombian statistics, growing at a rate of 2.7%, as does to a lesser extent Uruguay, at a rate of 1.8% (see table 1-5).

In terms of imports, it stands out that national demand for external consumer goods, contrary to expectation, has not experienced a considerable reduction. This is due in large part to the existence of an industrial sector low in both dynamism and

competetiveness which has not managed to diversify production in order to satisfy domestic demand. A similar situation exists with capital assets and intermediate products. In effect, the dependence of the industrial sector on the export sector is the same as it was at the beginning of the 1950's (see table 1-2). This demonstrates that the substitution of imports has not been effective, which strikes a blow to development possibilities for the country, given how important this is for the attainment of self-sustained growth.

The effects of economic growth on the population and on income

Consistent with the pattern of Colombian economic development, the last forty years have been characterized by the country's rapid process of urbanization. The development of both industrial and service activities in the urban centres have made the cities important poles of attraction for the rural population, which see in them great possibilities for raising their standard of living.

In effect, as can be seen in table 1-6, the process of urbanization coincides with the structural change in the economy described earlier, and with the emergence of the industrial sector as the most dynamic sector.

In 1951 the urban population made up 38.7% of the total population. By 1985, this percentage was 67.2%. The population of the four largest cities (Bogotá, Medellín, Cali and Barranquilla)

TABLE I-4

EXPORTS
AS A PERCENTAGE OF GDP

YEAR	LATIN AMERICA				SCANDINAVIAN COUNTRIES			
	CHILE	COLOMBIA	ECUADOR	URUGUAY	DENMARK	FINLAND	NORWAY	SWEDEN

Source: Hagnus B. (1989)

TABLE I-5

EXPORTS PER-CAPITA
(US$ In 1980)

YEAR	LATIN AMERICA				SCANDINAVIAN COUNTRIES			
	CHILE	COLOMBIA	ECUADOR	URUGUAY	DENMARK	FINLAND	NORWAY	SWEDEN
1950								
1960								
1970								
1980								
1985								
	INDEX : 1950 = 100							
1950								
1960								
1970								
1980								
1985								
	ANNUAL GROWTH							

Source: Magnus B. (1989) and Fedesarrollo calculations.

TABLE I-6

COLOMBIA
POPULATION EVOLUTION ACCORDING TO CENSUSES
(%)

YEARS	POPULATION			TOTAL 12 CITIES	TOTAL 4 CITIES
	TOTAL	URBAN	RURAL		
1912		N.A	N.A		
1918		N.A	N.A		
1938					
1951					
1964					
1973					
1985					

Source: Ocampo J.A. (1989) and Fedesarrollo calculations.
N.A = Not available

doubled during this time, rising from 13% of the total population in 1951 to 23% in 1985.

Thus urbanization led to a recomposition of the structure of the labour force, in which the primary sector began conceding territory to the secondary and terciary sectors. Therefore, while in 1951, those employed by the primary sector represented 55% of the employed workers, by 1985, this sector absorbed only a third of the total of the labour force. The secondary sector, for its part, went from employing 16% of workers in 1951 to employing 21.4% of the total labour force in 1985. Employment by the service sector experienced a more intense growth, rising from 28.7% in 1951 to 45% in 1985, which denotes, in addition, a certain inadequacy on the part of the Colombian secondary sector to absorb excesses of manual labour from the rural sector (see table 1-7).

The restructuring of employment, associated with the growth of the country's industrialization, created a need for substantial changes in the productivity of the labour force. First, the technical changes implicit in the industrialization process demanded higher levels of qualification from the labour force. Second, industrial development, by demanding more products originiating from the primary sector, demanded higher agricultural productivity. Likewise, higher levels of productivity in both the primary and secondary sectors made necessary higher levels of efficiency from the terciary sector of the economy.

TABLE I-7

COLOMBIA
EMPLOYMENT DISTRIBUTION
BETWEEN ECONOMIC SECTORS

Sector	1938	1951	1964	1973	1985
Primary					
Secondary					
Terciary					
Total					

Source: J.A. "Historia Económica de Colombia". Table 7.3, p.247.

Economic growth and wages

Changes in productivity were clearly reflected by the trends in real wages in the different economic sectors. As can be seen in table 1-8, real industrial wages are higher in absolute terms than agricultural wages during the whole period of 1960-1989. Looking in detail at this period, however, a fairly irregular behavioural tendency can be observed on the part of industrial wages, which to a large extent is associated with the production cycles of the sector. In 1970, industrial wages reached their highest value. From this point on, there is a decreasing trend, with a slight recovery in 1978-79, after which the trend again reverts due to the recessionary factor in the Colombian economy in the 1980's. Industrial wages therefore experience the same stagnation as the sector as a whole. As a result, in 1987, they do not exceed their 1970 value.

However, if fringe benefits are added to the basic salary, the increases in total earnings are superior to those of the basic salary. In Colombia, fringe benefits have in fact emerged as a substantial part of total earnings. Table 1-8 shows that the basic industrial wage increased 19% between 1975 and 1987 in real terms, whilst total earnings increased 46% in the same period.

TABLE I-8

COLOMBIA
EVOLUTION OF REAL DAY-WAGES
INDUSTRY, AGRICULTURE AND MINIMUM URBAN DAY-WAGE
($ 1978)

YEAR	RATE OF INFLATION	WORKERS INDUSTRIAL SECTOR		AGRICULTURAL WORKERS	URBAN MINIMUM
		WAGES * & SALARIES	TOTAL EARNINGS (1)		
1960					
1961					
1962					
1963					
1964					
1965					
1966					
1967					
1968					
1969					
1970					
1971					
1972					
1973					
1974					
1975					
1976					
1977					
1978					
1979					
1980					
1981					
1982					
1983					
1984					
1985					
1986					
1987					
1988					
1989					

(1) Includes Wages, salaries and loans
* 1960-1974, calculations based on Urrutia M. (1984). "Los de arriba y los de Abajo". Fedesarrollo-Cerec.
Source: Fedesarrollo calculations based on DANE information.

The welfare of the industrial worker therefore cannot be measured on the basis of wages, but rather on a salary plus fringe benefits, this being a better index of his buying power.

The smaller increase in the industrial salaries in the last two decades is linked to low dynamism in the productivity of the labour force, evidenced by the fact that the sector's participation in output has remained unaltered between 1965 and 1986 (see table 1-2), whilst the percentage of employment in industry out of the total labour force has moderately increased (see table 1-7).

Conversely, the growth in industrial wages has been affected by trends in the qualified urban labour force. In the first two post-war decades, the demand for qualified workers was high and the supply limited. In this period industrial real wages grew at an accelerated pace. Later, with the increase in education, the supply of qualified labour grew more rapidly and real wages increased more slowly.

With regard to agricultural sector wages, there is a markedly growing trend towards the elimination of excess workers in the countryside, which coincides with the strong movement of rural workers towards the urban centres. The emigration from the countryside thus had a contrary effect upon agricultural wages, which increased in the decade of the seventies, when industrial wages were growing less.

The shrinking of the rural labour supply, linked to processes of technological improvement, allowed an increase of rural earnings in the rural sector, in such a way that at the beginning of the 1970's agricultural wages already exceeded the minimum urban wage in absolute terms (see table 1-8).

The growing dynamism of agricultural wages gives way to a relative stagnation at the advent of the recessive period of the 1980's.

Economic growth and income per-capita in Colombia

The Colombian economy has shown signs of greater stability, in terms of economic growth, than the economies of other Latin American countries. In contrast to the other countries of the region, Colombia has managed to maintain a positive growth for more than four decades, and especially since the 1980's, despite having suffered serious external shocks.

As can be seen in table 1-9, in the 1960's there was a period of sustained economic growth which lasted until 1972. From 1973 on, the world oil crisis wreaked its effects on the Colombian economy and brought with it a slowdown of its growth rate which was later counteracted by the coffee boom. In 1978, the Colombian economy grew at an exceptional rate of 8.5%.

TABLE I-9

COLOMBIA
EVOLUTION OF NET GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT
(Millions of pesos in 1975)

YEAR	GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT			
	TOTAL	ANNUAL GROWTH %	PER CAPITA	ANNUAL GROWTH %
1965				
1966				
1967				
1968				
1969				
1970				
1971				
1972				
1973				
1974				
1975				
1976				
1977				
1978				
1979				
1980				
1981				
1982				
1983				
1984				
1985				
1986				
1987				
1988				
1989				

Source: DANE, Fedesarrollo calculations.

In the 1980's, the Colombian economy was confronted with the most critical situation of the last forty years. The crisis of the 1980's was brought about by different factors, as much on the external as on the domestic front.

During this period, international coffee prices dropped severely at the same time as the volume of exports also decreased with the renewed introduction of the quota system. This stagnation of the coffee sector seriously affected the flow of international currency and led to a reduction in the overall domestic demand.

As a consequence of the external surpluses produced by the coffee boom at the end of the 1970's, the first years of the crisis brought with them a period of high importation, both legal and illegal, which contributed particularly to exacerbate the drop in industrial demand.

The crisis intensifies due to the serious under-valoration of the exchange rates during these years. In addition to accelerated importation, this caused a loss in competitiveness of our products on both world and domestic markets, where they had to compete with contraband.

Another factor which greatly affected the behaviour of the economy in the 1980's was the restriction of international loans, after the Mexican declaration of moratorium in 1982. As a result,

the increase in state activity in the economy was seriously affected, due to government expenditure's high dependence on external financing. The Colombian economy in this way suffered a de-acceleration in growth; 1982 marked the lowest rate of growth since 1965; -0.9%.

Later there came a period of recovery, attained to a large extent by means of stabilizing economic policies, in which exchange rate management and reduction of public spending figured greatly. At the same time, the recovery of coffee prices and the increase in oil and mineral exports brought about an improved situation in the external sector. This led to an economic growth rate of 5.1% in 1986.

The evolution of income per-capita in Colombia is not immune to external shocks, and in particular variations in the price of coffee. Nevertheless, in comparison with other Latin American countries, this indicator has demonstrated a behavioural tendency which is much more stable and relatively sustained (see graph 1-2). The behaviour of GDP per-capita however, is ostensibly weakened during the crisis years. Thus, in 1975 it grew at a rate of 0.1% while in the recent years of crisis, 1982 and 1983, negative rates were observed; -1% and -3% respectively.

Nevertheless, comparing the behaviour of income per-capita in Colombia with that which occurs in other Latin American countries

GRAPH I-2

COLOMBIA GDP PER-CAPITA, 1966-1989
1975 INDEX = 100

(viene el gráfico)

Source: DANE

over longer periods, Colombia holds an advantageous position. As is shown in table 1-10, the growth of income per-capita in the country had begun to occupy a relatively better position in the Latin American context. Thus, whilst in the 1950's the growth rate of this indicator occupied the 11th position, in the first five years of the 1980's, it occupied the third. In this last period, it can be seen that out of the 25 countries included in the survey, 21 experienced negative growth rates.

Public expenditure in the Colombian economy

The intervention of the state in the Colombian economy has been a topic of great debate in our country for many years. The controversy has been fed by different theoretical and ideological points of view, which centre around the forms of state intervention, by means of different spending measures and economic policies, and the effect of these on the performance of the economy as a whole, as well as the concept of the state as a social model.

Without going into the argument in depth, we want to highlight the role which state intervention has played in the development of the national economy through the development of public expenditure and the direction which it has taken in the last forty years.

It becomes clear that the state has played a very important role in the model of development, not only through economic policy

TABLE I-10

LATIN AMERICA
RATE OF GROWTH OF GDP PER-CAPITA (%)

1950-1960	1960-1970	1970-1980	1980-1985	1986-1988
Jamaica	Surinam	Brazil	Panamá	Chile
Barbados	Barbados	Ecuador	Bahamas	Barbados
Venezuela	Panamá	Paraguay	Colombia	Colombia
Mexico	Jamaica	Trin.Tobag.	Surinam	Uruguay
Perú	Mexico	Surinam	Mexico	Paraguay
Uruguay	Nicaragua	Dominican Rep.	Ecuador	Dominican Rep.
Dominican Rep.	Brazil	Mexico	Dominican Rep.	Jamaica
Nicaragua	Guatemala	Colombia	Paraguay	Bahamas
Panamá	Argentina	Guatemala	Barbados	Costa Rica
Chile	Bolivia	Haiti	Brazil	Venezuela
Colombia	Trin.Tobag.	Costa Rica	Jamaica	Honduras
El Salvador	Venezuela	Panamá	Chile	Guatemala
Guyana	Costa Rica	Uruguay	Honduras	El Salvador
Argentina	Bahamas	Honduras	Costa Rica	Bolivia
Guatemala	Honduras	Bolivia	Nicaragua	Brazil
Paraguay	Perú	Barbados	Haiti	Argentina
Honduras	El Salvador	Perú	Perú	Mexico
Brazil	Colombia	Guyana	El Salvador	Guyana
Surinam	Chile	El Salvad.	Guyana	Ecuador
Trin.Tobag.	Paraguay	Chile	Argentina	Haiti
Haiti	Dominican Rep.	Argentina	Uruguay	Perú
Costa Rica	Ecuador	Venezuela	Venezuela	Surinam
Ecuador	Guyana	Bahamas	Guatemala	Trin.Tobag.
Bolivia	Uruguay	Jamaica	Trin.Tob.	Nicaragua
Bahamas	Haiti	Nicaragua	Bolivia	Panamá
Latin America	Latin America	Latin America	Latin America	Latin America

Source: Urrutia M. (1989).

but also through the direction of public expenditure in different periods. Thus, for example, the increase in public spending in Colombia shot up in the years of international crisis, such as the 1930's and 1940's, at the same time as the state made considerable efforts to expand the national production capacity, with the aim of achieving a greater independence from external demands in terms of economic growth. In this way, the application of economic policy measures which to a large extent strengthened the industrial sector and fed the increase in public spending geared towards the construction of infrastructure, especially of communication services, assisted in the articulation of the country. The measures expanded the national markets and in a reciprocal manner boosted national productivity. In the same way, the increase in public spending as a whole served as a dynamic agent in economic activity, having a positive impact on the level of national consumption.

Government intervention through expenditure has been expanding in a sustained manner since the 1950's. In those years, a systematic recomposition of expenditure began to take shape, which in good part came in response to the requirements demanded by the new development model.

Since 1950, public consumption has been losing ground to investment, as a response to urban demands originating from the changes in the national production structure, in which public services emerged for the first time as the major priorities for the

population and for the development of the modern sector of the economy.

In this way, the increase in public investment has been gaining importance in the dynamism of the growth of overall public spending. As is shown in 1-2, state intervention in national economic activity has been growing steadily since 1950. In that year, nearly 9% of the GDP corresponded to state expenditure, in which the consumption by public administration represented 79%, dedicating the remaining 21% to public investment. In the second half of the 1960's, the contribution of public spending to the GDP hovered at around 13.5%, while public investment in these years claimed a third of total expenditure.

In the 1980's, the contribution by the state to the generation of production was more than double its contribution of 1950, reaching 20%. The same behaviour can be seen for public investment, which in 1987 represented 47% of total expenditure. As a proportion of GDP, this went from 1.8% in 1950 to 8.8% in 1987 (see 1-2). The increase in public investment at the beginning of the 1980's was geared towards increasing the economy's productive capacity, giving greater weight to the mining and energy sectors.

On the other hand, recent government investment has been increasing its participation in the composition of the economy's total investment, which could suggest a displacement of the private

TABLE I-11

COLOMBIA
EVOLUTION OF PUBLIC EXPENDITURE AND CONTRIBUTION
TO GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT
(MILLIONS OF $)

YEAR	TOTAL PUBLIC EXPENDITURE (1)	PUBLIC INVESTMENT (2)	% (2/1)	GOV'T. CONSUMPTION (3)	% (3/1)	GDP (4)	PARTICIPATION IN GDP (%) (1)	(2)	(3)
1950									
1951									
1952									
1953									
1954									
1955									
1956									
1957									
1958									
1959									
1960									
1961									
1962									
1963									
1964									
1965									
1966									
1967									
1968									
1969									
1970									
1971									
1972									
1973									
1974									
1975									
1976									
1977									
1978									
1979									
1980									
1981									
1982									
1983									

Source: "Informe Final de la Comisión del Gasto Público" Economia Colombiana, magazine, April 1987.

sector by the public sector. However, it should be made clear that this occurrs due to the large amounts of public investment earmarked for the earlier -mentioned sectors (especially energy and mining), which tend to have a high capital- output ratio.

In the late eighties, there was a recomposition of investment, in which social spending was awarded a greater importance, especially in investments which involve the welfare of the Colombian rural population. This has led to a stagnation of investment in the energy sector and in hydrocarbons, at the same time as there is evidence of a dimunition in the rest of the mining sector[7]/.

The strong growth in public expenditure in the national economy could suggest the existence of excessive activity on the part of the state. Nevertheless, everything seems to indicate that Colombia finds itself in an intermediate position with respect to other countries with similar development characteristics[8]/, which means it is in a favorable situation.

In reality, what is of most concern with respect to the intervention of the state in the economic sphere is up to what point this has been effective in attaining the previously stated objectives as regards the excecution of various projects. In this

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7/ Bernal J. (1989).

8/ "Informe Final de la Comisión del Gasto Público" (1986).

way, the levels of efficiency involved in the administration of expenditure on different projects take on a significant importance, as do the origins of funding and their effect upon the performance of the economy as a whole. It is equally important to see how much the population itself has benefited from development projects. This last point is the central theme of this book and will be explored in greater depth in the following chapters.

Conclusions

Between 1950 and 1990 income per-capita in Colombia slightly more than doubled. At the same time, the economy underwent a very profound structural change, as did the country's demographics.

The country went from being a predominantly rural society to being an urban society. At the same time, agriculture lost much of its participation in the GDP, and industry and services came to employ the majority of the work force.

If Colombian development is compared to international development patterns, various points stand out:

1) The economy in 1950 was relatively closed, and in contrast to what occurred in countries which enjoyed an accelerated development in the post-war era, in Colombia the proportion of national output which was exported did not grow. It would therefore

seem that the country did not make use of the opportunities offered by the accelerated growth of national commerce in the post-war era. This meant that economic growth would be based essentially on the domestic market.

2) In the last decades the proportion of the GDP constituted by the manufacturing sector has not increased. This has retarded the process of technological change in the economy. In order to make manufacturing increase its participation in the GDP, a process of internationalizing the economy so that it utilizes external demand as a motor for industrial growth is probably needed.

3) The management of macroeconomic policies has been fortunate and has prevented the economic instability characteristic of other Latin American countries from appearing in Colombia.

4) Agricultural development has also been more consistent than in other countries of the region, and agricultural activity has increased, which has prevented the emergence of differences in productivity between the agricultural sector and industry and services. This has helped achieve a better distribution of income.

5) Public expenditure has been concentrated on the creation of infrastructure and on social spending. Therefore there was no creation of a sector of public companies, of the magnitude which existed in other countries of the region in the early 1980's.

6) During the whole period of 1950-1990 urban salaries grew in real terms, and rural salaries did so after the 1960's. This suggests that the working class, to different extents, benefited from the development process of the last forty years.

7) To summarize, between 1950 and 1990, the Colombian economy was transformed and national income grew not at the rate of leading countries in economic terms, but in a constant fashion. It would appear that the fruits of development were distributed in a fairly equitative manner and therefore that development should have improved the welfare of the Colombian population.

The remaining chapters will try to explore how this development has affected different groups within society and in what way it has improved the standard of living of these groups.

Increase in production does not always lead to an improvement in welfare; sometimes because economic development benefits only a few, and other times because this development brings with it high social costs. The conclusion of the following chapters is that surprisingly, Colombian economic development has especially benefited groups which in 1950 were the least privileged in our society and that many factors which negatively affect present day quality of life have not been direct results of that process of economic development.

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CHAPTER II

THE QUALITY OF HOUSING AND NUTRITION AND INDEXES OF THE QUALITY OF LIFE

INTRODUCTION

Forty years of development have been translated into the clear improvement of some of the indicators which are usually identified with increases in the welfare of a society. Included amongst these are infant mortality rates, life expectancy at birth, the average education of the population, unemployment levels, level of nutrition, the amount of liberty granted to the individual by the political system, and the degree of citizens' participation in decisions which concern them.

In the last forty years, probably all these indicators have improved in Colombia. Democracy has been strengthened and a greater proportion of the population is participating in the determination of policies. In the following chapters we shall analyze in greater detail the progress made in education and in the distribution of income. The chapter on the demographic transition registers the improvements in the indexes of life expectancy at birth and the accelerated decrease of infant mortality rates.

This chapter will discuss some of the advances in the quality of housing and food security, and in the reduction of the poverty indexes.

Before embarking on this analysis, it is worth considering some methodological problems. Economic development is to a high degree responsible for creating new needs for man and the ways in which these are met. Nevertheless, just as it creates new needs, economic development also generates the conditions for improving the population's standards of living, especially as regards housing and nutrition.

To evaluate the progress which the country's living conditions have made in these last forty years is not an easy task. First, because applying a standard measure of welfare (or quality) is strongly conditioned by present day needs and tends to undervalue the living conditions of previous years. For example, the availability of a private car, which today almost constitutes a necessity, at least in metropolitan areas, was certainly not so vital in the 1950's. Therefore, if we take car ownership as a representative index of quality of life, the increase in this index could undervalue the increases in welfare for the reasons stated here. Another example would be the indexes of sewage systems. In smaller cities sewage is not quite so indispensable, but in large cities it certainly is. In this case greater availability, when it

is simultaneous with the growth in size of provincial capitals, is not an unequivocal index of welfare.

Conversely, the sparse information available on indexes of quality of life is fragmentary and the figures at hand reflect different concepts and methodologies, which leads to difficulties in the vital process of statistical homogenization.

Taking these limits into account, below will consider some aspects of the process of satisfying the needs of Colombians in the last four decades, related to quality of housing, some socioeconomic characteristics of the home, and food security.

Quality of housing

There are three important cupects which are generally taken into account when analyzing the quality of housing; the building structure, the availability of public services and usable space.

Table II-1 shows the progression of indexes of these three components, construed on the basis of statistical information published in the censuses of 1951, 1964, 1973 and 1985.

As regards the structure of the building, it has been possible to fully trace two characteristics: the existence in houses of

walls of unstable materials and of dirt floors, as predominant features (table II-1, section A).

Although the data presents some methodological inconsistencies[1/], the substantial advances made in both these spheres between 1951 and 1985 are undeniable, especially in urban areas. At the present time only a reduced number of urban dwellings can be considered inadequate from the structural point of view. In the countryside, 48.8% of housing still has dirt floors and 52.5% is built of non-permanent materials.

This process of the adaptation of buildings has been most intense during the periods of 1951 to 1964 and 1973 to 1985, and as has already been pointed out, more intense in principal towns than in the rest of the country.

With respect to this last point, however, we cannot forget that the quality of housing can bear different characteristics depending on location. In the cities, materials of low specifications can be associated with buildings of low quality, while in rural areas a structure with the same specifications can be considered acceptable.

1/ In 1951, in contrast to other years, it was not possible to extract adobe and mud bricks from the rubric of "walls made of inferior materials" Equally, methodological changes must be responsible for the 1973 increase in percentage of urban dwellings with dirt floors.

TABLE II-1

C O L O M B I A

QUALITY OF HOUSING, 1951-1985

A. HOUSING ACCORDING TO PREDOMINANT CONSTRUCTION MATERIALS

CHARACTERISTICS OF CONSTRUCTION	1951 CENSUS			1964 CENSUS			1973 CENSUS			1985 CENSUS		
	MAIN TOWNS	REST	TOTAL	MAIN TOWNS	REST	TOTAL	MAIN TOWNS	REST	TOTAL	MAIN TOWNS	REST	TOTAL
DIRT FLOORS												
WALLS OF UNSTABLE MATERIAL (1)												

(1) In 1951: Housing with walls of wood, adobe, clay and sticks, other materials.
In 1964: Housing with walls of wood, clay and sticks, scraps and other materials.
In 1973: Housing with walls of wood, reeds, bamboo, clay and sticks, scraps and other materials.
In 1985: Housing with walls of clay and sticks, reeds, bamboo, wood, scraps, cloth, no walls.

Source: For 1951, DANE (1957), table 5, p.19; For 1964, DANE (1968), table 5, p.33; For 1973, DANE (1981), table 28, p.435; For 1985, DANE (1986), table 16, p.278.

B. HOUSING ACCORDING TO AVAILABILITY OF UTILITIES

TYPE OF SERVICE	1951 CENSUS			1964 CENSUS			1973 CENSUS			1985 CENSUS		
	MAIN TOWNS	REST	TOTAL	MAIN TOWNS	REST	TOTAL	MAIN TOWNS	REST	TOTAL	MAIN TOWNS	REST	TOTAL
WATER SUPPLY (2)												
ENERGY (3)												
SANITATION (4)												
SEWAGE												

(2) In 1951 covers occupied family housing with water supply inside or outside house
In 1964 means occupied family housing with running water inside or outside the house (but inside the bui
In 1973 and 1985 means private occupied housing with persons present and connected to water mains.
(3) In 1951 includes occupied family housing with electricity.
In 1964 includes occupied family housing with electrical connections. In 1973 and 1985 includes private occupied housing with persons present and connected to electrical energy supply.
(4) In 1951 represents occupied family housing with private or shared sanitation or with a toilet. In 1964 represents occupied family housing with a toilet or latrine.
In 1973 and 1985 represents private occupied housing with persons present and with sanitary services with a toilet connected to sewage or a septic tank or a latrine.
Source: For 1951, DANE (1987), Table 10, p.34 and Table 8, p.31; for 1964, DANE (1968), Table 9, p.58; for 1973 and 1985, DANE, et.al. (1989), Table 23, p.36, Table 24, p.36.

C. POPULATION IN HOUSING WITH CRITICAL OVERCROWDING (5)

1964 CENSUS	1964 CENSUS	1973 CENSUS	1985 CENSUS
MAIN TOWNS			
REMAINDER			
TOTAL			

(5) More than three persons per room.
Source: For 1964, DANE , 1968, Table 14, p.230; for 1973 and 1985, DANE et.al. (1989), Table 31, p.82.

As regards services available in the home, the three most basic ones have been considered to be: water supply, electricity and sanitation, to which sewage can be added under certain conditions.

The presence of these services in Colombian homes has increased in the last twenty years and in particular, state investments have aided connection to the electricity network. It is impressive to note that 95% of the urban dwellings have access to electricity in 1985 and that between 1973 and 1985 the proportion of electrified rural housing jumps from 15% to 40%.

During the inter-census period of 1951-1964 little progress was made in the area of public utilities in cities, and the advances made in the rural areas were minimal, with the exception of water supply.

In the nine years between 1964 and 1973 great efforts were made to increase the supply of public utilities nationwide and particularly in the urban centres. By 1973 the vast majority of city homes had access to the three basic utilities and availability continued to increase, albeit at much lower rates during the next inter-census period. In 1985 only 2.7% of urban housing lacked all three[2]/. During the period 1973-1985, supply increased

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2/ Source: DANE et al. (1989) Graph 22, p.35. The source refers to water, electricity and sewage services.

significantly in the rest of the country, and in particular, the availability of electricity and sanitation.

In the countryside, however, there continues to be an elevated number of dwellings with either no utilities at all (51.2%)[3]/ or only partial services. Water supply is particularly low (28%) and only about 40% of dwellings have electrical or sanitary connections. Also, sewage is rare in the rural population, a fact which only partially reflects a deficiency in service, since this is not as necessary in sparsely populated areas.

Unfortunately, the gap between the countryside and the city has not been closed: In 1951 the percentages of rural dwellings with access to only one of these three utilities were 60 points lower than those corresponding to urban dwellings; in 1985 this difference was more than 54 percentage points[4]/.

As to the last aspect of housing quality, i.e. utilization of available space, a critical overcrowding index has been defined, following the methods proposed by a recent work by DANE et.al.[5]/. A critical standard for use of space is considered therefore to be

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[3]/ DANE et. al. (1989) Graph 22 p.35.

[4]/ Compare the first and second columns for the years 1951 and 1985 in section B, Graph 1.

[5]/ DANE et.al. (1989).

a situation in which on average, more than three people share a room.

The proportion of Colombians living in an overcrowded situation (table II-1, section C) fell by a few percentage points between 1964 and 1973; only after this period have there been notable improvements in the availability of housing space. These recent advancements can be attributed in large part to the progress made in rural zones, where the relative depopulation has been one of the principal causes of the strong drop of the indicator. Lower incomes, the low availability of housing loans, the higher fertility rates and the different socio-economic characteristics of rural families, however, contribute to the high overcrowding in rural homes.

As to the cities, in addition, no definitive conclusion can be reached without taking into account changes in the dimensions of housing. Data related to construction activity in Bogotá[6]/ confirm the reduction of the average area of houses and apartments. So therefore another consequence of the urban squeeze has been a much more intensive use of available housing space.

6/ In Bogotá the average area of new construction (apartments and houses) has recently evolved in the following manner: September 1978: 85.0 square metres. May 1985: 70.0 square metres. September 1988: 80.4 square metres. October 1989: 79.4 square metres. Source: Camacol.

The form of tenancy, although it does not strictly constitute an indicator of the quality of housing, certainly has much to do with the quality of life. Table II-2 shows that in 1985, as in 1951, little more than 67% of Colombians were owners of their own homes.

In the countryside, housing ownership has always been the prevalent form of tenancy, whilst renting has not been widespread, especially in comparison with the urban centres. The former is due fundamentally to the higher costs of land and construction in the cities, added to the reduced possibilities for independent construction.

Nevertheless, due to internal migration and the proletariatization of the rural workers, the alteration over time in the percentage of home ownership shows a continual decrease until 1973, as much in the urban sector as in the rural sector. After this date, the creation of the Savings and Housing Corporations in 1972 and the great push which has been given to the UPAC (a unit which provides the basic indexing for housing and mortgage institutions) system and to mass housing programs during the years 1983-1985, have induced a strong growth in home ownership at the same time as a strong reduction in the "other forms" of tenancy[7/], especially in the urban centres.

7/ Which include squatters and illegal occupants to a substantial degree.

TABLE II-2

HOUSING
BY FORMS OF TENANCY, 1951-1985

FORM OF TENANCY		OWNERS	LEASERS	OTHERS FORMS	TOTAL OCCUPIED HOUSING
1951 CENSUS	MAIN TOWNS				
	REMAINDER				
	TOTAL				
1964 CENSUS	MAIN TOWNS				
	REMAINDER				
	TOTAL				
1973 CENSUS	MAIN TOWNS				
	REMAINDER				
	TOTAL				
1985 CENSUS	MAIN TOWNS				
	REMAINDER				
	TOTAL				

Source: For 1951, DANE, (1957), Table 9, p.32; For 1964, DANE (1968), Table 14, p.227; For 1973 and 1985, DANE (1989A), Table II.3, p.221 and Table II.4, p.222.

Food security

The need for food is second only in importance to the need for air and water. It is therefore unnecessary to highlight the importance of a population's food situation as an index of its standard of living.

Even when it is not the extreme case of a starving population, a quantitatively or qualitatively insufficient diet has an important effect on the physical and social development of man; work capacity; life expectancy at birth; and mortality, particularly infant mortality. Thus the relation between nutritional conditions and the economic development of the country is not univocal; the first reflects the second, but at the same time the nutritional state of the population influences the level and pace of economic development.

DANE has dedicated three investigations to the food situation, in 1972, 1981, and 1984-85,[8]/ from which it is possible to derive a fairly complete picture of the nutritional conditions for Colombians. Prior to these surveys, studies upon this subject had

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8/ The Income and Expenditure Survey of October 1972, the Food Nutrition and Housing Survey of November 1981 and the Income and Expenditure Survey lasting from March 1984 to February 1985. The first two were of national scope (Urban and rural); the last one referred only to the principal cities of the country.

been based generally on the concept of consumption or on the apparent supply of foodstuffs[9]/.

Table II-3 summarizes some of the results obtained by earlier investigations on nutrition in Colombia.

These studies point to a deterioration in the nutritional situation of Colombians in the twenty years between 1950 and 1970. This is confirmed by changes in the (apparent) availability of foodstuffs and of calories per-capita consumption[10]/, which drops from 552 to 501 kilos per year and from 2,171 to 1,943 calories daily (see section A of table II-3).

García (1979) finds two principal causes for this nutritional impoverishment: demographic growth, which during the years 1950-1960 exceeded any reasonable increase in agricultural production, and the nation's external sector imbalance, which throughout the period 1958-1969 provoked serious problems in the balance of payments and limited the imports of foodstuffs.

9/ Apparent consumption is defined as the amounts that disappear from the market in a given year and are directed to consumption, whether final or intermediate. It is therefore: apparent consumption = domestic production + imports - exports + variation of goods.

10/ Caloric consumption is the most useful simple indicator of nutritional conditions, basically because caloric deficiencies indicate other nutritional deficiencies.

TABLE II-3

C O L O M B I A
FOOD CONDITIONS, 1950-1985

A. AVAILABILITY OF FOOD AND CALORIE CONSUMPTION
1950-1975

PERIOD	1950-1955	1956-1960	1961-1965	1966-1970	1971-1975
AVAILABILITY OF FOOD PER-CAPITA (KILOS/YEAR)					
ANNUAL CALORIC CONSUMPTION (DAILY PER CAPITA)					

Source: Garcia J. (1979), Table 2. p.133 and Table 3, p.134.

B. POPULATION FACING FOOD SECURITY RISKS,
1972, 1981 AND 1984-85*

PERIOD	1972	1981	1984 - 1985
URBAN POPULATION			
RURAL POPULATION			
TOTAL POPULATION			

* Population percentages coincide with low-income population percentages.

Source: For 1972, Garcia J. (1979), Table 8, p.145; for 1981 and 1984-85, Córdoba R. Uribe R. (1990), Tables 10 and 11, pp.186 and 189.

Only after improvements in the distribution of income at the beginning of the seventies do nutritional levels reach the standards that existed at the beginning of the fifties.

Despite the deterioration observed in the supply of foodstuffs, however, if the minimum amount of 1,970 daily calories-per- person suggested by the ICBF[11/] is taken as a reference, Colombia would seem not to have suffered severe nutritional problems during the period discussed. This conclusion should be approached with extreme caution, as it is a reflection of average consumption and of data which are only a preliminary approximation of the real food situation.

In fact, García (1979), based on the results of the first Income and Expenditure Survey which allowed for the division of caloric consumption according to income levels and geographic location, and using the same criteria of 1,970 daily calories, comes to the conclusion that in 1972, 19% (the poorest) of the urban population and 72% of the rural population faced the greatest risks of undernourishment; which means that 40% of all Colombians suffered from malnutrition.

11/ See ICBF (1977).

Subsequently, Córdoba and Uribe (1990), based on the criteria for sufficient caloric intake[12]/estimated the risks of malnutrition in 1984-1985. The figures reveal a notable improvement in nutritional standards during the 1970's (table II-3, section B), as a result of lower demographic growth and a substantial improvement in the distribution of income and intake of calories and nutrients.

In 1981, the percentage of the Colombian population facing the risk of malnutrition was reduced by half, till it comprised only the poorest 20%. Nutritional progress amongst the rural population was spectacular, for the percentage of malnourished persons diminished from 72% to 20%. At the urban level the changes were not so positive and the dietary conditions probably remained unchanged. Córdoba and Uribe stress the point that if the minimum and uniform criterion of 1,970 calories per-capita is employed, food insecurity would affect, in 1981, 20% of city inhabitants, a proportion similar to that of 1972. They also note that the average consumption of calories was higher in 1981 than in 1972. In any case the figures reveal an interesting situation: during the 1970's the nutritional problem has been shifting from the rural to the urban zones.

12/ In this case the population facing food security hazards is defined based on a standard for average adequate caloric consumption in homes (divided according to income percentages) of 90% of the recommended dietary allowance.

For the years between 1981 and 1984-1985, only a comparison at an urban level is possible. On examining the percentage of the population which faces nutritional problems, it appears that it has remained practically unchanged. The former should not come as a surprise, since, as will be shown, in that period there occurred a regression in the distribution of urban income as well as in the per-capita caloric consumption.

Income is, intuitively, a primary determinant of nutritional deficiency. In fact, we have seen that the nutritional problem in Colombia is restricted to the poorest fringes of the population, independent of habitat. There should therefore exist a correlation between the level and distribution of a country's income and the nutritional level of its respective population. An attempt to capture this correlation in Colombia is made in II-4, with a comparative analysis of caloric consumption and the distribution of urban income in the years 1972-1981, and 1984-1985.

We can thus appreciate how, on the ten levels, income per-capita improved markedly between 1972 and 1981 and deteriorated between 1981 and 1984. In a corresponding fashion, the average caloric consumption per-capita increased in the first of these two periods and fell in the second. Only the three richest income brackets (deciles 8 to 10) demonstrate tendencies contrary to the average. Their caloric consumption shrank between 1972 and 1981, but increased in the second period. We have seen, however, that

these groups are not amongst those affected by nutritional hazards and that therefore changes in the quantity of consumed nutrients do not affect their dietary conditions.

Recent studies on distribution of income[13]/ highlight an improvement in the distribution of labour earnings after a deterioration registered between 1983 and 1985, favoring principally the poorest 50% of the population. As to 1984-1985, it must be hoped, therefore, that in recent years the nutritional situation of Colombians has improved.

At the same time as the reduction in malnutrition risks after the 1970's, the nutritional composition of the Colombian diet has also improved. Table II-5 contains a list of certain comestible products consumed domestically in the years 1972, 1984, and 1987. For the reasons mentioned earlier these figures should be used as indicators since they constitute a non-stratified average and refer to the apparent daily availability and not to the actual consumption of foodstuffs[14]/.

It is in any case evident that as regards the early 1970's, the consumption patterns of Colombians have modified positively, in the sense of including more nutritious and more expensive products.

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[13]/ See, for example, Moreno A. (1989).

[14]/ In particular, in reference to annual figures, this can reflect unexpected variations in harvests.

TABLE II-4

CALORIE CONSUMPTION
AND URBAN INCOME DISTRIBUTION, 1972-1984

DANE LEVELS 1972	1972 INCOME (A)	1972 CALORIES (B)	1981 INCOME (A)	1981 CALORIES (B)	1984 - 1985 INCOME (A)	1984 - 1985 CALORIES (B)
I						
II						
III						
IV						
V						
VI						
VII						
VIII						
IX						
X						
AVERAGES						

(A) Annual income per-capita in thousands of pesos for 1970.
(B) Daily calorie consumption per-capita.

Source: Córdoba R., Uribe T. (1990), Table 2. p.174.

TABLE II-5

C O L O M B I A
DAILY NET PER-CAPITA FOOD AVAILABILITY (a)
1972, 1984 and 1987

F O O D	1972	1984	1987
BEEF			
PORK			
MUTTON AND GOAT			
POULTRY			
FISH			
EGGS			
FRESH MILK			
WHEAT			
BARLEY			
MAIZE			
RICE			
POTATO			
YUCCA			
YAMS			
GARLIC & ONIONS			
TOMATO			
PLAINTAINS			
BANANAS			
CITRUSES			
PINEAPPLE			
WHITE SUGAR			
BROWN SUGAR			
BEANS			
SOYA			
NUTS			
LENTILS			
COTTON OIL			
SESAME SEED OIL			
SOYA OIL			
PALM OIL			
LARD			

(a) Apparent availability in grams

Source: ICBF (1972), table EH-2, p.10; ICBF (1984), table 2, p.13 and ICBF (1987), table 2, p.23.

In fact, during this period the consumption of eggs and meat, especially beef, poultry and fish, has increased considerably. Wheat and rice have partly replaced yucca, maize, yams, and plaintains, the consumption of which has diminished on Colombian tables. In contrast to the situation in 1972, at present, refined white sugar is preferred to raw brown sugar, and the use of lard seems to practically disappear, replaced by vegetable oils. One surprising fact is that fresh milk has lost space in the Colombian nutritional basket. This, however, may have been accompanied by an increase in the consumption of powdered milk, the availability of which is not addressed here.

In brief, the quality of the Colombian diet has much improved since 1970, at the same time as the incidence of malnutrition has significantly diminished. These indicators suggest that the country's greatest social progress is achieved after the 1970's, and that perhaps the benefits of development in Colombia were distributed less equitatively in the first two post war decades.

Poverty in Colombia, 1973-1985

The National Planning Department (DNP), the DANE, the UNDP, UNICEF and the Ministry of Agriculture have recently published an interesting study on poverty in Colombia[15/]. Five simple indicators have been constructed, based on the census results of

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15/ DANE et.al. (1989).

1973 and 1985: three defining critical housing conditions and the remaining two synthesizing some of the socio-economic characteristics of the home.

Homes in inadequate buildings, lacking basic utilities and suffering from overcrowding, constitute the indicators of the first group. It should be warned that if housing conditions fairly similar to those examined in this chapter are properly taken into account, their definitions do not always coincide exactly with the indicators of table II-1. The other two indexes consider aspects such as income levels and school absenteeism[16]/.

Using all these criteria, all homes which possess at least one of the characteristics defined by the simple indexes are identified as either poor or with unmet basic needs (UBN). In the event of the presence of two or more characteristics, homes are considered to be in a state of misery. In the same way, all persons living in homes with UBN or in misery are classified as being in the same situation[17]/. Defined in these terms, poverty in Colombia in 1985 embraced 45.6% of the total population; 22.8% were in a state of misery (table II-6).

16/ For a more detailed definition of these five simple indexes, see the annex at the end of this chapter.

17/ The native Indian population, for which the five simple indexes were not elaborated, is considered as completely with UBN, but it does not enter into the calculations for persons in misery.

TABLE II-6

I N D I C A T O R S
BY DEPARTMENTS 1973-1985
PERSONS WITH UNSATISFIED BASIC NEEDS (UBN)

DEPARTMENT		PERSONS WITH UBN (%)		PERSONS IN MISERY (%)	
		1973	1985	1973	1985
NATIONAL TOTAL	TOTAL				
	MAIN TOWNS				
	REMAINDER				
BOGOTA	TOTAL				
QUINDIO	TOTAL				
VALLE	TOTAL				
RISARALDA	TOTAL				
SANTANDER	TOTAL				
CALDAS	TOTAL				
META	TOTAL				
ANTIOQUIA	TOTAL				
CUNDINAMARCA	TOTAL				
HUILA	TOTAL				
TOLIMA	TOTAL				
ATLANTICO	TOTAL				
N. SANTANDER	TOTAL				
CAQUETA	TOTAL				
BOYACA	TOTAL				
NARINO	TOTAL				
CAUCA	TOTAL				
CESAR	TOTAL				
BOLIVAR	TOTAL				
MAGDALENA	TOTAL				
GUAJIRA	TOTAL				
SUCRE	TOTAL				
CORDOBA	TOTAL				
CHOCO	TOTAL				
NAT'L TERRIT.	TOTAL				

NOTE: Persons with unsatisfied basic needs include the native Indian population. Persons in misery do not include the native Indian population.

Source: For 1973, DANE (1989B), table I, p.234; for 1985, DANE et.al. (1989), table I.3, p.106.

As always, great contrasts between geographical zones stand out. In the cities, the above percentages are much lower; 32.3% and 12.6% respectively, and the simple indicator with most influence is the one relating to overcrowding[18]/. In contrast, in the countryside the greatest problems are those of basic utilities and structural conditions. The poor constitute a proportion more than double that of the urban sector's, and those living in misery a proportion three times greater.

From a temporary perspective, the most significant advances, once more, are made in main towns, and in particular, the adaptation of housing and the reduction in school absenteeism were the most important factors in the improvement of the quality of urban life. In turn, the demographic tendencies in the rest of the country during the last intercensus period seem to have been important factors in the reduction of poverty, for the shrinkage of the percentage of persons in need is principally due to the significant drop in the indicators of households with persons with children who do not attend school, overcrowding and high economic dependence.

In any case, as much in the countryside as in the cities, it was the poorest of the poor who most benefited; whilst the UBN

18/ For reasons of space, the values of simple indexes are not reported here. The interested reader can consult: DANE (1989b) for the year 1973 and DANE et.al. (1989) for the year 1985.

index dropped to 17.9% (rural) and 45.2% (main towns), the index relative to persons in misery diminished to 34.5% and 58.8% respectively.

At the administrative level there is also evidence of rather different situations. The special district of Bogotá, the primary industrial and political center of the country, shows the lowest percentage of persons in need. In general, a lower percentage of persons with UBN is associated with industrial development or with the existence of commercialized and technologically advanced agriculture or a coffee based economy. This explains why Bogotá is followed by the departments of Valle, Quindío, Risaralda, Caldas, Antioquia, Atlántico and Santander. In these regions of the country less than 40% of the total population is classified as UBN[19]/ and those in misery constitute 20%.

In the departments with an intermediate level of agricultural and industrial development, the poor constitute less than half the total population and those in misery comprise roughly 1/4 of the inhabitants counted by the census. This is the case in Meta, Cundinamarca, Huila, and Tolima.

In the remaining administrative divisions of the country, poverty envelops the majority of the population. The situation is

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[19]/ Excluding the departments of Santander (43.6%) and Atlántico (41.5%).

particularly severe in Sucre and Córdoba, where persons in misery amount to 55% of the total population. In Chocó 82.8% of the population have basic needs which are not satisfied.

Between 1973 and 1975 the three large groups into which the country's departments have been divided have experienced different rates of progress in the improvement of the quality of life of their populations.

Conditions of poverty have been overcome most rapidly in the departments with the highest economic development, while the regions in the last group have been characterized by much slower responses to basic insufficiencies. In the majority of these, this retardation is associated with important demographic growth, and in some cases (Chocó and Guajira) there is a registered increase in one or more of the simple indexes of poverty.

Conclusions

Without any doubt, during the last forty years the conditions of life in Colombia have improved substantially. This is confirmed by the examination of all the considered indexes of welfare.

The satisfaction of Colombians' needs, however, has not been a uniform process, either chronologically or on a geographical

level. In general, progress has been most rapid since the 1960's, in accordance with a slackening of the rate of population growth.

During the period 1964-1973 the diffusion of public services was the principal objective, although the efforts in this area diminished in the following years with the exception of rural electrification. Conversely, we have seen that during this same period of 1964-1973, the nutritional conditions appear to have deteriorated.

During the last intercensus period, a more equitative distribution of income, the launching of the UPAC system, the mass housing plans, and once more, the contraction of the population growth rate were the principal causes of the improvements in the indicators considered here. In this way, great advances steps were made in terms of housing conditions and school absenteeism; more Colombians became owners of their own homes and benefited from a more complete and richer nutritional diet.

With respect to the satisfaction of the basic needs of Colombians, the rural areas have almost always lagged behind. However, recent efforts to extend the electrical network in the countryside, and the fact that the rural population as a whole is much better nourished cannot be ignored.

An analysis of the poverty indicators at a departmental level between 1973 and 1985 confirms unequivocably the hypothesis that economic development does not only create new needs but also creates the conditions with which to fulfill them. We therefore have that in the country's two principal development zones, the Andean zone and the coffee zones, the population enjoys standards of living which are clearly superior to those of the national average, as much in the countryside as in the cities. At the other extreme, the regions of Norte de Santander, Boyacá, Chocó, the National Territories, the Southern Pacific zone, and the Atlantic coastal region (with the exception of the department of Atlántico), are the least advanced in terms of the provision of minimum levels of welfare. In these regions of the country there is still much to be done in order to eradicate the poverty of the inhabitants, especially those of the rural zones.

Annex

Unsatisfied Basic Needs (UBN) constitutes a direct method for measuring poverty. This consists in determining some basic human needs and in setting standards of minimum satisfaction for each one of these.

The DANE et.al.[20]/ have constructed this index based on census information from 1973 and 1985. In the first instance five simple indexes of poverty were selected, namely:

1. People living in inadequate housing

This represents an indicator of the physical characteristics of the dwelling. Constructions classed as inadequate were:

- Mobile, without walls or with exterior walls of cloth or scraps. Natural shelters or bridges.
- With dirt flors in urban areas (capitals).
- With dirt flors and walls of inferior construction materials[21]/ in rural zones (countryside).

2. Persons in homes without basic services

This expresses lack of water supply and sanitation. It includes persons occupying dwellings:

- Without either water supply hookups or santiation in urban areas.
- Without water supply or sanitation in rural zones.

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[20]/ (fr. DANE et.al. (1989).

[21]/ Clay and sticks, large bamboo, reeds or wood.

3. **Persons in dwellings with critical overcrowding**

With this indicator an attempt is made to capture critical levels of occupation. Included in this category are all individuals living in houses with more than three people per room (including sitting room, dining room and bedrooms and excluding kitchen, bathroom and garage).

4. **Persons in households with high economic dependence**

This constitutes an indirect indicator of income levels. Classed in this group were all members of households with more than three inactive persons for every employed member and in which, simultaneously, the head had a maximum of two years of primary education.

5. **Persons in households with school-age children who do not attend school**

This measures the satisfaction of the minimum educational needs of the child population. It includes occupants of households with at least one child between 1 to 11 years who does not attend a formal center of education and is also a relative of the head of household.

A compound indicator was created from these five simple indicators, classifying persons with unmet basic needs as those

living in homes which fall into at least one of the categories established by these simple indicators. In the event that the households possess two or more of these characteristics, the inhabitants are classified as living in misery.

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CHAPTER III

TENDENCIES IN INCOME DISTRIBUTION

INTRODUCTION

The social results of the process of growth depend on what happens to income distribution. Changes in this area determine whether development benefits are concentrated in a few hands or, conversely, directed towards all sectors of the population.

The Increase in per capita income is a good measure of economic development, as it means that goods and services produced by the economy grow more rapidly than the population, but it does not show which social groups the resources are being channelled. This chapter will attempt to trace the distribution process in the last forty years and the factors which may have influenced its evolution.

There are many factors which determine income distribution. Numbered amongst these are demographic growth, migration from the countryside to the city, the specific type of industrialization pursued by the country, different regional developments, redistributive government policies, and family expenditures on health and education.

DEFINITIONS AND LIMITS OF INCOME INDICATORS

Personal income distribution is the theme of this chapter. This term designates income received by persons or families, independent of origin. An individual may have diverse sources of income: work earnings, interests received on savings, resources obtained, for example, through the rental of a property, or the profits of a business.

The term personal distribution is used in contrast with functional income distribution, which refers to capital and labour earnings. It is evident that a strong relation exists between the two distributions, but using only the second category does not permit comprehension of the structure and composition of income recipients according to socio-economic levels, who possess, as was noted earlier, a mixture of incomes from diverse sources. In this way, it cannot be inferred that a rise in salary earnings (functional distribution) will translate directly into better personal income distribution for all if only the salaries of some highly qualified workers increase. However, the structure of functional distribution helps to explain the evolution of an important element in personal distribution, such as the labour factor. Its structure with respect to the GDP can be seen in table III-1, in which income for independent labour is also included. Also shown is the improvement between 1951 and 1963 of labour earnings and their progressive deterioration until 1977, the year

GRAPH III-1

LABOUR EARNINGS IN THE GDP
(%)

(viene el gráfico)

Source: Ocampo J.A. (1989), p.420

TABLE III-1

URBAN SECTOR
ACCUMULATED SHARE IN INCOME

YEAR	POOREST POPULATION			
	10%	50%	90%	95%
1964				
1965(a)				
1967(a)				
1970				
1971				
1971(a)				
1972(a)				
1974				
1974(a)				
1975				
1975(a)				
1982				
1988				

(a) Households
Source: Aguilar L. (1989), p.20. Londoño J. (1989), p.137.

in which their recovery began. Variations in terms of labour do not translate directly into a reduction in the concentration of personal income, as will be seen later.

A distinction should also be made as regards distribution between families and between individuals. It is important to obtain for the period of analysis the family distribution of personal income, given that it is this unit which absorbs expenditure and that it contains persons who earn income and others who do not. The limitation to this type of aggregation of income is the difficulty in accounting for some income determinants such as education or experience, which are individual.

An inevitable obstacle in studies of the evolution of income distribution is the difficulty in comparing different income sources, for they have not always received equal study, and in general, require different methodologies[1/].

INCOME DISTRIBUTION IN COLOMBIA

There are no reliable systematic studies on income distribution for the period prior to 1951, but there are indicators showing the situation of the population's standard of living since 1920. It is

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1/ A presentation of the diverse sources and methodologis used to calculate the distribution of income in Colombia can be seen in ECLA (1988).

important to consider a period prior to 1950, given that changes in distributive processes occur over relatively long periods of time.

Some indicators for the period 1920-1960

Between 1920 and 1947 economic development and increase in per-capita income were both significant, but the benefits of growth were distributed in an unequal manner. Farmers were those who least benefited from output growth. On the contrary, it was capital and land owners and specialized urban workers who profited most. In 1947, 88% of the population received less than 60% of income. Rural poverty was linked to the unequal distribution of land and lack of education[2/].

In 1953 the poorest 49% of the population received 26% of national income. The richest 5% collected 41% of national income. This supposes that the middle-income bracket obtained 33% of total income. It was determined that the families of labourers and small land-owners in the agricultural sector represented the lowest-income group. The poverty in this sector was due to the under-exploitation of capital and labour resources, associated with slow technological progress and production organization[3/].

2/ See International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (1950).

3/ See ECLA (1957).

The concentration of income at the end of the fifties was such that barely 10% of the population received earnings superior to the average income; measured as total national income divided by number of inhabitants; while the poorest 80% earned less than this. Comparing the Colombian situation with that of the developed countries, it was found that the incomes in the highest brackets in these countries were equal to four times the average, while in Colombia they were eight or nine times higher. An explanation for this situation can be found in a greater contribution of profits and interests to income, as opposed to labour earnings[4]/.

The studies demonstrate that the distribution of total income deteriorated between 1920 and the end of the 1950's. The rural sector was the major contributor to this inequality. This was due to land distribution, to the bias against agriculture on the part of most import substitution policies, and also to the expansion of commercial agriculture, characterized by a decreasing demand for labour. Industrial protectionism was also linked to the deterioration of income distribution in the urban sector[5]/.

It is important to bear in mind the relationship between the urban and rural sectors, since the last phase of this period brings

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
4/ See Mision Economía y Humanismo (1958).

5/ See Urrutia, M., Berry A. (1975) and Aguilar L., Perfetti J. (1957).

GRAPH III-2

LORENZ CURVES
NATIONAL 1970 AND 1988

INCOME



POPULATION

1970 1988

Source: Córdoba P. (1973), p. 71. -Londoño J. (1989), p.137

the commencement of a migration process from the countryside to the city, a determining factor in the country's economic growth[6]/.

Income distribution after 1960

Within the limitations mentioned earlier, after 1964 a greater supply of figures are available, permitting the estimate of a trajectory of income distribution in Colombia. To achieve this, two continuous complementary sources of information are employed: one, the share of income per population group, and the other, the utilization of a concentration index, the Gini coefficient. The first allows the observation of movements in the shares of the different groups in the urban and rural sectors and the national total. In this way, a better distribution of income can be inferred if the top level loses shares in the national total, or if the lower population group gains. The Gini coefficient, on the other hand, places the degree of concentration in one indicator. It is common to divide the population into five or ten equal parts and comparisons are thus made between shares in the total income of each tenth or fifth of the population.

Graph III-2 shows accumulated shares of the national total income for the years 1971 and 1988. The concentration is greater the further away the curves (called Lorenz curves) are from the diagonal. The diagonal represents equitative distribution. The Gini

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6/ Chapter 7 reffers to this process in detail.

coefficient is the quotient in which the numerator is the area contained between the Lorenz curve and the diagonal, and the denominator corresponds to the triangle formed by the diagonal and the axes. Its interpretation is simple: as the coefficient nears the unit, the concentration is greater.

Tables III-1 to III-3 demonstrate the accumulated shares of income, according to different studies. It is indicated whether the information refers to individuals or to households. Graph III-1 pertains to the urban sector. Judging from this, its behavioural tendencies are very similar to those of the rural sector shown in graph III-2. Despite the fact that the figures do not present a clear trajectory, due to substantial differences in the scope and quality of the samples used to make the calculations, it would seem that the richest 5% experience a substantial drop in their share of national income. Although not with the same force, the poorest 10% gain some share and, although the share of the poorer 50% goes up by a few points, it only obtains 20% of total income.

It can be observed in greater detail that in 1964 the richest 5% of the urban population received 32% of income. After 1971, this share begins to decrease, reaching 20% in 1988 (graph III-1). On the other hand, the poorest 10%, which in 1964 possessed less than 1% of income, improves its share slightly until 1971, and with later variations reaches a share of roughly 2% in 1988. Following the same behavioural pattern between 1964 and 1988, the 50% with

TABLE III-2

RURAL SECTOR
ACCUMULATED SHARE IN INCOME

YEAR	POOREST POPULATION			
	10%	50%	90%	95%
1964				
1965(a)				
1970				
1971				
1971(a)				
1972				
1972(a)				
1982(a)				
1988				

(a) Households
Source: Aguilar L. (1989), p.20. Londoño J. (1989), p.137.

TABLE III-3

C O L O M B I A
ACCUMULATED SHARE IN INCOME

YEAR	POOREST POPULATION			
	10%	50%	90%	95%
1964				
1970				
1971				
1971(a)				
1972				
1972(a)				
1974				
1974(a)				
1988				

(a) Households
Source: Aguilar L. (1988), p.23. Londoño J. (1989), p.137.

least income increases its share from 16% of the total to 20%. The drop in the share of the richest tenth has been mostly absorbed by the population groups in the top 50%. In fact, the differential in share in income between the fifth and ninth divisions rises from 40.5 in 1964 to 47.5 in 1988.

In 1964, in the rural sector (graph III-2), income was concentrated on the richest 5%, but the poorest tenth received a larger share of income than in the urban sector. In contrast with the urban areas, there is an important improvement in the share of the poorest tenth at the beginning of the seventies. However, after 1972 this part of the population loses participation. During the whole period the transfer of income from the richest tenth is appropriated principally by the next 40%, as in the urban sector.

The national total experiences the same tendencies as the urban and rural sectors between 1964 and 1988, without particular distortions in the 1970's. In 1988 there is an improvement in the lowest tenth, and the poorer 50% receive a little more of the trickledown from the top 10%, but in general, it is clear that overall, the deconcentration of income was due to a recomposition of income amongst the top 50%.

The Gini coefficients presented in graph III-4 also show the improvement in income distribution in the relevant period. A tendency towards equality of distribution between the urban and

rural sectors should be pointed out here. Referring only to the Gini coefficients, it can be asserted that there has been an improvement in total distribution since 1973. Urban and rural distributions have clearly improved since 1982[7]/.

The best indexes, however, do not demonstrate an equitative allocation of income. In the case of Colombia it seems to be confirmed that the greatest benefits are appropriated by the richest groups. However, the reduction of this concentration could have led to the elimination of absolute poverty. This does not refer directly to the relative position of the poorest levels compared to the rest, but rather to the system's capacity to satisfy basic needs. In order to determine basic needs, an arbitrary criterion of a minimum real income is used as a dividing line between those who are poor and those who are not. This aspect will be treated in greater detail in the next section.

Determinants of income distribution

In a pioneer article on the determinants of income distribution in the developed countries, Kuznets[8]/ asks why the participation of the groups with highest income tends to decrease over time, given

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7/ The strong variations in the calculation of the indexes, even for the same year, as can be seen in the table, demonstrate once more the metholodogical problems of the range of the samples.

8/ Kuznets, S. (1955).

that the concentration of savings, which are done mostly by these groups, should further concentrate income. He also asks why inequality is reduced, or why the participation of the poorest groups increases if there is growth in the urban sector, which, in general, has greater degrees of inequality and per capita income.

Kuznets responds to the second question (after completing some exercises in which he supposes that there are no population changes and that the urban sector increases its share of income, at the same time as it increases its per-capita income and it maintains an equal or more unequal distribution than the rural sector) in the following way: he argues for the existence of a model in which a higher concentration can exist at first, but as industrialization or the urbanization process increases, the proportion of persons earning the higher urban salaries also increases, thereby reducing the proportion of the poorest groups in society.

The simple model can be fitted to the Colombian case. The demographic change, especially from the migration to the cities, is important in explaining the increased share in income of the poorest groups, up to 1973, in the rural sector. As can be seen in table III-5, the urban population has grown at much higher rates than the rural and total population. The urban distribution of income may deteriorate, but the national distribution improves in any case due to the reduction of the proportion of the population living in the countryside and earning low salaries. In addition,

TABLE III-4

GINI COEFFICIENTS

YEAR	UNIT	URBAN	RURAL	NATIONAL
1964	Individuals			
1965	Households			
1967	Households			
1967	Households			
1970	Individuals			
1971	Individuals			
1971	Households			
1972	Households			
1972	Individuals			
1975	Individuals			
1975	Households			
1982	Households			
1982	Households			
1988	Individuals			

Source: Aguilar L. (1989), p.28. Londoño J. (1989), p.137

the permanent reduction of the population growth rates has led to an improvement in the distribution of the national total.

In terms of economic policy, perhaps most interesting is Kuznets's response to the first question. That is, reasons for the historic reduction in the income share of the richest sections of the population. The factors opposing the concentration of income in the richest groups are: government intervention and the consequences of the industrialization process.

Among the forms of goverment intervention are income and expenditure policies and forms of price control. Taxation policy in Colombia has been directed, especially in recent years, towards funding government income by means of indirect taxes. This method of obtaining resources ignores the criterion of redistributary intervention. However, it is evident that without an efficient tax administration system, taxation is not the method best suited to obtaining improvements in income distribution[9]/. Public spending appears to be a better redistributive mechaninsm.

With regard to public spending, especially social spending, emphasis should be laid on the strong push given to educational

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9/ "(...) The possibilities of ensuring a change in distribution by means of taxation policy are limited, especially when considering the impact of taxation on economic development. It can be better achieved, however, through an appropriate policy of expenditure". Musgrave, R. (1969) p.229.

development in the mid-1950's. A large part of the structural change in Colombian society is due to the drastic reduction of illiteracy, as shown in Chapter II. All estimates on the role of education in the generation of income, and therefore, in the reduction of inequality show that educated persons receive higher incomes than non-educated persons. However, there are great differences between the countryside and the city -and not only in the area of education- which impede a greater reduction of inequality. Educational levels in the rural sector are very low: 28% of heads of family are illiterate, and 50% have only an incomplete primary education. Only 8% of rural inhabitants have a level of education higher than primary. Differences in income, as might be expected, are much higher between those who have finished primary and those who have not, than between illiterates and those who have not completed primary[10/].

Other types of expenditure, such as those on health or housing, do not show the growth tendency maintained by educational expenditure. Despite the importance these types of expenditure represent for the general welfare of the population, and the generation of family income, they have often been manipulated as variables for the adjustment of macroeconomic tendencies[11/].

10/ Aguilar L.; Perfetti J. (1987); p.136.

11/ See Fedesarrollo (1989), p.11.

TABLE III-5

POPULATION GROWTH
1938-1985
ANNUAL PERCENTAGE RATES

YEAR	URBAN POPULATION	RURAL POPULATION	NATIONAL POPULATION
1938-1951			
1951-1964			
1964-1973			
1973-1977			
1977-1981			
1981-1985			

Source: Lora E. (1989), p.53.

The impact of salary policy is uncertain. The setting of a minimum wage is an important tool of intervention, but the increase in minimum wage tends to mostly favour the middle sectors of the population. Likewise, it cannot be denied that part of the favorable effect of increases in the minimum wage in workers' incomes is eroded by the lower demand for labour on the part of businesses and by greater unemployment. Although the urban-rural differential of minimum wages has diminished, the salary differentials between city and countryside do not demonstrate a clear tendency which permits the confirmation of the theory that changes in differentials caused by the minimum wage policy have contributed to a decrease in the concentration of income (Table III-6).

There are also other types of policies which can assist in the reduction of inequality and in aiding the poorest sectors of the population. A large part of the factors explaining rural poverty at the beginning of the century were determined by the poor distribution of land. The attempts of agrarian reform to correct this distortion in the countryside have not been backed by the necessary political will. But poverty in the countryside will probably not be reduced by a simple policy of land redistribution. Some estimates show that households with property receive less income than those without. Property can therefore be an obstacle, as it impedes the mobility of the labour force, or because the reduced size of lands, if other sources of earnings are

TABLE III-6

AVERAGE SALARIES
IN DIFFERENT SECTORS
Expressed as a proportion of national income per-capita
(Current prices)

YEARS	INDUSTRY	GOVERNMENT	CONSTRUC.	AGRICULT.
1950-1954				
1955-1959				
1960-1964				
1965-1969				
1970-1974				
1975-1979				
1980-1984				

1 1953
2 Excludes 1975.
Source: Ocampo J.A. (1989), p.422.

unavailable, limits work productivity and reduces family income[12/].

The second factor mentioned by Kuznets, referring to the consequences of the industrialization process and urbanization, is more open to speculation, but it is not less important. Increases in productivity, greater relations between labour and output, and between economic growth and increase in per-capita income, as well as the development of business capacities, can affect the reduction of income concentration.

With a final reference to the question of whether the poorest actually benefit from the process of deconcentration, one indicator for measuring "poverty intensity" is to divide the real salary of an unqualified worker by the number of people dependent on him. Table III-7 presents the index for the rural and urban sectors. It is observed that the urban sector shows better indexes of real family earnings in the poorest homes. The rural sector shows that, from 1950 to the beginning of the seventies, the real wage per person in the home remained constant. From that point on, there has been a clear improvement.

A recent study[13/] contends that in the eighties the reduction of poverty in the rural sector was caused by the increase

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12/ Aguilar L., Perfetti J. (1987) p.157.

13/ PREALC/OIT (1990).

TABLE III-7

REAL WAGE INDEX
1951-1986
(1972-1974 = 100)

YEARS	BY HOUSEHOLD MEMBERS (1972-1974 = 100)	
	RURAL	URBAN(a)
1950-1952		
1963-1965		
1969-1971		
1972-1974		
1977-1979		
1984-1986		

(A) Construction worker
Source: Ocampo J.A. (1989), p.425.

in employment and the growth of small scale production. As to the cities, although unemployment increased, the dynamism of the informal sector, in particular of small businesses, was able to absorb the displaced labour force. Although the informalizing of the economy has favoured the reduction of poverty in the last few years, it remains to be seen whether this process will allow, in the long-term, an adequate growth in national output, a factor which has been the determining one in the attainment of lower concentration indexes by means of increases in labour demand.

Conclusions

Based on the fragmentary data available for the years prior to 1964, it can be affirmed that up until this year, the indexes of income concentration had been rising. After the mid-seventies, conversely, there is a tendency towards a better distribution of income.

Although per-capita output in Colombia has increased, this does not mean that the fruits of development have been equitatively distributed. On the contrary, the reduction in the concentration indexes is due to the shrinkage of the income share of the richest ten percent and a redistribution amongst the richer 50% of the population. However, as a result of the increase in total income, the poverty indexes were reduced, since the poorest families did not lose any of their share in the total.

There are many factors which have influenced a better distribution of income in the last forty years. Two of the most important aspects are the growth of the economy and the greater contribution of the cities to total output. Both phenomena have also led to a higher level of per-capita income.

Other factors have contributed to the reduction of the concentration indexes, such as state intervention through public spending, the decrease in population growth rates, and the effects of industrial growth on the behaviour of social and economic variables. It has been observed that although government intervention has played a constructive role, such as in the case of education, it would be possible to intensify redistributive policies in order to ensure that the benefits of development reach the poorest sectors of the population, and that income distribution does not improve solely through redistribution amongst the richer 50%.

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CHAPTER IV

THE DEMOGRAPHIC TRANSITION

INTRODUCTION

The theory of demographic transition characterizes premodern societies by their high mortality rates and their equally high birth rates. In these conditions, population growth is limited by population mortality and the survival of the species is guaranteed by an elevated birth rate which compensates for the attrition by deaths.

As to modern societies, the histories of the most advanced Western nations demonstrate how the modernization process is first accompanied by reductions in mortality rates, and only in a second instance, affects birth rates. In fact, economic development, with the subsequent improvements in health, education, nutrition etc. has brought, at first, "population explosions" or increases in population growth rates. Only when contraception and changes in attitude towards the family begin to have an impact on the number of children per woman does the growth rate recede, and the countries begin to experience growth rates similar to those existing before the drop in mortality rates. This phenomenon is known in literature as a "demographic transition".

As will be seen, the experience of the European countries showed, in addition, that only over very long periods of time (more than a century for certain countries) could countries complete a demographic transition. Based on this, the population projections for Latin America were hardly encouraging in the middle of this century, when the countries of the region had already experienced a significant reduction of mortality rates. However, by the end of the 1970's a good part of the countries of the subcontinent had dramatically reduced their gross birth rates, showing decreases of 20% to 40% in countries such as Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, the Dominican Republic and Panama.

The reasons for the pessimism that prevailed in the first half of the century were, however, forceful: in barely 30 years the mortality rates had notably decreased while, at the same time, fertility rates remained relatively stable. In Colombia, life expectancy at birth increased from 44 years in 1938 to 61 in 1978; the gross mortality rate went from 30.5 per thousand to 9 per thousand; and, as for infant mortality, the reduction was one of 200.2 per thousand to 61 per thousand.

In the European countries, changes in mortality rates had occurred over a period of ninety years, and history taught that the required time for reducing birth rates was well over 30 years: 150 for Finland and 40 for Poland, for example. In Latin America, the best examples of descent "had been Argentina and Uruguay, the only

countries on the subcontinent which by the 1950's had already completed the demographic transition, although it had required nearly sixty years and a great influx of immigrants"[1/].

However, by 1965 fertility rates were showing important signs of descent, confirming a hypothesis defended by some authors, according to which a drop in mortality is followed, albeit with a few years of delay, by a drop in fertility.

The overall fertility rate in Colombia, i.e. the total number of births per woman at the end of her reproductive period (50 years of, age) fell from 7.04 in the period 1960-1964 to 4.6 between 1972 and 1973 and to 3.4 in 1980. That is, a reduction of almost 50% in less than 20 years.

The speed at which the demographic transition has taken place in Colombia has been termed by various authors as unprecedented. The drop in gross birth rates between 1950 and 1980 was one of 35%, a figure surpassed only by Cuba (40%), Hong Kong (40%) and Singapore (36%) in similar periods. Countries such as Chile, South Korea, Malaysia, Costa Rica and Taiwan, which have also experienced notable changes in fertility rates, show slower rates of descent.

Various factors contributed to the process of demographic transition in Colombia. Without doubt, the expansion process of

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1/ Ochoa L.H. (1981).

urbanization, the expansion of education, and the greater participation of women in the labour market are responsible. The ways in which these changes affected patterns of mortality and fertility will be explored next.

Changes in mortality rates

The first point to be stressed is the rapid descent in mortality rates experienced by the country between 1930 and 1970. An explanation for this can be found in the substantial changes in the areas of health and education during these years. In fact, in the 1950's Colombia launches massive health campaigns for disease prevention, causing a considerable acceleration in the rate of descent or the mortality rate after these years, as will be seen. Second, the substantial increase in public expenditure on education, commencing in 1956, has a similar effect. By virtue of this, illiteracy rates fall from 47.7% in 1938 to 20.6% in 1973. And primary education, which in 1951 reaches only 56.2%, rises to 89% in 1976. Different studies reveal the important impact which the increase in education has on health, and the relatively rapid response of mortality patterns to the changes in educational levels. The expansion of education effectively increases public awareness of nutrition and disease prevention.

Finally, the urbanization process, which between 1950 and 1970 practically reversed the proportion of inhabitants in the

countryside and the city, serves to reinforce this tendency, by permitting a greater access to education, health and public services such as purified water.

As a result of this, life expectancy at birth has increased constantly during this century, showing gains in average survival "of approximately half a year of life for each calendar year"[2]/. Of this change, 15 years, or 80% of the gains, occurred between 1944 and 1986. This means that during this first period, the gain in years of life expectancy increased at an average of almost four years per half decade. Between 1944 and 1985, colombians have increased their life expectancy by 23 years. Given that life is highly prized by the majority of persons, an increase of this magnitude in life expectancy implies a very large improvement in the welfare of the population. The improvement in health also aids general welfare with a diminishing number of average days of illness.

This descent in mortality rates preceded by nearly thirty years the response of fertility rates, which show signs of slackening only at the end of the sixties. As a result, the country experienced a very rapid population growth between 1930 and 1970,

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2/ Summary, Tercera Encuesta Nacional de Prevalencia del uso de Anticonceptivo y Primera de Demografía y Salud - (Third National Survey of Prevalence of Use of Contraceptives and first of Population and Health), CCRP, (1989) (ENP).

which reached its highest peak in the 1960's with annual growth rates of 3.2%.

In response to the worrisome population explosion presented by Colombia in the mid-sixties, the government and private groups began to direct their efforts towards birth control and family planning, managing to impact population growth in a surprisingly short time.

Changes in fertility rates

Amongst the factors which certainly affected the drop in fertility, the following should be emphasized. First, the rapid population growth mentioned earlier alerted the government to the need to implement policies to slow it down, which, even if it was not expressed as a population policy per se, was reflected in the implementation of programs designed to promote birth control.

Thus, for example, in 1968 the government approved a law regarding paternal responsibility, whose objective was to reduce the number of illegitimate births. In the same vein, and within the policy on population proposed in the National Plan for Development of the time, PROFAMILIA initiated the first rural program of Community Contraception Distribution in Latin America. In 1974, this program was expanded to the urban zones.

In a parallel manner, at the end of the 1960's private enterprise started to become involved in the area of family planning. The Colombian Association of Medical Faculties (ASCOFAME) started activities in this field in 1965, including the training of doctors in these subjects.

Although various authors cite the difficulty in linking family planning campaigns to drops in fertility rates over relatively short periods of time, it is certain that given the conditions in the country at that time, that is, the changes taking place both in education and in population distribution between cities and the countryside and, in general, given the modernization process Colombia was then undergoing, information and the availability of contraception methods must have accelerated the process.

The impact of the above programs has been notable. The data used to evaluate these policies are recent but give an idea of the speed with which they can affect the population. Between 1978 and 1980, for example, the level of contraception awareness for women in rural zones aged 15 to 19 increased from 75% to 84%. In the Pacific zone, which had the lowest levels of awareness, the increase was even move spectacular, rising from 65% to 85%. At present, 99% of all women know of at least one contraceptive method.

In addition, there has been an important change in the uses of different contraceptive methods, increasing the proportion of women using modern devices (the Pill, condom, IUD, male or female sterilization, spermicidal jellies and creams) versus those who continue to use traditional methods (rhythm, withdrawal). Thus in the urban zones the proportion of women utilizing modern methods rose from 23% in 1969 to 45% in 1980. In the countryside, the variation was from 6% in 1969 to 31% in 1980.

Use of contraception has been increasing, to the point that in 1986 64.3% of women exposed to pregnancy risks employed birth control. This figure contrasts with 43% in 1976 and 48% in 1978. Amongst the most widely used are the Pill, the intrauterine device (IUD) and female sterilization.

All of the above are doubtless related to the increase in levels of education. It has clearly depressive effects on fertility rates, not only because better education permits a break with the cultural tradition of "the more children the better", but because it increases, first, the opportunity costs of maternity, and second the costs of having children, which rise along with parental expectations and the possibility of offering them higher levels of education.

Equally, the country's very rapid urbanization process must have contributed also, as much to the drop in mortality as to the

drop in fertility, since the greater employment opportunities outside the home for women in the urban zones also reduce the desired number of children.

Thus, urbanization, industrialization and education were accompanied by important social and cultural changes, which can be detected, for example, in the number of children desired by women of different ages in the country. Certain figures give a clear idea of the impact of these factors on the cultural change regarding womens' attitude to family: according to the prevalence of contraceptive use survey of 1986[3/], while the ideal average of children for women between 15 and 19 years of age was 2.4, for women between 45 and 49 the figure was 4.

The number of desired children obviously varies according to regions and the educational level of women. By regions, the highest average, for women of all ages, is that of the Atlantic coast, where the ideal average is 3 children. In the rest of the country, the figure presently oscilates between 2.4 and 2.7.

Equally, significant differences are observed between the city and the countryside. The ideal average in the rural zones exceeds the corresponding urban average by one child. Differentiating according to levels of education and zone of residence, the difference is of 1.1 for women with further education. Amongst

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3/ ENP, Op.cit.

totally non-educated women, the relation is 2.3 children for city residents and 3.4 for rural inhabitants.

Finally, the increased female participation in the labour market and the increase in the levels of female education affect marriage patterns, delaying the formation of unions and therefore reducing the incidence of pregnancy. In 1986, women with further education tended to marry after the age of 25, i.e., after completing their studies. The average age of marriage for women without education, however, was 18.

All of the former have combined to notably reduce fertility rates in Colombia. Thus, if at the end of the 1960's the average number of children per woman was 6, in the mid-eighties this figure was situated at about 3.3 children. The greatest acceleration in the decrease in fertility was experienced in the 1970's, a period in which the reduction was by an average of 2.2 children per woman. In the eighties, this reduction has been by 0.6 children/woman.

By regions, the one which presents the highest fertility rate at the present time is the Atlantic, with an average of 3.6 children per woman (see Table IV-1). The lowest rate is in the eastern region, where the average is 3.1 children per woman.

TABLE IV-1

AVERAGE NUMBER OF CHILDREN PER WOMAN

REGION	1951	1964	1973	1985
ATLANTIC				
EASTERN				
CENTRAL				
PACIFIC				
TOTAL				

Source: 1951, 1964, 1973, 1985 censuses.

Demographic impact

The notable drops in fertility and mortality rates already mentioned had a significant impact on the demographic structure of the country. In fact the Colombian population has shown an ageing tendency. As can be seen in Table IV-2, after the population boom of the 1960's, which concentrated 18% of the population in the 0-5 age group, in 1987 this age group represented 13%, a percentage inferior to that of 1951 (16%). With respect to the above, a study completed at the beginning of the 1980's[4]/ concluded: "Had the Colombian population continued growing with the dynamism of the period prior to 1963, the number of persons younger than 15 would have risen in 1983 to 15 million, 81% more than the 8.3 million which there were in the country in 1963". Conversely, in 1987 the under-15 population was only 11.8 million. The same study also noted: "The future evolution of fertility will show for the year 2003 an under-15 population of 6 million less than would have been produced at 1973 fertility rates, and barely 21% more than the 1973 population".

This is reflected in the decreasing population growth rates, which as observed in table IV-3, were of 32 per thousand annually between 1951 and 1964 and fell to an annual 21.3 per thousand in the period 1973-1985.

4/ Ochoa, L.H. (1982).

TABLE IV-2

POPULATION DISTRIBUTION
BY AGE GROUPS
(Percentage Share)

AGE	1951	1964	1973	1987
0-4				
5-9				
10-14				
15-19				
20-24				
25-29				
30-34				
35-39				
40-44				
45-49				
50-54				
55-59				
60-64				
65-69				
70-74				
75 AND OLDER				

Sources: 1951, 1964, 1973 censuses. 1987 Colombia en cifras, DANE 1989.

TABLE IV-3

POPULATION DISTRIBUTION
MAIN TOWNS AND REST 1951-1985

YEARS	POPULATION THOUS OF INHAB.		MAIN TOWN POPULATION %	ANNUAL RATES OF GROWTH (BY THOUS.)		
	MAIN TOWNS	REST		MAIN TOWNS	REST	TOTAL
1951						
1964						
1973						
1985						

Source: "La pobreza en Colombia", DANE et.al. 1989.

However, since the Colombian population is still very young, the growth rate is nowhere near zero. Taking 1980 as a point of reference, people between 15 and 50 at that time had been born between 1930 and 1965, a period of high fertility rates. Those younger than 15 in 1980, are in contrast the survivors of births which took place between 1965 and 1980, a period in which fertility rates fell rapidly. In the same way, the population of 20 year olds for the year 2000 is already basically determined by the population in 1980.

On the basis of this demographic structure, projections of future population growth forecast the following: "If colombian women had decided to reproduce at replacement levels (net reproduction rate equal to 1.0, i.e. slightly more than 2 children per woman) after 1973-1978, the country's population would keep growing up until 2050, at which point it would stabilize around 38 million, 66% more than the 1973 population (...) If, on the contrary, the level of replacement was attained at the beginning of the 21st century (which would occur if present trends continued in a consistent fashion), the final population reached would be almost 60 million for the year 2065"5/.

5/ Ochoa, L.H. (1982), Op.cit.

Conclusions

As a result of the important changes in the patterns of mortality and fertility which the country underwent in a very short time, the demographic transition was consolidated in Colombia in only 30 years, surpassing the most optimistic projections possible in 1960.

Present population growth rates are equal to those of between 1938 and 1951, but the reasons for this are radically opposed: during the first half of the century, the population growth was the result of high fertility rates accompanied by significant mortality rates. At present, demographic growth, explosive in the 1960's, has been halted thanks to considerable reductions in fertility as well as mortality.

This is reflected by a demographic structure which begins to age as the population of 0-15 years diminishes. However, given that changes in fertility have very long-term repercussions upon the age structure of a country, the participation of persons of a fertile age is still extremely important, so zero growth for the Colombian population is still far off. This will be achieved, following present tendencies in mortality and fertility patterns, towards the year 2065, when Colombia will have a population of roughly 60 million people.

In order to ensure that population growth does not exceed this projection, it is important to continue to support the policies of education, health, birth control information and subsidies for paternal responsibility and the creation of female employment which have had such good results in the last few decades. The demographic problem has not disappeared and fertility continues at excessively high levels precisely in the poorest regions of the country.

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CHAPTER V

THE WOMEN'S REVOLUTION

INTRODUCTION

The development of Colombia in the second half of the twentieth century brought with it fundamental changes in the conditions of women. The industrialization process and the accelerated urbanization which characterized the Colombian evolution of these forty years resulted in a significant drop in fertility rates, a substantial rise in educational levels, and a rapid increase in female participation in the labour market.

In only 30 years, the Colombian State went from regarding women as under-age minors to being managed, in a large part of its functions, by women: in 1945 a timid law granted women citizenship but without the right to vote or to be elected; at the end of the 1980's Colombia had one of the ministerial cabinets with the most women in the world, and a relatively important female participation in high-level national positions.

The profound transformation of the country has resulted therefore in a real "women's revolution", with all the positive elements that this implies for a society which strives to be equal.

However, the insertion of women and the family into the modern economic, industrial and urban structure has to a large extent exceeded society's and the state's capacity for response. The "new" Colombian woman, with a level of education substantially higher than that of her predecessors and who contributes significantly to family income, maintains, however, the same duties inside the home as did earlier generations. The cultural gap and the slow adaptation of the state to the dizzying changes which have taken place in the last few years, i.e. the positive but slow development of nurseries and family welfare centres, have meant that for many, the "revolution" has translated into double and exhausting working days which limit, in their turn, the rise of women on the employment ladder and reduce their chances of inclusion in the country's circles of power. "Modernization" and "liberation", in the end, do not always go together.

This "two-speed" transformation has resulted in a new life situation for women which is dogged by conflict-also reflected by what has been called the crisis of the couple -without the formation of any clear recognition of its position as a social issue with specific demands and considerations. The abscence of significant femenist organizations is perhaps a reflection of this, just as it probably contributes to the delay in the process. In Colombia, the majority of legislative transformations which have benefited women have arisen from presidential or party initiatives, or in response to needs felt by society, or pressured by changes at

the international level; but not under the auspices or from discussions with femenist groups, as usually happens in other countries.

The incipient changes in attitude which are becoming apparent amongst urban youth, however, are probably an auspicious step towards a new definition of women and the family which will nurture a more harmonious development of the needs and potentials of Colombian women. Colombia is in fact one of the Latin American countries which has shown the greatest progress in this respect. Table V-1 lists some of the results obtained in a study carried out in eight Colombian cities in 1988.

Thus, even if the influence of traditional thought, which offers women so few possibilities in a modern world, persists, it is certain that the country has embarked on a clear process of transformation. It would be absurd to ignore this fact, just as it would be to ignore the enormous material and educational advancements, as well as changes in working conditions, and in the access of women to power, which have taken place in the second half of this century.

Nevertheless, there is still much ground to be covered. A large part of this chapter will focus on the identification of these problems and the existing imbalances, not because the changes

TABLE V-1

LATIN AMERICAN YOUTH
ON THE ROLE OF WOMEN IN THE FAMILY (%)

PHRASES/ ATTITUDES	ARGEN.	BRAZIL	CHILE	COLOMBIA	C.RICA	ECUADOR	EL SALV.	MEXICO	URUG.
The husband should control household spending									
The wife should obey the husband									
Marriage is more important for women									
The man should command and control the couple's relationship									
Professional qualifications are more important for the son than for the daughter									
The wife should not work outside the home because men prefer women to depend on them									
Women are only truly fulfilled as wives and mothers									
When women work outside the home the children grow up without knowing a real family									
Women with children should not work outside the home									

Source: "Retratos de Familia", (1989) Latin American Listening Post, No.3. October.

are denied, but because the construction of a better future depends on the overcoming of these problems.

Urbanization and female migration

The enormous changes which took place in Colombian society during the last forty years resulted in the urbanization of the country, which was, until the middle of the century, fundamentally agrarian; and in the birth of the industrial sector. The impressive speed of this process determined that in only twenty years, the proportion between rural and urban populations was practically inverted.

The massive migrations to the cities transformed the family relations predominant in rural societies and determined new ways of integrating women into society. The urbanization process is linked without doubt to the drop in fertility rates, to improvements as much in the access to education as in its quality and, obviously, to increased female participation in the most modern sectors of the economy. All these are factors which have acted in favour of the Colombian woman, who is tending to compete with men on more and more equitative terms. But the way in which this process developed, and its speed, also had negative effects on women, many of which are still in force today.

Thus the rapid migration from the country to the city swamped the responsive capacities of the economy and of the state,

resulting in very difficult conditions for the poorest sectors of the economy, amongst which, as will be seen, women have been harshly punished.

More women abandon the countryside

One of the most striking characteristics of the Colombian migratory process is that it was dominated by women. The reason for this must be sought in the production conditions in the countryside, in which women's work has traditionally been subsidiary. The improvements in agricultural productivity tended to shed, in consequence, surplus female labour.

For the "new" urban woman, the former had two important effects. First, the emigration from the rural areas by young women, with low levels of education, meant that their labour participation, fundamentally, was in employment at the bottom of the wage pyramid. The majority of them turned to the service sector, doing work which was fundamentally an extension of the type they carried out in their homes, socially undervalued and as a result, badly paid: domestic servants, laundresses, cleaners, hotel and restaurant maids, etc. Although employment in these sectors meant higher wages than in the countryside, and as will be seen, the real wages of these occupations increased significantly after the end of the seventies, they remain the lowest-paid.

At the present time, although the pace of migration has slackened, a good number of rural women continue to migrate to the cities[1]/. Despite the fact that the level of female education has risen considerably, at the same time as the percentage of domestic service in overall female employment has diminished, for the migrants from the countryside, labour opportunities continue to lie fundamentally in these basic forms of employment. Rakesh Mohan, a researcher of population issues, records in a study carried out in Bogotá at the end of the seventies, that the traditional idea that migrants always ended up at the bottom of the pay scale, although it did not necessarily apply to men, certainly reflected the case of women, precisely because they tended to work, for the most part, as domestic servants. "Female migrants are considerably poorer but they are dominated for the most part by the large proportion of women in domestic service which forms part of this category"[2]/. A recent report on aspects of Colombian socio-demographics continues in the same vein:" The economic participation of women (migrants) is only superior to that of men (migrants) for the first five years of residence in the under-20 age group. This may stem from the fact that the majority of employed women of this age are found in the service branch, especially in domestic service"[3]/.

1/ At present, the male indexes in Bogotá, Barranquilla and Cartagena are under 80 men per 100 women. In the majority of the other large cities, the index lies between 80 and 87.

2/ Rakesh Mohan (1979).

3/ Heredia R. (1989).

If the former points to the continuing prescence of obstacles to the entrance of the migrant woman into the labour market, it does not mean, however, that within this category there have not been positive changes. As will be seen later on, income distribution in Colombia, one of the most inequitative in the world in the 1960's amongst countries at a similar stage of development, has shown signs of improvement in the last few years.

Income differences between rural and urban zones have been reduced, as well as intersectorial ones and differences in income distribution between the sexes. The study by Mohan notes a significant improvement in the average income of migrant women during the period 1973-1977. In the first year the average salary of migrant women was 90% lower than the average worker's salary in Bogotá. In 1977, the difference, albeit still large, had been reduced to 63%.

Second, the female migration reinforced an existing sexual imbalance in the cities[4/], observable in the indexes of males, which were already low at the beginning of the century. Fed by the migration of young women, the sexual imbalance became more acute, especially, in the 20 to 30 age group: in Bogotá, the lowest index of males (77%) was found, in 1973, in the 20-24 population.

4/ Sandroni P.

Single motherhood was the expected corollary of this situation. The population of the Special District -Distrito Especial- (D.E.) grew by roughly 65% between 1965 and 1974, rising from 1,823,000 to 3,019,000 inhabitants. In this period the number of marriages per thousand inhabitants diminished from 6.8 in 1965 to 4.7 in 1974[5]/. The total number of births in 1965 was 64,327, of which 7,097 were illegitimate. In 1974, the total number of births fell (57,104) but the number of illegitimate births increased (15,008).

In Bogotá, in 1973, almost 28% of women with children were unmarried or separated. If widows with children are added, the proportion of single mothers rises to 38%[6]/. In 1978, 23% of urban families, independent of region, were run by women.

Obviously, it is not being contended here that the sexual imbalance alone explains these phenomena. With the opportunity of working, Colombian women have found it easier to dissolve conjugal unions, and their attitude to divorce has changed notably in the last few years. In reference to this, a study by Bonilla and Florez[7]/ observes a greater acceptance of divorce amongst the youngest women in all social groups domestic violence being the reason most frequently put forward by the poorest women. Single

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5/ Sandroni P. Op.cit.

6/ Sandroni P., Op.cit.

7/ Bonilla E, Flórez C.E. (1985).

motherhood, therefore, can be seen as an indication of a greater female independence and a reflection of positive changes in the condition of women in Colombia. However, it has also been accompanied by serious problems.

Incorporation into the labour market, pressured by single-motherhood or the dissolution of marriage, takes place under extremely difficult conditions which lead to the marginalization of these women in the worst-paid activities. It is an established fact that the double work - day which the woman must complete impedes her entrance into enterprises with high organizational levels and whose wages tend to be higher. This does not only affect single mothers, and the traditional family structure leaves the woman with the greatest burden of domestic chores, whether or not she has a partner. But for single mothers the situation is without doubt particularly critical.

Finally, Colombia's rapid urbanization swamped the capacities of the public services administration in the cities, resulting in housing which lacked utilities. Although in the last 20 years the supply of services (electricity, water, and sanitation) has increased considerably in the cities, in 1986 16% of urban families did not have access to any utilities and only 56% had all three[8]/.

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[8]/ La pobreza en Colombia, DANE, June 1989.

The abscence of an adequate infrastructure makes domestic tasks much more difficult: besides lacking cooking and cleaning appliances, the poorest women must also fetch and carry water and fuel, resulting in work days which can be 2 or 3 hours longer than those of their male counterparts[9]/.

In short, then, the Colombian migration of the 1950's and 1960's was characterized as much by the great speed of the process, which in the space of only two decades reversed the proportion of rural and urban populations, as by the fact that it was dominated by women. Besides the positive effects of this process upon women, such as increases in income and education and drops in fertility rates, there are also marked negative effects, related to the sexual imbalance in Colombian cities and the inadequacy of urban infrastructure resulting from this process.

First, motherhood has pushed many women and their families down to the lowest income levels, reinforcing -in that this limits women's access to better working conditions- the vicious cycle of poverty.

Second, the poverty in Colombian cities, made more acute by unchecked growth and lack of urban planning, has made the situation of women worse, since it is they who by cultural tradition bear the

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9/ Flórez C.E. and. Bonilla de Ramos E., (1985), Op.cit.

greatest responsibility for the family and the home. Time, in fact, appears consistently as one of the factors which most limits women's advance towards better employment conditions and consequently, better wages. It does only not affect the women of the poorest levels but the situation for them is undoubtedly more severe.

As will be seen, the former is closely tied to the high rate of female participation in the informal sector of the economy, whose organizational form facilitates women's fulfillment of their two roles. The vicious cycle which is created leaves women, to a large extent, with jobs which are secondary in terms of their contribution to family income; or in the case of single women, pushes their families down to the lowest levels of income in the country. This, in its turn, reinforces the distribution of domestic chores, perpetuating the difficulty for women in gaining access to more advanced sectors of the economy.

Women and the labour market

The last decades have seen female participation in the labour market increase markedly. All of Latin America, the number of active women has grown by 120% in the last thirty years, so that if in 1950 the proportion of women in the labour force of the region was one of 17.9%, in the year 2000 it will be 27%. And Colombia is one of the Latin-American countries with the highest rates of

female participation. In 1985, it figured at 47% in the seven principal cities. The global rate that year was 31.6%. Other countries with high rates of female participation are Chile (32.4% in 1984), Perú (36% in 1982) and Venezuela (38% in 1978) (see table V-2).

Increased female participation in the labour market is usually taken to be an indicator of improved national conditions for women. A woman's income facilitates her independence, and no less important, the contact with women in her same situation, allows her to take stock of her position as a woman and to actively defend her rights. Therefore, perhaps it would not be rash to relate high female participation in the Colombian labour market to the changes in society's attitudes towards women, mentioned at the beginning of the chapter, which denote the country's increased acceptance of the working woman and the formation of a more modern vision of the family.

However, increases in participation can obscure phenomena such as increases in unemployment rates or fundamental increases in the informal sector, which work against women's liberation[10/]. This is the case when the need to increase real family income causes family members other than the head to look for work, thus

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10/ The rate of participation is defined as the economically active population over the population of working age.

TABLE V-2

ECONOMIC ACTIVITY
RATES OF PARTICIPATION ACCORDING TO INCOME AND SEX

COUNTRY		TOTAL	INDIGENT	POOR HOMES	NOT POOR
C.RICA 1979	Total				
	Men				
	Women				
C.RICA 1982	Total				
	Men				
	Women				
VENEZ. 1978	Total				
	Men				
	Women				
CHILE 1979	Total				
	Men				
	Women				
CHILE 1984	Total				
	Men				
	Women				
PERU 1982	Total				
	Men				
	Women				

Source: Pollack, Molly, Pobreza y mercado de trabajo en cuatro paises: Costa Rica, Venezuela, Chile y Perú, series Documentos de Trabajo, No.309. (PREALC), Santiago de Chile, (OIT), 1987.

pressuring the labour market, without the formal market necessarily being in a position to absorb them.

To good measure, the increases in female participation in South America have been accompanied by increases in both the phenomena mentioned. And Colombia is no exception. As will be seen, although in the last fifty years the situation of women in the labour market has improved considerably compared to that of men, serious problems still persist: female unemployment is higher than male unemployment, the incorporation of women into the informal sector continues to be great, and sexual discrimination in terms of both wages and promotions continues to be very much in evidence.

Employment vs. Unemployment

That female earnings should be, as a general rule, the secondary income of the home is reflected in the evolution of female participation and its relation to unemployment and changes in the real incomes of families. A rapid revision of what happened with these variables in the last twenty years (see table V-3) shows in fact that women join the labour market more in times of economic crisis, and that female participation drops or remains stable in times of economic growth.

Between 1971 and 1975, female participation grew from 27.8% to 31.9%. During this period, real wages were decreasing, which must

TABLE V-3

FEMALE POPULATION
OF WORKING AGE, EMPLOYED AND UNEMPLOYED AND
UNEMPLOYMENT RATES AND FEMALE POPULATION

YEARS	1971*	1974	1978	1982**	1985**	1989**
Women of working age						
Employed women						
Unemployed women						
Unemployment rate						
Rate of participation						

Source: * National Urban total EH3, EH8, EH19, DANE.
** 4 cities EH37, EH48, EH65 DANE

have propelled family members other than the head to seek employment. Part of the increase in female participation was thus tempered by increases in unemployment, which grew amongst urban women from 11.2% to 15.1%. Between 1974 and 1978 conversely, labour demand recovered and female unemployment dropped in an appreciable manner, from 15.1% to 9.4%. At the same time, female participation fell slightly, from 31.9% to 29%.

During the eighties, urban female participation grew at a rate of about four points a year, reaching its highest peak in September 1985, when it hit 50%; falling later to rest at around 45% at the end of the decade. Female participation was thus growing rapidly in times of crisis, when global unemployment was also rising, and began to diminish along with it. During the same period (1980-1989), female unemployment, additionally, was higher than male unemployment, affecting 19% of active women in 1985 when male unemployment was 11%.

Such tendencies on the part of female participation and unemployment led some authors to formulate, at the end of the 1970's, this rather dismal diagnosis: "(...) according to these figures, the proportion of women older than twelve who in one way or another were linked to the labour market, in relation to the total number of women of the same age, does not appear to have

varied sufficiently enough to warrant the declaration of fundamental changes in female `participation´"[11/].

The eighties, however, allow for more positive conclusions, although not exempt from problems. Certainly the increases in female participation obscure serious increases in unemployment in this group. But the high participation observed in 1988 denotes an important change in job opportunities for women.

In terms of income level, there are large differences, with women in the higher groups showing higher participation rates and the lowest figures of unemployment. In 1985 the rate of participation amongst "not poor" women was 35.1% and the unemployment rate for this group (men and women) was 5.3%. In a parallel manner, the participation rate of women from homes "in misery" was 22.5% and the unemployment rate for both sexes in this income group was 9.2% (see table V-4).

Thus, the change in the possibilities of access to the labour market by women has principally benefited women in the higher social groups. For lower-income women, although increases in participation have indeed meant increases in employment, they have also been accompanied by increases in unemployment rates.

11/ Rey de Marulanda N., (1981).

TABLE V-4

SOCIAL GROUPS
GROWTH RATES BY SOCIAL GROUPS IN CITIES OF MORE THAN 40.000 INHABITANTS, 1985

GROUPS	OVERAL RATE OF PARTICIPATION	GLOBAL RATE OF PARTICIPATION			UNEMPLOYMENT RATES	DEPENDENCY COEFFICIENT
		TOTAL	MEN	WOMEN		
NOT POOR						
POOR						
IN MISERY						

Source: La pobreza en Colombia, DANE 1989. Vol.II, Table 6, p.25.

As a result of all these factors, the increase in labour participation should be evaluated with caution as an indicator of improvement in women's conditions, and should be adjusted for the changes in unemployment. In the same way, it is important to choose carefully the periods with which to make comparisons over time, for it is clear that female participation grows more rapidly in times of crisis. However, it seems a legitimate claim that in the last few decades female employment has grown rapidly as a percentage of the total population.

Female income and informal labour

The fact that more women tend to look for work in times of crisis, results in the increase in the participation of the informal sector in total female employment. Thus it is the informal economy that surges most strongly in times of stagnation, thereby supplying a good part of the employment which the formal economy is incapable of supplying. In 1986, for example, when global unemployment reached its highest peak of the 1980's, the informal sector provided 50% of urban jobs in the country[12/].

12/ The informal sector includes industrial production of domestic or artesan type, personal services such as domestic service and a good part of commercial workers, such as street vendors.

To this it must be added that women, given their work situation in the home, find it harder than men to work in advanced companies with high levels of organization and longer time demands.

All of the above surely explains the significant importance of small family businesses in overall female employment, with the negative effects implied in terms of working conditions and wage security.

The evolution of employment structure by sexes in the case of the tobacco industry is an illustration of the above statement and probably reflects a more general situation[13]/. In 1945, the tobacco industry consisted of a good number of small firms, often of a domestic nature, devoted to cigar production. Seventy per cent of the industry's workers were women.

By 1969, however, the industry had been considerably transformed, raising its productivity levels to the point that five firms generated 80% of tobacco output. At the same time, female participation had been curtailed, from 70% to 43%.

Female participation in other types of industries could have followed the same pattern, i.e. evolving in a form which was inverted by industrial concentration.

13/ See Sandroni P., Op. cit.

In actual fact, althongh since 1950 women's training has increased to a surprising extent, as will be seen later on, to the point of being on equal footing with male workers, female integration into the labour market continues, to a large extent, to be through the informal sector.

In a study carried out at the end of the seventies, it was found that women working at that time in industry were employed especially in "the most backward industries, meaning those least capital-intensive, those generating a smaller proportion of total output, and possibly the least dynamic or at least those which permit an artesan-type production, even if its workers are not classed as artesans[14]/.

Fifty percent of these women worked in their own homes and 35% worked alone. Of those who worked in businesses with more than one person, the majority worked in firms of less than twenty workers. The workplace and the number of workers per firm are both indicators of the level of sophistication of the companies and give an idea of the working conditions that must prevail (wages, security, hours, etc).

In the less technologically advanced businesses, 62% of female workers surveyed earned less than two minimum salaries per month. Only 49% of workers in more advanced enterprises fell into that

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14/ Rey de Marulanda N. (1981) Op.cit.

same income category. In addition, the most primitive industries employ the largest number of unpaid family helpers, a group which contains a large number of women workers. In the commercial sector, 16% of female workers belong to this category, while only 8.4% of men in the same sector are thus employed.

Looking at the proportions of housewives employed in industries of some sort, it was observed that the proportion was higher in less advanced industries: 51% as opposed to 19% in more developed industries. This suggests that the burden of domestic work probably explains why the entrance of women into the labour market is through such firms, whose labour organization allows them to fulfill out both roles[15/].

It is a common phenomenon in Latin America, but in Colombia the problem seems to be much more acute than in other countries of the region (see table V-5). In 1985, 25% of employed women in Bogotá, excluding domestic service, were working in the informal sector. In the same year, the proportion of women in this sector in Caracas, Panamá and San José did not exceed 13%. In São Paulo, the percentage was 15%.

If the prominence of the informal sector in overall female employment denotes serious problems in the income conditions for this group, it is important to observe that in the last twenty

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15/ See Rey de Marulanda N. (1981), Op.cit.

TABLE V-5

INFORMAL SECTOR
EMPLOYED WOMEN (PERCENTAGES)

CITIES	YEARS	DOMESTIC SERVICE	
		EXCLUDED	INCLUDED
BOGOTA	1982		
	1985		
CARACAS	1982		
	1985		
PANAMA	1982		
	1985		
SAN JOSE	1982		
	1985		
SAO PAULO	1982		
	1985		

Source: ECLA (1988), From specially tabulated surveys of the home, 1982 and 1985.

years, the salarial difference between these sectors has tended to diminish, suggesting the gradual dissolution of the dualist tendency in the Colombian economy[16]/.

In fact, in 1960 Colombia had one of the most concentrated incomes in Latin America and occupied a dismal position amongst the countries with the most inequitative income distributions in the woreld. The Gini coefficient calculated for 1964 was .480 for urban areas and .550 in rural zones. In the mid-seventies, however, income concentration began to decrease and by 1988 the calculated Gini coefficients were .451 in the countryside and .441 in the cities[17]/.

The female worker, mostly situated in the lowest income categories, has benefited from this development. But the evolution of salaries has benefited her particularly, because wage differences between the sexes have tended to diminish, especially in the cities. In 1988 the attributable difference between the sexes was 39%, which although significant, "is much less than in past decades and is no higher than in developed countries such as the U.S.A."[18]/.

16/ See Urrutia M. (1984).

17/ See Chapter III.

18/ Londoño J.L., Op. cit.

To good measure, this last development seems a response to the increases in female educational levels, which allow women to compete on a progressively more equal basis with men. This development, however, has not benefited the whole country in the same way and the wage differences between the sexes in rural areas continue to be extreme. In 1988 the differential was 67%, double that of the cities.

The evolution of female labour according to occupation

From another angle, irrespective of whether female participation has taken place in the more or less advanced sectors of the economy, it is important to know whether female labour has evolved from the point of view of occupation. In other words, it is important to know whether the female worker is employed in the lowest occupational levels, fundamentally as a labourer; or whether her job spectrum has expanded over time.

According to the industrial census of 1945, 33% of industrial workers were women. They were distributed amongst seven occupations: 10.6% were sorters; 3.7% spinners, 7.6% seamstresses; 2.5% folders, 5.6% packers, 8.5% weavers; 6% cigar makers. They were, therefore, jobs which are for the most part an extension of domestic tasks or very elementary and, in consequence, the lowest paid.

Equally, if the division between skilled workers and basic labourers is made along sexual lines, women were found mostly in the labourer category, while men, even in industries with a high percentage of female labour, predominated in the skilled worker positions. The industrial average of skilled workers was 83% male, 16% female; the average labourers', 63% male and 36% female.

By the end of the 1980's the situation, albeit slowly, was showing changes in favour of women. The industrial average of skilled workers and labourers according to sex in 1987 was the following: women represented 34% of skilled workers in industry and 31% of labourers. Amongst national technicians, women represented 30%. It is important to also highlight female participation in management personnel, which amounted to 17%.

Therefore, even if sexual differentiation continues to place proportionately more women than men in less advanced, more subordinate-level jobs, there has still been a notable change and the prescence of women in higher positions or more qualified jobs is beginning to be significant.

On the basis of this information, then, it is possible to conclude the following. The industrialization process has undoubtedly been accompanied by a significant change in the condition of women and in the way women are perceived by society. Today, women's employment is accepted as normal, if not necessary,

and the participation of women in the production machine reflects considerable improvements in their situation compared to that of forty or fifty years ago.

In the same way, the change in the country's income distribution and the shrinkage in wage differences between the sectors, as well as the increases in female educational levels, have clearly benefited female workers, bringing as a result the dimunition of wage differentials between the sexes and the expansion of the female occupational spectrum.

However, if the cultural tradition which stipulated that the man should be "the breadwinner" while the women took charge of domestic chores has been broken, the present family organization continues to follow the old model, which means that the working woman confronts the labour market from a clearly disadvantaged standpoint compared to that of the man. This leads women to seek employment in the least advanced sectors of the economy, limiting their income and prospects of rising on the job ladder. Thus, if the Colombian woman works more and in better working conditions today than in the middle of the century, given that her independence and social 'value' have surely increased, she is still employed under insecure conditions and primarily in subordinate and or low-paid positions.

Women and Education

If there is one area which has undergone a women's revolution, it is undoubtedly education. Although it lagged behind not only industrialized countries but also other Latin American countries, the involvement of Colombian women in further education gathered momentum in the sixties, spurred on by the industrialization and urbanization processes of the country.

Today, percentages of female enrollment in primary and further education are very similar to percentages of male enrollment, this being perhaps one of the most crucial factors in the explanation of the important changes which have affected the situation of women in the country in the last few decades.

Antecedents

"Without making her learned, pendantic or ridiculous"

Rufino Cuervo

Heir to the philosophy of the 19th century, the Colombian educational system continued to discriminate between men and women until well into the 20th century.

The title of high school graduate was only granted to women in 1930, and until 1940, teacher training schools were the only real

available option for secondary education. Programs of study were different for boys and girls, and women teachers from the training institutes were only allowed to teach in all-girls' schools or in schools without boys older than twelve.

In 1945, with the creation of colleges of further education for girls, the possibilties for female education were considerably enriched. They offered university courses in science, arts, and social studies, without requiring a high school graduate qualification. Examples of such courses were social services, clinical laboratory technicians, technology, architectural design, secretarial studies, ceramics, bacteriology, or interior decoration. At the same time, many similar private institutions emerged geared towards female education, many of which, like the colleges, exist today.

Present conditions of female education

Towards 1960, scholastic programs for men and women were fundamentally unified, even if some differences survived, such as the inclusion in the girls' programs of classes like embroidery, sewing, cooking, and child care. But it was not until 1974 that the Colombian educational system eliminated the difference between the sexes, "putting an end to the century and -a-half old tradition of

female education which assigned domestic tasks to women as a duty of the sex"[19]/.

However, if the change in the official concept of female education was slow, the development of female educational levels has been astonishing. In 1951 the percentage of illiterate women was 44%, as compared to 41% of men. In 1964, these percentages were 31.4% and 29.8% respectively. In 1988, the proportion was 12% for both sexes[20]/.

The rapid integration of Colombian women into the country's educational system is as marked at the primary level as in further education. As is observed in table V-6, female participation in professional training schemes was already high in 1976, compared to participation in other Latin American countries. By the end of the 1980's, 50% of registered university students were women[21]/.

Obviously, these figures hide the persistence of "typically" femenine fields like nursing or primary school teaching, for example, and "typically" masculine fields like engineering. But it would be erroneous to ignore the enormous change which has occurred in this area: psychology can no longer be defined as a typically

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19/ Ochoa H., (1977).

20/ Ochoa H., Op.cit.

21/ ICFES, Statistics on Further Education, January-June 1988.

TABLE V-6

PROFESSIONAL TRAINING COURSES
RATES OF FEMALE PARTICIPATION, 1970-1986 (%)

COUNTRY AND INSTITUTION		1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976
ARGEN.	CONET1							
BRAZIL2	LBA							
	PIPMO							
	SENALI							
	SENAC							
COLOM.	SENA							
C.RICA	INA							
CHILE	DUOC							
	INACAP							
ECUAD.	SECAP							
PERU	SENATI							
VENEZ.	INCE3							

1 Includes formal technical training. 2 Municipality of Rio de Janeiro. 3 In positions of employment.
a Estimated figures. b Excludes women atterndding evening improvement classes. c Only apprenticeship.
Source: OIT (1979)

femenine subject, as it was in the beginning, while careers like architecture, economics and law are pursued by a good number of women.

Thus, if in the first half of this century the female educational perspective was bleak, Colombia enters the 21st century with a totally different agenda. Certainly, there remains a gap in terms of technical training, which fewer women receive, as well as differences in the standard of teaching, which is higher at boys' schools than at girls' schools[22/]. But the evolution has tended towards the rapid democratization of the Colombian educational system.

Undoubtedly, discussion of this topic in terms of future decades should focus not on the rights of women to education, but rather on its very content, and on where democratization has not yet crystallized. This is not the place to analyze said content, nor to evaluate for example, school textbooks, but there is no doubt that if the cultural change facilitating women's integration into the country is yet to come, or is in the process of emerging, the educational system faces a great responsibility in terms of its development.

22/ Based on test results on high school students from ICFES (C.S.1) See "Indicadores sobre Educación" (1990), Coyuntura Social No. 1, Fedesarrollo, March.

Women and Power

The legislative changes of the second half of this century reflect the enormous transformation undergone by the female situation in Colombia in the last 50 years. The first administration of López Pumarejo conceded to women, in 1936, the right to fulfill administrative tasks; in 1945 women were granted citizenship, although without the right to vote; in 1957, under the military government of Rojas Pinilla, women obtained the right to vote and be elected.

However, there was very limited female participation in the carrying out of these changes. With the possible exception of the right to vote, lobbied for and defended by a group of women in opposition to the political parties, the majority of the subsequent legislative changes have been advanced by the men in power. In effect, the history of the Colombian femenist movement is very short and few women have come to power campaigning for such legislation: Clotilde García Ucrós headed the lobby for the reform of the "Articles of Marriage" petitioning the Senate in the early 1930's until in 1932, the law granted women the rights to their own property, up till this point the possession of their husbands; Ofelia Uribe posted a landmark in the history of Colombian women with her struggle for women's rights through her newspaper, "Female Agitation" (1944-46), through radio broadcasts, and from Congress benches, being undoubtedly one of the most important people to

remember in the women's suffrage movement. However, since then there have been few such female voices heard, and even fewer, if any, such means of communication campaigning for women's rights.

This probably explains the slowness with which Colombian legislature has moved to fully protect the rights of women. For example, only in 1968 did the law repeal husbands' rights and substitute government jurisdiction, "conceding to women the right to be an equal guardian of the home, to decide jointly with the husband the location of the home, matters concerning the children, the joint management of the home"[23]/; until 1980, the law granted the husband and other relatives the right "to kill women whom they discover in illegitimate carnal acts, in which case the homicide punishment will be reduced from half to three-fourths", and admitted "legitimate defense of honour", by virtue of which "there was a diminished charge of homicide when committed in a state of rage and intense anguish.... caused by such an offense... even if not carried out at the actual moment of discovering them in the carnal act" and the legal equality of the sexes was declared, by presidential decree, only in 1974!, a date until which, from the legal point of view, the rights of the husband over the wife continued to be in force.

Legal inequality, however, has not meant that women have been absent from the political process, and to a certain degree, from

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[23]/ Martínez S., (1986).

power. After the legislative reform of 1957, female participation in the fulfillment of public offices began immediately. For the first time a woman occupied a ministry, belonged to a legislative body and directed a government institution[24/].

In the 1970's Colombia held a relatively promising position from an international perspective, with a female participation in the Congress of 3.5%, not very far off the percentages attained in Great Britain, France, Germany and India (4%). In Latin America, Chile had primacy at the time, with a participation rate of 8.5%[25/].

Since the 1970's, the López, Betancur and Barco administrations have all made encouraging advances in terms of female participation in public office: during the Lopez administration women were appointed to ministries, governorships, and mayoral positions; under Betancur a female quota was established in almost all the vice-ministries, two women were made ministers, and a significant number of women occupied top-level jobs in the government administration; as to the last government, at the end of the term four ministries were controlled by women: Energy, Labour, Works and Development.

24/ Josefina Valencia de Hubach was Education Minister, María Eugenia Rojas headed the National Bureau of Social Assistance (SENDAS), and Esmeralda Arboleda and Josefina de Hubach participated between 1953 and 1957, in the National Constituent Assembly (ANAC).

25/ See Pinzón de Lewis P., and Rothsberger D., (1977).

But if the former shows a positive change in attitude, as mucho on the part of men, traditional holders of power in our society, as on the part of women themselves, it cannot mask serious problems in the consolidation of female leadership. At the end of the 1980's, despite the encouraging balance in heads of ministries, "women are very far away from the top hierarchical posts conceded in earlier administrations, and it appears they will continue to be at the mercy of the nominating power of the men on the executive board"[26/].

According to Ocampo, an analysis of the distribution of top level positions in the executive, legislative and judicial branches of the present administration leads to the following conclusion: "(...) descending the hierarchical ladder of the administration, women account for a higher relative proportion, especially in the executive branch, which almost triples female prescence in management positions".

Conversely, the distribution of overall positions, irrespective of their level, continues to benefit men; maximum female participation, which occurs in the executive branch, barely reaching a modest (although notable in South America), 29% (see graph V-1).

26/ Ocampo de Herran M.C., (1989).

GRAPH V-1

DISTRIBUTION
BY NATURE OF JOB

TOTAL
EXECUTIVE BRANCH

(va gráfico)

MEN WOMEN

TOTAL
LEGISLATIVE BRANCH

(va gráfico)

MEN WOMEN

TOTAL
JUDICIAL BRANCH

(va gráfico)

MEN WOMEN

Source: Ocampo de Herrán, M. C. (1988) "Las mujeres Dirigentes", in: Páez de Tavera Helena.

Why, then, does the women's revolution appear to have stagnated after the spectacular transformations which followed the 1950's? Part of the answer must lie in the very structure of Colombian political parties and in the possibilities for new leaders either men or women to rise within them. Interviews with women directors lead Ocampo to formulate the following hypothesis: "(...) only when there exist processes of renovation inside the parties, formations of new parties or else a compromise between the political organizations with serious institutional crises, will there be space for the renovation of the leadership, including greater possibilities for the participation of women and other socially marginalized groups".

The rigid structure of Colombian power, would act therefore as a brake on the renovation of the government apparatus, not so much because there is open discrimination against women, but more because women are new players in a process which only with great difficulty opens up to anything new.

However, if the above affects men as much as women, certain characteristics of the female social condition also act against the political ascension of women. To attain leadership positions involves the high costs of political campaigns and large amounts of time for publicity work. For men, political work seems like a "double day", alternating paid employment and the necessary campaign time. For women, political work results in taking on a

"triple day", given the burden of domestic chores she must bear" (...) a profile of Bogotá's female administrators reveals the parallelism between family responsibilities, public service tasks, and also, for a considerable proportion, economic duties, inside a traditional mold which is beginning to show some signs of cracking, but always in terms of unequal tradeoffs: there are more women who collaborate with or totally supply the family income, than there are men undertaking domestic tasks"[27/].

All of this considerably reduces the opportunities for women in the political arena and this is undoubtedly expressed in the rates of female participation, which although not insignificant, are nowhere near male rates. In 1988, female presence in the circles of power was the following: women made up 28% of union leaders, held 29.7% of directorships in the cooperatives, 20% of community directives in Bogotá, and 28% of top positions in national and district administrations[28/].

Obviously, these percentages are high when compared to women's presence in the state apparatus three or four decades ago. The profound transformation undergone by Colombian society during the second half of the 20th century has allowed women, who until 1945 were regarded by the state as under-age minors, to occupy, at the end of the eighties, some of the highest positions in the national

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27/ Ocampo, Op.cit.

28/ Ocampo, Op.cit.

hierarchy. There are few cabinets in the world which contain so many women ministers without there being a growing female participation in the top levels of the bench and in private industry. But the day has not yet arrived when, the appointment of a woman minister does not make headlines.

To close this section with recent words from Ofelia Uribe: "Thirty years and more after the vote, women continue to be pawned off with a little job which they are grateful for. They vote divided by different masculine ideological trends, each following a man. They serve for sorting or counting votes, for collecting funds; in short, they are useful for carrying the bricks of others, while theirs remain scattered and unused"[29/].

A women's revolution without a revolution in the family?

It can be asserted that nationally, economic modernization has progressed more rapidly than cultural change, since women, more educated now than four decades ago, and more integrated into the production system, continue to a large extent to define themselves and be defined by those around them fundamentally as wives and mothers, in the same way as earlier generations.

29/ Interview by Anabel Torres and Ofelia Uribe, in Laverde M.C. and Sanchez L.H., Op.cit.

A study based on surveys carried out at the beginning of the 1980's produced the following results regarding the opinions of working women and their male counterparts on female wage-earning labour and domestic work[30/].

Irrespective of economic level or of age, the women surveyed said they valued their domestic work as much as their paid work, but accepted the sexual distribution of chores within the home. Child care, cooking, and cleaning, continue to be female responsibilities, including amongst the youngest women who consider their paid jobs to be as important as those of their male colleagues.

That men have not undertaken domestic tasks has meant longer working days for working women, especially in the middle and lower economic levels which have less access to outside help. Women in these groups get up as much as an hour earlier than the men, and of ten go to bed later[31/]. For women in the higher groups, the possibility of domestic help lightens ther burden in the home, but, there has not been a significant change here either as regards the division of the responsibilities of the couple.

All the women interviewed consider motherhood to be a central part of their lives, although the young women of the middle and

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30/ Flórez C.E. and Bonilla de Ramos E., (1985). Op.cit.

31/ Flórez C.E. and Bonilla E., Op.cit.

upper levels, did not consider that it excluded other activities. However, despite the fact that these women see themselves as being on an equal footing with their male counterparts, male participation in child care or looking after the house continues to be marginal. According to a 1977 survey, only 3.3% of heads of household in the high income bracket were looking after children younger than ten; 2% took charge of cooking; and only 1.5% were responsible for laundry and ironing[32/]. If to this is added the fact that some heads of households are women, the results are even more derisive percentages of male participation in domestic tasks.

The low use of electric appliances in the majority of Colombian homes makes women's labour even more difficult, making her work slower and heavier. According to the survey mentioned, in 1977 only 54.9% of homes possessed, simultaneously, a large gas or electric cooker, refridgerator, T.V., blender and pressure cooker. In this category were 91% of top bracket homes, 68.4% of middle income homes and 43.4% of lower level homes. On the other extreme, homes which possessed only cooking rings and some items such as a blender and a pressure cooker, represented 1% of high income homes and 20.9% of low income homes.

State participation in the improvement of the conditions of women has been, in addition, unaggressive, despite the almost immediately positive results produced by the few programs which

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32/ Rey de Marulanda N., (1981), Op.cit.

have been set up. It is important to note that in general, if these programs, such as child-care assistance, have indeed had a positive effect on mothers, it has been in an indirect manner since women are rarely the population group being targeted. However, the impact which these have had on women, by facilitating their double role of mother and worker, should be taken into account and encourage the state to take a more active role, clearly directing support towards this section of the population.

The participation of the state: the example of the CAIP and the Hogares de Bienestar Familiar (Family Welfare Houses.

In the last few years, with the creation of the ICBF and through it, the CAIP (Centres of Special Preschool Attention), some women have been partly relieved of the double working day, which probably increases their chances of obtaining better-paid jobs.

The CAIP were created in 1974 under the auspices of María Helena de Crovo, then Labour Minister. The targeted population is children under seven. According to a 1981 study[33/], 32% of user mothers of CAIP were unmarried, widowed or separated. In addition, the majority of female heads of household are concentrated in the lowest income brackets. The program's impact is thus greater on poor mothers, thereby guaranteeing a positive effect on income redistribution and acting directly on the female population which

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33/ Bonilla de Ramos E. (1981).

faces the greatest difficulties in improving its working conditions.

The benefits derived by all women from CAIP services are evident: based on the aforementioned study, 19.3% of user mothers sought space in the centre in order to be able to continue at their present job. Another 17.3% were able to start work.

The reorganization of domestic labour permitted by this program is significant. Besides the time freed from child care, nearly 21% of interviewed mothers said they had had to cook less since the child's enrollment at the centre, 18% spent less time on house cleaning, and 11% considered that they did less laundry.

The effect of this was notable as much on the number of days these women could work, as on the length of the workdays. As to the former, it was observed that with the entrance of children into CAIP the number of mothers working less than five days a week diminished, or in other words, the number of women with 'legal' work weeks increased. As to the workday, nearly a quarter of women had access to jobs with legal work hours (eight hours).

Of interviewed mothers, 20% considered that the increase in income was due to the fact that the centre had allowed them to lengthen their work day. Of these, 86% were of low or middle income.

However, there is still much to be done in this area. The available space in CAIPs, in 1980, was only 15,852 in Bogotá, for a estimated population of 750,000 children. Additionally, the lack of transport of the CAIPs, counteracted the positive effects on women's time provided by the program. For some mothers, in fact, taking and picking up the children can mean more than an hour of additional travel. Because of this, 8.7% of interviewed mothers considered that their workload had increased with their childrens' entrance into the day care centre.

The contribution of the state to social programs tends also to be reduced in times of crisis when public social spending is immediately reined in. In this sense, however, the Hogares de Bienestar Familiar, launched by the Barco administration in 1987, appear as an important mitigating factor, allowing childrens' assistance to be maintained and even augmented in times when public social spending is diminishing.

This last assistance program is based on community participation, involving women in state child care programs. The "community mothers" are therefore mothers from the same community, enabled by SENA (National Service for Learning Assistance) to provide professional services in terms of nurseries, which operate in their own homes, adapted to this purpose with the collaboration of ICT (Institute for Land Credit). In 1989 the Hogares de Bienestar Familiar received 697,612 children.

Although controversial, because it involves the delegation of part of the state's responsibility to citizens, this type of assistance contains elements which are very important for both the mother and the family, community participation being one the most noteworthy amongst them.

Conclusions

Pressured by the industrialization and urbanization processes, Colombian society has created new openings for women, who now actively take part in national economic development, under conditions unimaginable at the beginning of the 1950's besides having a share in all the economic and political circles of power.

However, cultural tradition continues to impart all domestic labour to women, thereby limiting their progress within the modern social structure. The cultural gap is undoubtedly one of the biggest obstacles to increasing women's social power, and it is evidenced by the arduous working days which characterize the daily life of the majority of Colombian women.

The absence of women activists voicing their demands doubtless reinforces this bias in a society which is still largely responsive to the problems of such an important section of the population. The "womanization of poverty" or the large number of Colombian households which by virtue of being headed by women live in very

difficult conditions; female subordination in the political and working world; income differentials according to sex, are the results of a profound discrimination rooted in the very bosom of the family. And the timid participation of the state in programs geared towards improving the situation of women is also a reflection of the dominant ideological consensus which continues to relegate women to a secondary status.

However, little by little a common agreement has been reached: no development program can have the desired impact unless it recognizes the importance of improving the situation of women. It is indisputable that the fact that women of the less-developed world "should be obliged to work so hard and for so little has harmful effects on society. Besides the negative consequences for health, the inability to improve their education, their hygiene, or their nutrition, it compromises their families' welfare and reinforces the vicious cycle of poverty"[34/].

Débora Arango, the artist who paid so dearly for daring to paint nudes as a woman at the end of the 1930's spoke in this manner at the end of the eighties about the path traversed by Colombian women during the second half of this century: "The circumstances of women, here and everywhere, are very different to those lived in by my generation. This does not mean, of course, that all has been accomplished. On the contrary, there is still far

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34/ Páez de Tavera H., Op. cit.

to go. We have much to do to further the qualities and abilities that we possess; intelligence, intuition, tenacity, etc.. I frequently reflect that if in the face of so many obstacles, prohibitions, censures, absence of opportunities, we women have got to where we are, what will it be like when we eliminate the barriers? Without any doubt the world will be different; more human, more spacious, and with more charms".

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CHAPTER VI

THE EDUCATION OF A SOCIETY

INTRODUCTION

Colombia entered the second half of the 20th century in a state which, although not bad compared to that of other Latin American countries, was far from ideal (see table VI-1). From the beginning of the century, there had been a slow improvement in the country's literacy rates, with the percentage of illiterates dropping from 57.6% in 1918, to 44% in 1958. However, by this date it was evident that if Colombia were to continue at its present pace, "Colombia would need more than two centuries to reach the levels of the United States or France"[1/].

During the 1950's and 1960's, therefore, the state dedicated the bulk of its efforts to the expansion of the coverage of primary education, free by law since the beginning of the century, although not obligatory. At the end of the 1950's, access was still limited.

The state also increasingly invested in the expansion of university education. In both cases, it could be said that there was more concern with increasing the quantity of education supplied, rather than the quality.

1/ Lebret Report (1958), in Mineducación, (1986).

TABLE VI-1

ILLITERACY
AROUND THE 1940'S (VARIOUS COUNTRIES)

INDIA	1951
EGYPT	1947
HONDURAS	1945
VENEZUELA	1945
MEXICO	1940
BRAZIL	1950
COLOMBIA	1951
PANAMA	1951
CHILE	1940
SPAIN	1940
ARGENTINA	1947
FRANCE	1946
U.S.A.	1947
SWEDEN	1945

Source: La planificación educativa en Colombia, (1986) Op.cit.

State educational policy

Educational planning in Colombia was initiated in the 1950's when the modernization of the sector was consolidated in the first five year Plan for National Education. Since then, there have been continuous substantial efforts to strengthen the planning system, which has gradually taken shape under successive governments. However, it was probably with the changes which took place in the 1930's that the transformation crystallized, through the reinforcement of the power of the state and the consecration of its obligations regarding the education of its citizens.

The old polemic between the supporters of lay education and those who lobbied for church control over education gained impetus again, this time definitely favouring the first group. The nation's history was deeply marked by the surging conflict between these two factions, and active lay movements which led to the expulsion of the Jesuits in the 19th century. At the same time, starting with the Santander administration, the Colombian state assumed the responsibility for providing education. However, it was only in the thirties and forties that the discussion began to bring about concrete changes in terms of the operation of the educational system, geared towards strengthening the state's role as guarantor and organizer of education.

The great state effort to increase access to education was not free from bitter contention with the clergy and the supporters of the concordat. The change was consolidated however, setting the guidelines for the nation's educational system which are still followed today. The state, then, assumed the task of organizing, administrating and directing education, with the objectives of eliminating income discrimination and the unification of education of the sexes.

Primary education was nationalized during this period, creating wage categories for teachers and diversifying further education with the formal introduction of technical instruction.

The secularization of education and the search for a democratic system with significant state participation continued to influence, grosso modo, the Colombian educational system in the 1950's, although not without being affected by the conflicts which were then scarring the country.

So, in the midst of the contradictions, violence and ideological warfare which characterized the fifties, the educational system continued to progress along the path of modernization embarked upon two decades before. The Lebret and

Currie studies[2]/ produced in this way the first two systematic diagnoses of the conditions in the sector, resulting in the first Five Year Plan for the Education Sector, developed in 1957 by the newly created Planning Office of the Ministry of Education. Colombia thus initiated educational planning, a first on the subcontinent.

In the following years, basically during the period of the National Front, educational planning was characterized by the emphasis placed on educational infrastructure, holding as a principal objective the eradication of illiteracy in the country. In this way, the Colombian state has been the principal supplier of primary education (see graph VI-1), dedicating the majority of its resources at this level to the construction of school-rooms and teacher training. Only towards the end of the seventies, when the stumbling block produced by the lack of resources could be considered to have been satisfactorily overcome, does the country begin to direct itself towards improving the efficiency and the quality of primary education.

As to secondary education, educational planning had relegated it to the back burner until almost the 1980's, directing its main efforts towards the solution of the primary problem. State

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2/ Consists of the Currie Report, "Bases para un Programa de Fomento en Colombia" (1951) and the Lebret Report, "Estudio sobre las condiciones de desarrollo en Colombia" (1958), products of two international missions, BIRF and Economy and Humanism of France.

GRAPH VI-1

NATIONAL MATRICULATION
PARTICIPATION OF STATE SECTOR, 1954-1986

(va gráfico)

Basic Primary | Basic middle secondary vocational | Further Education

Source: Eficiencia interna básica secundaria media vocacional 1978-1984, Mineducación 1987.

participation has therefore been less active at this level (see graph VI-1), which has expanded thanks mostly to the private sector.

Second, the discussion centering on the importance and the character of this educational level has been marked by the oscilation between regarding it as a stepping-stone into the labour market, thus giving priority to a diversified curriculum, and a more humanist view of basic education, including all the subjects which an individual should have access to in order to integrate fully into society.

During the seventies, the first definition received the most approval, which meant that in this period technical institutes received much support. These, however, have never constituted more than a fourth of secondary enrollment. Half-way between these two philosophies lie the Institutes of Half-Diversified Education (INEM), also favoured since the 1970's, which combine vocational and humanistic training.

As regards further education, the state has always been conscious of the need to promote this level, given that it will provide the final formation of the nation's leaders. The state support for the Universidad Nacional is part of this vision. In fact, the Colombian state has traditionally supplied the majority of places in further education and, as will be seen later on, only

in the 1980's did private education begin to gain significant importance, with the enormous growth in technical and technological institutes of further education.

Finally, the eighties are marked by the proposal to set up a National Education System, with the objective of reaching the remotest zones, thus breaking with the marked centralism which has characterized the country. In this vein, the development plan "Change With Equity" (1982-1986), structures its educational policy with the following central points as its goals:

"Modernization, decentralization and cooperative planning, intersectorial coordination, qualitative change, the expansion of access and permanent opportunities, wide community participation, technological and scientific development, cultural, recreational and physical education development, and greater efficiency in the application of financial resources"[3]/.

The evolution of primary education

The situation of primary education in 1954 was the following: out of a school-age population of roughly 2.5 million, barely over a million children were enrolled in school. Just over half were boys and 66% of total pupils were in the cities.

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[3]/ Mineducación (1986).

In addition, the demographic transition the country was experiencing increased the pressure upon this sector: the infant population grew at an annual rate in excess of 2%, meaning that the efforts to extend the availability of education would have to be considerable if the situation was not going to remain stagnant.

Even for the population which actually went to school, the system contained serious deficiencies, reflected in high rates of desertion and repetition. As to the first point, the Lebret report declared: "In the countryside, the majority of matriculated children do not attend school for more than a year; the percentage of children who spend more than two years at school is insignificant. Calculating that more than two years of primary education are needed in order to retain more than the rudiments of reading, writing and arithmetic, it can be stated that only 176,471 children benefit from a proper primary education; that is, 18% of all matriculated pupils and 8% of the school-age population"[4/].

At this stage, the problems identified as essential were the insufficient numbers of schools and teachers, deficiencies which were felt especially in the countryside, and state efforts were directed towards the removal of these obstacles.

By the mid fifties it was already possible to measure the advances made in this area. School attendance rose more rapidly

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4/ Lebret Report, Op.cit.

than the infant population, and after 1955, the incidence of absenteeism was lower than in 1945. Several figures reveal the enormous progress made in the spread of primary education in the second half of the century: between 1933 and 1945, the annual rate of increase in primary matriculation was 2.38%, i.e. a rate of increase similar to that of the total population; between 1951 and 1964, primary matriculation rose at annual rates which exceeded 7%, and between 1965 and 1976, the rate was 5.8%.

In this manner, Colombia entered the 1980's with a satisfactory level of primary education coverage (90% of children aged 6 to 11 had access to primary in 1985), having resolved, in barely thirty years, the problem of the preoccupying paucity of schools and teaching staff which, at the end of the 1940's, excluded almost half the country's population from the educational system. As a reflection of this, between 1976 and 1984, the growth in primary matriculation was almost nil (-0.92%).

In the same way, the relative sexual discrimination that existed in the 1950's disappeared and levels of male and female matriculation do not differ at present.

The advances made, however, mask the persistence of serious problems within the sector. First, the country has not managed to eliminate the differences between rural and urban areas, and although coverage in the cities is acceptable, in the countryside

primary education reaches only 81%, almost 20 points below the coverage in the cities.

In addition, the "internal efficiency" of the educational system, or "the capacity which it has to retain and fluidly promote its students from grade to grade, completing each level in the time allotted for it"[5/], still leaves much to be desired. The figures, shown in table VI-2 demonstrate the magnitude of the challenge still confronting the sector in this area.

Despite the enormous advances which have been made in terms of student retention, at the beginning of the 1980's in urban areas only 62% of children admitted into primary completed the course (41% at the beginning of the 1960's). And if this proportion is far from satisfactory, it is even less so in rural areas where the situation is even more severe: in the last period, the proportion of children completing primary school in the countryside did not reach 20%.

The average grade level reached by the students who begin primary, is 3.8 in the urban areas and barely 1.7 in the rural zones. If, following what was said earlier, the minumum necessary number of years for a student to retain a basic knowledge of reading, writing and arithmetic is two years, the former means that a good part of the rural population continues to be classified as

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5/ Mineducación (1985).

TABLE VI-2

PRIMARY
THE REVOLUTION IN INTERNAL EFFICIENCY

YEARS	RETENTION		GRADE LEVEL REACHED	
	URBAN	RURAL	URBAN	RURAL
1961-1966				
1969-1973				
1978-1983				

Retention: Proportion of pupils who finish primary out of those who begin. Grade Level Reached: Average grade level reached by those who begin primary.

Source: MEN, Eficiencia interna de la educación primaria, 1978-1984.

"functional illiterates, that is, persons who are just capable of following written signs but do not develop higher levels of comprehension"[6/].

Thus, if the challenge in earlier decades was to provide schools and permit access to education for the whole population, the challenge for the future seems to be to reap more returns and to increase the system's efficiency, solving in particular, problems concerning student retention and the low grade levels attained by the population. Recent measures adopted on automatic promotion and the generalization of the methodology of the "New School" in the rural areas should work towards this end, although it is still too early to be able to evaluate the results of these measures.

Finally, it should be pointed out that teaching in the primary schools is marred by serious deficiencies which necessarily affect the quality of education provided. In reference to this, a recent report on the education sector noted: "the conditions under which teaching takes place leave much to be desired. As for physical resources, although the problem is no longer the construction of classrooms, existing ones are in desperate need of maintenance and equipment. Less than a tenth of schools have libraries and educational materials. Seventy per cent do not have minimal

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6/ Coyuntura Social, No. 1 (1989).

sanitary facilities. Nearly 20% of classrooms and 30% of desks used in primary schools need repair"[7].

Secondary education

The problem confronting secondary education in Colombia is fundamentally different to the one facing primary education. It can be said to lie principally in the lack of clarity of its definition by the state and by society, and as a result, in the function which it is assigned.

First, secondary education has been seen by some sectors as a step towards the integration of the individual into the labour market, thus making the preparation of efficient workers its principal goal. International credit and development agencies encouraged this concept in the 1970's, based on the idea that a country with Colombia's level of development should give priority to the overcoming of the impediments which confront the economy in terms of qualified labour supply.

In a manner compatible with this vision of education, the state should lean towards diversifying education, supporting the five types of existing secondary - level technical training (commercial, agricultural, industrial, pedagogical and social work).

7/ Mineducación (1988).

Second, another large sector has lobbied for a more humanist approach to secondary education, which, according to this philosophy, should be included in the basic education to which every individual should have access, supporting a classical curriculum as opposed to a diversified one. This form of envisioning secondary education questions the wisdom of a system which specializes the population from a very early age, and which in consequence offers very few years of basic education. Today international agencies consider that for the management of modern technology, it may be better to concentrate on giving young people the general knowledge which forms the basis of a classical education.

In reality, the nature of high school technical training has been controversial from its beginnings, due as much to its pedagogical content as to the efficacy of the same. Economically costly, the technical high schools have never encompassed more than 25% of secondary - school students. Recent evaluations by the World Bank and the Inter-American Bank have come to the conclusion that technical education is more expensive and does not prepare students better for their working career. Manuel Ramírez and Alvaro Reyes (1989), after analyzing all the information on Colombia, come to the same conclusion.

The definition of how many years constitute a "sufficient" basic education is obviously controversial, but in 1985, at the

Geneva Conference, a global consensus seems to have been reached, including secondary education in this category. Therefore the industrial countries now define eleven as the minimum number of years of education to which an individual should have access in order to dominate the basic elements necessary for a full integration into society. In Colombia, the "Four Strategies" plan, dating from the last National Front government, extended basic education to the ninth grade.

The above, however, has not been reflected in the evolution of educational policy concerning this category. Perhaps the lack of clarity about this aspect is simply reflective of the relatively little importance this level has held up till now in the country's educational plans. In effect, the state has concentrated above all on the extension of primary education, and on encouraging further education, relying on the participation of the private sector for the expansion of secondary education. Thus, whether a diversified secondary level curriculum is supported or criticized, it is certain, as was said earlier, that this type of education has never involved more than 25% of total high school students. However, in the years to come, the question of secondary education will assume more urgency, since solving the problems now confronted by primary schools will lead to more people demanding more education.

Until now, in fact, secondary education has not constituted a bottleneck, the continuation from primary to secondary school being

almost universal. Secondary education has some specific characteristics: first, private education continues to play an important role in secondary education (38% in 1988), in contrast to primary education, which is fundamentally state - run. It should be observed, however, that there has been a decrease in private education at this level, and state participation has increased, from 50% of enrollment in 1970 to 62% in 1988. Second, the bulk of secondary education is urban, thus encouraging migration from the countryside, given that "only 3 out of every 10 primary graduates continue to the Rural Secondary"[8]/.

Despite the imbalances mentioned, the major loss of students due to economic conditions in the home seems to occur in primary, since the majority of students that go on to secondary manage to complete this level (see table VI-3). There nevertheless exists a significant proportion of students with an incomplete secondary education (the average dropout rate in 1984 was 13% for all secondary grades), for whom the conditions of labour development are especially difficult. In a recent study, it was in fact found that this sector of the population shows the worst labour returns and the lowest possibilities of job promotion[9]/.

In the urban zones, which have demonstrated the most educational progress, the average completed years of education was

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8/ See Coyuntura Económica, No.1 (1989), Op.cit.

9/ See Molina C. and Bernal M.E. (1989).

TABLE VI-3

SECONDARY EDUCATION
INTERNAL EFFICIENCY

YEARS	INCOMPLETION	RETENTION		
		TOTAL	PASSING	FAILING
1978				
1979				
1980				
1981				
1982				
1983				
1984				

NOTE: The indicators of incompletion, passing and failing are obtained as a weighted average of the respective rates of each level, in the corresponding year.

Source: National Education Ministry, Eficiencia interna Básica Secundaria-Media Vocacional 1978-1984.

research. In 1958, the Lebret Report said to this respect: "Existing at the margins of national activity, badly equipped for research, without any contacts with the nation's directing bodies, the universities will find themselves fatally disconnected from the nation's real needs. In fact, nor the content of their teaching, nor the spirit guiding them, nor the organization of its faculties, correspond to Colombia's present phase of development"[10/].

The report continued to enumerate the professional deficiencies afflicting the country, to which the university system did not seem capable of responding. It found, for example, an excessive concentration of lawyers and doctors, alongside a significant lack of engineers, biologists, agronomists, veterinarians and economists.

At the present time, further education is in a different state, but the fundamental problem, i.e. the lack of a coordinated policy for adjusting education to meet regional and national needs, continues unresolved. In fact, although the composition according to careers has changed notoriously, this does not appear to have been the result of policies geared towards responding to the country's needs.

In a project carried out nearly thirty years after the Lebret Report, the concentration in areas such as architecture, economics,

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10/ Lebret Report, Op.cit.

and educational sciences was highlighted and the following diagnosis made: "This composition has been achieved by means of the greater dynanism observed in the lower-cost academic areas, such as architecture, economics, business administration and educational sciences. As to the participation of engineering, although it would appear high, when examined from the scientific and technological development point of view, it becomes clear that the country lags behind others at similar stages of development[11/].

In this respect, the growing importance of technical education should be highlighted -a result of the further education reforms of 1980-. Its enrollment has been constantly rising since then, growing from 6.5% in 1980 to 13% in 1986.

However, one of the most serious problems currently facing further education, and related to the above phenomenon, is the enormous proliferation of technical training institutes and private universities, whose proferred education, besides not necessarily responding to labour market demands, does not necessarily measure up to desirable standards. In only ten years, the number of these establishments rose from 62 in 1975 to 156 in 1985, giving Colombia the dubious distinction of one of the countries with the most institutes of further education in the world.

11/ Coyuntura Social No. 1 (1989), Op.cit.

Although it is not easy to measure the quality of education and, unfortunately no information is available on employment for graduates of different educational establishments, the above facts almost speak for themselves. The level of education of the teachers has risen, but in 1988, 4% of these had no professional qualification and the number of teachers with specializations and postgraduate degrees continues to be low: 32% for the state sector and 27% for the private sector.

Finally, the regional bias of further education is significant, with the establishments being concentrated in the wealthiest departments. "The regional presence of further education reflects the lack of a genuine university system which can harmoniously articulate increases in enrollment, and within this, the expansion of academic fields, in such a way that these adjust to the needs of a region, of its population, and the country as a whole"[12/].

Other Sectors: Culture, sports, science and technology

The non-traditional sectors of education have been the poor relatives of the educational system, due to the scarcity of resources and the order of priorities in which the eradication of illiteracy has been the main objective. Recreation, culture and

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12/ Coyuntura Social (1989), Op.cit.

even scientific research have thus been traditionally ignored and have shown a marginal growth only in the last ten years.

In the 1950's and 1960's, non-traditional education, in fact, did not even have a proper place within the educational system and it was only with the 1968 reform that a step was taken towards its institutional recognition. After this year institutions such as the Colombian Institute of Culture (COLCULTURA), the Colombian Fund for Scientific Research and Special Projects "Francisco José de Caldas" (COLCIENCIAS) and the Colombian Institute for Youth and Sports (COLDEPORTES) were created.

The basic budget for investments in programs of the "Four Strategies", however, gives an idea of the relatively little importance of these activities within the system: the percentage dedicated to cultural, sporting and recreational development was between 2% and 4% for the period 1972-1974.

These percentages have been maintained with few changes over the years. However, recent institutional changes and steps towards the decentralization of education are perhaps auspicious signs for a better future for these activities, transferring part of the responsibility for them onto departmental and municipal authorities. Thus, for example, the regional houses of culture could probably become an important vehicle for culture, making it accessible to a greater number of Colombians and correcting, to a

certain extent, the present imbalance which weighs in favour of the big cities.

As to the development of scientific research, public spending on this activity has been no more generous than on culture and recreation. In 1988, it appears as barely 0.7% of total public expenditure. This amount, although increasing in the last few years, represented only 0.19% of the GDP. Meanwhile, the rest of the Latin American countries invested, on average, 0.4% of their GDP in science and technology during this last decade.

The low state contribution to this area is reflected in a preoccupying lack of national attention to research. Thus, in Latin America, countries which have invested relatively more in the promotion of scientific activities, like Brazil (0.7% of GDP), Argentina, (0.4% of GDP), or Mexico (0.6%), contribute the majority of scientific articles published on the subcontinent (32%, 26% and 14% respectively in 1984), while Colombian contributions are relatively marginal, amounting to only 1% in 1984. Likewise, while the scientific community in the three countries mentioned fluctuates between 10,000 and 30,000 people, in Colombia it does not exceed 5,000 people[13]/.

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[13]/ See Coyuntura Social No.2 (1989) and Henao and Corredor, March (1990).

This is particulary preoccupying when considering the importance of this sector in the future development of Colombia.

The institutional and financial development of education

At the beginning of 1985, the Comptroller General of the Republic presented the then President of the Republic with a study on educational sector expenditure, concentrating on the following points:

a) the different solutions which have been procured for funding state education.

b) the evolution of total expenditure on education and the structure of its financing according to state levels.

c) an approximate evaluation of the evolution of the indicators of the operational efficiency of the system. This section is based fundamentally on this report, which presents a fairly clear picture of the change in the main guidelines which have governed the country's educational system[14/].

The 1968 Reforms

Until 1968 the national constitution, guided by the principle of political centralization and administrative decentralization, maintained the double responsibilities of both the nation and the

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14/ Comptroller General of the Republic (1985).

departments in the creation and regulation of primary and secondary education. The responsibilities of the different levels of the state can be summarized as following: the central government was responsible for regulation, management and inspection of public education. The responsibility for financing rested with the departments, and the local authorities took charge of the physical upkeep of the schools. As to teacher training colleges, these were financed by the nation, but controlled by departmental governments. Finally, professional and industrial training was the responsibility of the central government only with respect to establishments located in the capital; the creation, regulation and management of the rest of the establishments fell under the auspices of the departments.

This form of organization resulted however, in the continuous financial crisis of the sector, "derived from the growing relative impoverishment of the departmental and municipal treasuries". Various joint efforts to correct this situation were made in the 1960's, always failing to some degree, demonstrating, in consequence, the need for a fundamental change which finally occurred in 1968.

The three problems addressed by the reforms were: constitutional inconsistencies, financing, and organization. The fundamental problem, administrative decentralization and political centralization, continued but some of the existing inconsistencies

were corrected, eliminating for example the departmental responsibility for setting educational policy, In future, this rested with the Ministry of Education, covering primary and secondary school issues as well as teacher training. As to the administration of educational services, these began to be delegated to departmental bodies by the Ministry, by means of interstate contracts. Also delegated was the classification of the nation's teaching staff at the primary and secondary levels.

Various mechanisms for overcoming the financial problems were devised in the following years, including the so-called fiscal allowance, effective from 1973 - a constitutionally ordered transfer of a proportion of current resources collected at the national level - as well as a series of minor taxes and a percentage of regional production by means of a sales tax, to be managed by the departments.

As a complementary measure, the Regional Education Funds (FER) were created, their objective being the collection and administration of funds from the different national, municipal, district, or departmental budgets. The FER however, despite being conceived as organizations of a regional nature, remained under the supervision of the Ministry, which had to approve the different yearly budgets. Finally, the total cost of primary education was paid for out of the national budget.

It was therefore, once again, a half-way solution between centralization and decentralization, of which the following diagnosis was made in 1985.

1. "The regional elective bodies of assemblies and councils - supposedly where there is most community involvement- lost almost all their influence in the area of educational services, in terms of determining both policies and the organization and administration of services.

2. The executive branch now shared with national authorities the management and administration of educational services, not only for primary, but also for secondary and vocational schools, by means of a new level in the state structure, the FER, which contains hybrid elements from both centralization and decentralization.

3. From the financial, or fiscal point of view, the departmental and local authorities lose the responsibility for primary -level management, and obviously, lose the corresponding funds. However, "the suppression of the 'problem' goes hand in hand with the re-routing of fiscal allowances, which had been seen as a panacea for the chronic shortage of funding for regional and local services. In the case of the departments, their loss in the share of revenue from sales taxes deepens their financial troubles"[15/].

[15/] Comptroller General of the Republic (1985) Op.cit.

1975: The Nationalization of Education

By the mid - seventies the problem of the supply of primary education had largely been solved, and the government therefore turned its attention to the problems of secondary education. The 1975 reform, in consequence, did not make any substantial changes at the primary level, concentrating on the operation of secondary education. Educational services which still relied on regional budgets were thus nationalized, and national funds transferred to them.

The major impact of this reform fell on the teaching personnel, which became homogenized in terms of wages, benefits and ranking, even when regional authorities kept control over teacher appointments. There can be no doubt that this aided the teaching profession, resulting in greater labour stability and a greater professionalism. However, the corollary to this reform was the increase in the power of the Ministry, in detriment to the already low regional participation.

Bureaucratization and over-inflation thus became the crucial problems for the Ministry in the 1980's, the discussion of which centers chiefly around the present trend in general national policy, a movement towards a greater decentralization of the Colombian state.

The above is also related to the problems of efficiency in the sector, many of which, according to some experts, could be overcome within the present budget. As can be seen in Table VI-5 the share of public expenditure on education has increased continually from 1965 to 1984, rising from 1.2% of the GDP to 3.17%. Although with the crisis of the 1980's public spending on education tended to diminish as a percentage of the GDP since 1985, it is certain that its average share does not differ much from that of other countries at similar stages of development. Without pretending that it is enough to resolve all Colombian educational problems, it is obvious that the expenditure must be placed in context.

Conclusions

The Colombian effort in the area of education has been enormous in the last forty years. In this space of time, the country has advanced considerably in the construction of an educational planning system, which although still lacks the desired solidity, has already made significant achievements and possesses personnel capable of improving its future development. The impact upon the population has been notable, having substantially reduced the illiteracy rate which, during this period, fell from 40% of the population to less than 11%. The principal obstacle encountered by planners in the 1950's, the insufficient infrastructure in terms of construction and the availability of primary school teachers, has been largely overcome.

TABLE VI-5

EDUCATION
SHARE OF TOTAL EXPENDITURE IN THE GDP - 1965-1988
(CURRENT PRICES - MILLIONS OF PESOS)

YEARS	GDP	EXPENDITURE ON EDUCATION	% SHARE
1965			
1970			
1975			
1976			
1977			
1978			
1979			
1980			
1981			
1982			
1983			
1984			
1985			
1986			
1987			
1988			

Source: Mineducación (1988) and General Comptroller of the Republic (1988).

This all undoubtedly points to the good aspects of in the Colombian educational system and to its dizzyingly fast evolution in the last few years. However, serious problems still exist. If the country does not hold as one of its main objective the construction of more schools or the training of more teachers, a significant regional imbalance will persist, in which the countryside continues to be marginalized. This problem, significant still at the primary level, is especially acute at the secondary and further educational levels, which are dramatically concentrated in a few cities. In addition, Colombia must confront the problem of elevating the quality of the education offered, which, at all levels, is still insufficient. All educational resources are presently beginning to be directed towards this task, and it will surely be the topic to dominate educational debate in the years to come.

Finally, concerning other sectors of the educational system, such as culture, recreation, and scientific research, if until now these were relatively marginalized in state efforts in education, the time has come in which it may prove excessively costly in a not -too- distant future to continue discriminating against them.

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CHAPTER VII

FROM A RURAL SOCIETY TO AN URBAN NATION

INTRODUCTION

In the last forty years we have gone from being a rural society to an urban nation. While in 1951 38.7% of the population lived in an urban zone, in 1985, this proportion had reached 68%[1]/. These two statistics reflect a tremendous change in our society.

The culture of an agrarian society is profoundly different from that of a city. This is shown in different types of employment, family structures, uses of knowledge, distribution of power, social classes and the influence of religion. For these reasons the transformation of a rural society to an urban one in the short timespan of forty years is bound to be traumatic.

However, at the same time, this transformation is tremendously positive. Lewis Munford taught us to see the city as the quintessence of civilization[2]/ and Henri Pirenne (1925) described the progress of the West in terms of the development of urban culture in Europe. This centuries-long process, the basis of European civilization, occurs amongst us over the space of a few

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1/ Flórez, Echeverri and Méndez (1987), p.19.

2/ Gill B. (1990).

decades, and brings us civilization but also changes which transform, often in a traumatic manner, the lives of two generations.

Table VII-1 shows the pace of urbanization in Colombia. The object of this chapter is to explain the rural-urban migration -the principal cause of this accelerated process of urbanization- and to discuss some of the social transformations generated by both phenomena.

Economic causes of migration

In Colombia the belief exists that migration was caused by the expulsion of rural inhabitants from the countryside. Rural inhabitants migrate because they cannot find renumerative work where they live or because of violence. If this were the case, then there would be more migration than the cities could effectively absorb and the immigrants would be underemployed in relatively unproductive jobs, such as services. That is, if the worker were driven out of the countryside, there would be an excess of urbanization.

It has been said that in Colombia the land law of the late thirties forced small farmers from the countryside and that the great migratory flood of 1951-1964 was due to violence.

TABLE VII-1

POPULATION
URBAN AND RURAL ACCORDING TO CENSUSES
1938-1985

YEAR	POPULATION		ANNUAL GROWTH RATE		URBAN PROPORTION
	URBAN	RURAL	URBAN	RURAL	%
1938					
1951					
1964					
1973					
1985					

Source: Flórez, Echeverri and Méndez (1987) p.19.

Although it is undoubtedly possible that migration is due to an economic crisis in the countryside, all the empirical evidence suggests that migration, more than a process of expulsion, has been the result of the benefits of increased productivity and the employment opportunities generated by industrialization and the development of modern services in the cities.

In reality there has not been a rural crisis. Table VII-2 shows that there was no deterioration in real agricultural day-wages during the period of intense rural-urban migration. Simultaneously, in the first post-war decades real industrial wages increased in an accelerated manner, almost doubling between 1953 and 1969. Migration, therefore, is more of a response to the attraction of the city than to a rural crisis which was forcing inhabitants from their homes.

Table VII-3 sums up the differences in rural-urban earnings in 1970. These differences were greater in the 1950's, the period of most rapid migration, but in 1970 they continue to be large. It is observed that in all regions urban income is at least 100% higher than in the countryside. This is certainly an incentive for migration.

After the end of the sixties, agricultural day-wages began to grow rapidly in real terms, inducing a slowth of the rate of migration observed in table VII-1 for the period 1973-1985. It

TABLE VII-2

WAGES 1950-1970
AGRICULTURAL, CONSTRUCTION, INDUSTRY
(1958 PRICES)

YEAR	UNQUALIFIED CONSTRUCTION WORKERS. BOGOTA		AGRICULTURAL DAY-WAGES C/MARCA	ANNUAL EARNINGS OF PAID FACTORY WORKERS
	DAY WAGES	ANNUAL EARNINGS		
1950				
1951				
1952				
1953				
1954				
1955				
1956				
1957				
1958				
1959				
1960				
1961				
1962				
1963				
1964				
1965				
1966				
1967				
1968				
1969				
1970				

Source: Urrutia M. and Berry A. (Bogotá, 1975) p.138 and 140. La distribución de ingreso en Colombia.

TABLE VII-3

AVERAGE INCOME
BY REGION, RURAL SECTOR, URBAN SECTOR AND SEX
1970

REGIONS - SEX		AVERAGE INCOME	
		RURAL	URBAN
SEX	TOTAL		
	MEN		
	WOMEN		
REGION	ATLANTIC		
	EASTERN		
	BOGOTA		
	CENTRAL		
	PACIFIC.		

Source: Urrutia M. and Berry A. (1975), p.165.

would therefore appear that migration responds greatly to the changes in rural-urban wage differentials.

This has been found in the great number of developing countries in which migratory flows towards the cities have also been significant. In other words, the migratory process in Colombia has not been exceptional and was not born out of specific circumstances such as violence. It was a response to the fact that young people could radically improve their incomes if they migrated towards the cities or towards frontier agricultural zones.

The formulation of Harris and Todaro (1970) on the determinants of internal migration during the process of development has been empirically proved in many countries. This model postulates that people migrate according to the income differences between place of origin and place of destination and the relative levels of unemployment in the two places. The unemployment variable is important, because in many developing countries the wages in the modern sector of the economy are higher than the average wage, but the migrant has few possibilities of finding employment in modern businesses. Typically, therefore, the incentive to migrate is the observed difference in wages, multiplied by the probability of obtaining a job at that salary level.

Formally, $Mt = f(Su - Sr)$

[Equation 1]; that is, **Mt** is the number of rural-urban migrants in the period t, f is a response fuction and **Su** and **Sr** are the urban and rural salaries. But since not everyone can find work in the cities, **S***, or the expected urban salary, is a fuction of the probability **(p)** of finding work in the city, multiplied by the urban salary **Su**, resulting in: **S* = pSu** [Equation 2].

A simple definition of **p** is: **p = Eu/Eu + Uu** [Equation 3], where **Eu** = urban employment, and **Uu** = urban unemployment. Equation 1 becomes: **Mt = h(pSu - Sr)** [Equation 4]. That is, the flow of migrants from rural to urban zones will depend on wage (or earnings) differences between the countryside and the city and the level of urban unemployment.

This model describes the Colombian experience fairly well. Migration reached its peak between 1951-1964, when urban salaries were growing rapidly in real terms, while rural salaries did not increase. The rate of migration diminished significantly between 1973 and 1985 (see table VII-1), when rural salaries increased in real terms and manufacturing industry salaries diminished (at the beginning of the seventies), or rose little in the second half of the decade.

However, other variables also help to explain the migratory flows. Distance and transport costs determine people's destinations. For example, in the 1961 survey of the population of

Bogota analyzed by Urrutia and Castellanos (1962), it was found that 68% of migrants had been born in Cundinamarca, Boyacá, and Tolima. García (1970) found that in 1967, 83.5% of migrants in Bucaramanga had come from the department of Santander.

Distance and transport costs therefore influence migration destinations. This is due to the fact that the lesser cost of migration to the nearest city can be absorbed with greater ease by the migrant, but also to the fact that it is easier to obtain information about the labour market in the department capital than in distant cities. In addition, the migrant often arrives to live in the city with relatives or acquaintances and it is they who help him find employment. Therefore, once groups from one locality are established in Bogotá, this tends to accelerate the migration from this locality to the city.

Violence as a cause of migration

The common theory in the 1960's was that rural-urban migration had been greatly influenced by violence. In that same decade, the first labour-force surveys were designed and conducted, testing this hypothesis.

Upon analyzing the characteristics of migrants in the first urban surveys, it was quite surprising to find that this population bore no resemblance to the expected stereotypes. It was imagined

that the typical migrant was a poor rural labourer, frequently uprooted by violence, illiterate, living in the squatters' settlements on the city edges, employed in marginal jobs such as street vending, shoe shining or prostitution.

The surprise was great upon discovering in the first wide urban survey by Urrutia and Castellanos (1962) that the bulk of migrants to Bogotá bore very different characteristics. First, the majority came from urban zones (63.5%) and not from the countryside. Second, the migrants were better educated than Bogotanos and much better educated than the population of their place of origin. In 1961, 89% of migrants living in Bogotá were literate and 26% had some type of secondary or university education, compared to 24% for persons born in Bogotá Migrants were also not over-represented in the worse-paid jobs. For example, 7% of immigrant men were professional and skilled workers, as opposed to only 2% of those born in Bogotá. Michael Conroy (1976), on summarizing various studies on migration, comments that immigrants in the cities systematically experience lower unemployment rates than natives and various studies find that the poorest immigrants are not found in the squatters' settlements on the cities' peripheries but in the tenements of the old historic centres.

In short, none of the generalizations that were made about migration appeared to be true. Besides that, the majority of migrants did not seem to be typically displaced by violence.

Various studies carried out in the sixties by the CEDE of the Universidad de los Andes, attempted to determine the real influence of violence on rural-urban migration.

Marco Reyes (1965) conducted a survey in Bogotá precisely to discover the motivations of people for moving to the city. Table VII-4 shows the reasons for migration to Bogotá.

The family motive includes all those persons (housewives, children, old people) who migrate because of the head of household or elders. Other motives determine this move, which can therefore be ignored.

Table VII-4 shows that very few people came to Bogotá because of violence before 1963, but that this motivation can be of some relevance in the case of migrants from Tolima and Santander. Since migrants from furthest-away zones (other than Cundinamarca) frequently did not migrate directly to Bogotá, but rather first to an intermediate city and then to Bogotá, it could be that violence caused the first move from place of origin and did not motivate the move to Bogotá. Table VII-5 shows the motivations for the first phase of moving. The table shows that violence played a major role in the motivation of this first decision to migrate, but in any case only 4.7% of men declared it to be their reason for moving.

TABLE VII-4

REASONS FOR MIGRATION
OF INMIGRANT POPULATION BY DEPARTMENT
%

	REASON FOR MOVE						
DEPT.	ECON.	FAMIL.	STUDY	MILIT.	VIOL.	ADMIN.	OTHERS
C/MARCA							
BOYACA							
TOLIMA							
CALDAS							
SANTANDER							
NARIÑO							
VALLE							
BOLIVAR							
HUILA							
OTHER ZONES							

Source: Reyes M. (1965) Summary 11, p.18.

It would therefore appear that the high migration to Bogotá during 1951-1964 was not due to violence. There is some evidence, however, that the emigration from Tolima and Santander may have been partly caused by violence. In table VII-4 a small proportion of migrants from these departments in Bogotá give this as their reason for moving. Michael E. Conroy (1976) also demonstrates that according to the censuses of 1951-1964-1973, Tolima is the department with the highest yearly rate of emigration (1.62%) in the period of violence (1951-1964) and the only department whose migration rate is substantially higher in 1951-1964 than in 1964-1973.

Santander also demonstrates a high yearly net rate of emigration (0.53%) in 1951-1964 and it is slightly higher in that period of violence than in 1964-1973, when in general the rates of emigration and immigration in other departments accelerate in the second period (see table VII-6).

In 1967, CEDE conducted some surveys of greater breadth in five Colombian cities and also investigates into the causes of migration. Carlos García (1970) summarized the motivations for migration of immigrants in Bogotá, Bucaramanga, Manizales, Medellín and Popayán. Table VII-7 summarizes the data.

It is once again observed that violence is not one of the principal causes of migration. It is a motivation which carried

TABLE VII-5

REASONS FOR MOVE
FROM PLACE OF BIRTH TO SECOND PLACE
OF RESIDENCE OTHER THAN BOGOTA OF IMMIGRANTS
LIVING IN BOGOTA IN 1963

REASONS FOR MOVE	PERCENTAGES		
	TOTAL	MEN	WOMEN
ECONOMIC			
FAMILY			
STUDY			
ADMIN. MOVE			
MILIT. SERVICE			
VIOLENCE			
OTHER REASONS			

Source: Reyes M. (1965).

TABLE VII-6

MIGRATORY FLOW
ANNUAL RATE BY DEPARTMENT
1951-1964 AND 1964-1973

DEPARTMENTS	PERIOD	
	1951-1964	1964-1973
ANTIOQUIA		
ATLANTICO		
BOLIVAR		
BOYACA		
CALDAS		
CAUCA		
CHOCO		
CORDOBA		
C/MARCA AND BOGOTA		
HUILA		
MAGDALENA		
NARIÑO		
N. DE SANTANDER		
SANTANDER		
TOLIMA		
VALLE		

Source: Conroy M. (1976).

weight in the decision to migrate to Bucaramanga, which confirms that part of rural emigration in Santander may have been rooted in the desire to flee the violence. In any case, what is certainly clear is that economic motives are put forward 10 to 20 times more often than violence as causes of migration.

In short, many writers are mistaken when they identify the violence of 1951-1964 as one of the causes for the accelerated urbanization of Colombia at that time. Urbanization and the transformation of a rural society into an urban one had an economic basis. People migrated from the countryside to the city in order to better their economic situation and the majority of those who embarked on this enterprise achieved this.

In the rural zones, migration also had economic motivations. Torales (1979) cites a study which demonstrates that the motivation for the migration of the workers who harvest cotton is better wages in 53% of cases, and unemployment in 31% of cases. In the area of the river Suárez near Chiquinquirá, economic reasons for migration also predominate. In that rural area, which experienced violence in the 1950's, 0.2% of immigrants declared violence to be the reason for their move[3]/.

Although circular migration did occurr -i.e. people who migrated in search of economic improvement, did not find it and

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3/ Reyes, Prieto and Hunmeson (1965).

TABLE VII-7

1967 IMMIGRATION
BY SEX, BY MOTIVATION FOR MOVING
TO CITY OF PRESENT RESIDENCE (%)

	CITY	WORK-RELATED	FAMILY	STUDY	VIOLENCE	ADMIN. MOVE	OTHERS	TOTAL
	BOGOTA							
M	BUCARAMANGA							
E	MANIZALES							
N	MEDELLIN							
	POPAYAN							
W	BOGOTA							
O	BUCARAMANGA							
M	MANIZALES							
E	MEDELLIN							
N	POPAYAN							

Source: Garcia C. (1970, Table 23.

returned to their place of origin- it was infrequent, according to different surveys and censuses.

The great majority of immigrants did indeed improve their economic situation. They went from underproductive jobs to more productive jobs. This was one of the sources of economic growth in the forty years of post-war development.

Econometric studies on migration

Until this point we have described the process of migration essentially by means of an analysis of the migrants found in the cities in the 1960's. Econometric methods can also be used with survey and census data to determine causes of migration.

DANE (1977) used a correlation by ranks between immigration rates and socio economic variables of the 1973 census, in order to reach the conclusion that "people migrate in search of better job and educational opportunities. A department with higher immigration rates has a higher average wage (.6475) while a department with higher illiteracy rates (cr = -.6038), and higher percentage of housing without water and electricity, has lower immigration rates".

Conroy (1976) developed a model to explain immigration in Colombia. The estimated econometric models were the following:

(1) $Mt_j = f_1 (S_{1j}, S_{2j}, S_{3j}, S_{4j}, S_{5j}, U_{1j}, U_{2j})$

(2) $Ma_j = f_2 (S_{1j}, S_{2j}, S_{3j}, S_{4j}, S_{5j}, U_{1j}, U_{2j})$

Where Mt_j = Net migration to department j.

S_{ij} = employment growth in the department j in the sector i.

U_{1j} = number of unemployed persons per department. U_{2j} = human labour years available per department. Ma_j = net migration to the main towns of department j.

The variables explain between 89% and 98% of variations in migration. That is, the variables of employment growth explain the majority of migration equations as much between departments as between the rural and urban sectors. For rural-urban migration, the growth variable in manufacturing employment is very significant. Employment growth in construction, conversely, did not stimulate rural-urban migration.

Table VII-8 shows two of the best equations of the model.

Paul Schultz (1969) also attempted to explain migration in the period 1951 to 1964 with an econometric model. The explicative power of the model, however, is not very good as it only explains 31% to 37% of migration. However, the breadth is greater than that of Conroy (1976), since instead of explaining interdepartmental migration (18 observations) it attemps to explain migration with an analysis of 131 municipalities.

TABLE VII-8

EXPLICATIVE REGRESSIONS
OF NET MIGRATION BY DEPARTMENT
(VALUES T, IN PARENTHESES)

CONSTANT	PRIMARY SECTOR	MANUF., ELECTRIC., WATER	CONSTRUC.	MODERN SERVICES	TRANSP. AND COMMUNIC.

Source: Conroy (1976, table A-2.8 and table A-2.9).

The results of Schultz show a clear positive relation between the level of rural wages and immigration; i.e. that emigration is higher in municipalities with low agricultural wages. Another interesting result is that emigration is also higher in municipalities with high rates of natural population growth and also higher in municipalities with a higher percentage of persons with a primary education between the ages of 10 to 14. Finally, Schultz finds a negative relationship between violence and immigration.

Using the data of Germán Guzmán, Orlando Fals Borda and Eduardo Umaña (1964), Schultz calculated the number of violent deaths for political reasons for 10,000 inhabitants per municipality and included those figures in his model. The relationship between violence and immigration was negative -i.e. those municipalities with the most violence tend to lose population.

However, violence did not affect migration in main towns. It only affected rural zones. According to the model's estimate, if no violence had occurred, as opposed to the actual case of 8.7 violent deaths per 10,000 inhabitants, the emigration in the surveyed areas would have been 13% less than actually occurred, i.e. it would have diminished from 2.25 to 1.95 a year[4]/.

4/ Schultz (1969), p.64.

It was also found that violence had a positive correlation to rural wages. That is, violence occurred not in the poorest zones, but in those where the rural labour force earned the highest wages. It was also positively linked to the proportion of immigrants in rural zones. These last two results are very significant. Now, as in the fifties, rural violence takes place in agricultural frontier areas, where there is much new immigration and high wages. They are areas in which property is not clearly defined and without a well-established social structure. As we will see later on, violent areas are also those in which there is a clear demographic imbalance, with many more men than women, due to the predominance of young men in rural - rural migration. In addition, there is an over-representation of men in the 16 to 30 age group, and this group has the highest crime rate in the whole world.

Schultz's results clarify somewhat the relationship between violence and migration, for they show that violence did not affect migration in main towns. Second, the surveys in the main cities do not show people displaced by violence and at the same time show that the majority of migrants originated from urban, not rural zones. This means that violence was able to displace rural inhabitants from certain rural areas to other rural areas or to the municipality's main towns. What is also clear is that it did not influence migration to the large centres which were undergoing an accelerated industrialization process.

Migration by stages

Research on migrants in the 1960's and census data lead to the impression that migration took place by stages. The majority of immigrants to the large cities did not arrive from the countryside. Table VII-9, based on the surveys analyzed by García (1970), shows how the great majority of the immigrants to the large cities in 1967 came from urban zones.

It would therefore seem that the migration which led to the rapid growth of the country's principal cities did not imply the transformation of rural families into an urban protetariat. The process was less traumatic. It seems that the people who arrive in Bogotá, Medellín and Cali before the 1970's are of an urban culture. The rural emigrants arrive first in main towns where they initiate the process of adapting to urban life.

Life in main municipal towns constitutes a culture of transition between countryside and city. In the Cundinamarca-Boyacá area, for example, it would seem that the village inhabitants have a culture and way of life that is much more urban than rural. In this way, young people who grow up in these towns, besides enjoying better opportunities for study than in the countryside, also adapt more easily to life in a big city like Bogotá.

TABLE VII-9

IMMIGRANTS
ACCORDING TO URBAN-RURAL ORIGIN 1967
% VARIOUS CITIES

MEN		WOMEN	
URBAN	RURAL	URBAN	RURAL
	BOGOTA		
	BUCARAMANGA		
	MANIZALES		
	MEDELLIN		
	POPAYAN		

Source: Garcia (1970), table 9.

William P. McGreevey (1965) at the end of the sixties, put forward a hypothesis about the characteristics of internal migration in Colombia, which was later supported by the results of research projects such as that of Reyes (1970). This hypothesis stated that the migration to the large cities in Colombia took place in two stages. The first generation moved from the countryside to main provincial towns, or regional urban centres, and the second generation migrated to the large cities.

It is possible that this type of migration is less traumatic in social terms than the massive displacements from the countryside to urban industrial centres, as may have happened in other Latin American countries.

One interesting effect produced by urban-urban migration in Colombia is that access to education is much greater in main towns than in the countryside, which determined that immigrants to the big cities, mostly originating from main provincial towns, had high levels of education. This prepared them well for employment in the modern sector of the urban economy and guaranteed that those immigrants not only had low unemployment indexes, but were able to obtain well-paid jobs.

In the words of Simonne and Cardona (1970, p.170) "The migrants (to Bogotá), those from small towns as much as those from cities, tend to be a fairly select group in relation to their place

of origin, in terms of the status of the father and his education, and their general status".

The city which experienced the greatest direct migration from the countryside to the city was Bogotá, which directly attracted the rural inhabitants from the surrounding areas of Cundinamarca and Boyacá. The empirical evidence, partially reflected in table VII-9, demonstrates that the majority of this direct rural-city migration occurred amongst women and that many of them arrived in the city to engage in domestic service. This was one of the few urban jobs which required neither education nor a knowledge of urban culture.

To summarize, the migration processes in Colombia adapted fairly well to national reality and made it possible for urbanization in the new industrial centres to take place with a relatively well educated labour force, one which was adapted to the skill levels required by the new production processes. Although the specific characteristics of this migratory process facilitated the transition of the country from a rural society to an urban one, this process did create an imbalance which could have had a high social cost: migration created a significant imbalance between the sexes in various regions of the country.

Although the subject is touched on in the chapter on the womens' revolution, it is worth noting here that this imbalance was

essentially created by the higher immigration rates of women to the cities and by the higher rates of rural-rural migration amongst men. This phenomenon led to towns with an over-representation of young men in the agricultural frontier towns, which may be related to the high levels of violence in these regions. The excess of women in the cities, in its turn, may have led to increases in single - motherhood, a phenomenon which has placed many children in situations of extreme poverty, since in Colombia, as in many other countries in the world, a significant proportion of families living in absolute poverty are families in which the head of household is a single woman.

Winners and losers in the urbanization process

In general, the accelerated process of urbanization in Colombia between 1950 and 1990 led to a substantial improvement in the standard of living and in the opportunities presented to those who took part in the migratory flow from the rural zones to the main towns and from there to the big cities.

Table VII-3 shows the potential improvement in income for those persons who go from working in rural areas to urban ones. Besides increases in earnings, migrants from rural zones and small towns to large cities also manage to improve their children's access to education, improve their housing, and have better access to essential public utilities such as drinkable water, electricity

and telephones. The movement of the population from scattered houses in the countryside to the city also improves access to health and recreation facilities.

A second very significant aspect of urbanization is the effect on the population growth rate. Not only is access to modern contraceptive methods easier in the cities, but there are also many more incentives for limiting the size of the family. In Colombia it has been found that women's fertility diminishes significantly as both their level of education and the possibility of their finding well-paid work outside the home increase. Both of these factors are facilitated by the city, and at the same time, the reduction in the birth rate has strong correlations with urbanization.

Finally, the estimates on changes in income distribution, Urrutia (1984), show that although between 1964 and 1972 there was no clear improvement in urban or rural income distribution, rural-urban migration did lead to an improvement in national distribution of income. After the mid-seventies, both rural and urban income distribution appear to improve, made possible by the continued improvement in national income distribution with much lower migration rates than in the past.

In the first period of accelerated migration (1951-1964), it was migrants who benefited most from urbanization, since they significantly improved their incomes upon obtaining the well-paid

new jobs offered by the new industrial centres. Many migrants from rural zones or main municipal towns and small cities also increased their incomes. Finally, new industry and modern services were developed thanks to the well qualified labour supply made possible by migration.

Urban populations do not appear to have suffered from the increase in labour supply caused by migration, for real urban wages grew in an accelerated way until the end of the 1960's.

In short, the majority of Colombians benefited from the migratory processes which preceded the 1970's. Perhaps the exception is the minority of families which did not migrate voluntarily, but were forced from the countryside by violence or by a growing population pressure in some zones with an excess of population density per cultivable hectare. Some women who moved directly from rural areas to domestic service in the cities may have been in this situation.

Those who remained in the rural zones also benefited from migration. Given that the demographic increase was in part a rise in fertility rates, if there had not been a great migratory flow, agricultural day-wages would have fallen significantly due to the excess of labour supply in the countryside.

In the seventies migration did not only prevent rural wages from falling, but even made possible an increase in real day-wages. The migration in the second period therefore clearly benefitted the poorest groups who remained in the rural areas. Conversely, urban wages ceased to rise, due partly to the increased labour supply engendered by migration. In this second phase, migrants and those who remained in the rural areas continued to benefit from the process, but the benefits were less clear for urban workers. This means that the second phase of migration, after 1973, benefited the poorest workers (agricultural labourers) but may have contributed to a deterioration of the relative position of the urban middle class.

In any case, urbanization and migration have been the great mechanisms of progress for a great number of Colombians in the last forty years and have been the fundamental mechanisms for the modernization of our society.

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CHAPTER VIII

DETERIORATING INDEXES OF WELFARE

INTRODUCTION

The fundamental object of this chapter is to analyze some of the costs of economic progress, such as the deterioration of the environment and the welfare indicators which do not appear to have been helped by economic development, like the indexes of conflict in our society. This analysis leads to the reevaluation of the traditional idea that there exists a direct and close link between economic conditions and the growth in violence. With respect to the increase of conflict in our society[1]/ the hypothesis suggested here is that violence in Colombia has not always been a direct result of a rise in unemployment nor of a deterioration of family economic conditions. Although economic development generates conflict and in many countries is related to increases in crime and social conflict, in Colombia there does not appear to have been a direct link between economic conditions and the homicide rate since the mid-seventies, as the rate began to rise at the same time as all the social indicators began to improve, as has been observed in earlier chapters.

1/ From now on, violence will be measured as the homicide rate per 100,000 inhabitants, see Losada R. (1989).

Economic development and the political evolution of the 1960´s do appear to have contributed to the gradual brake on the phenomenon of violence from which the Colombian population has traditionally suffered. However, a long-term analysis shows that political and economic motivations have been losing strength as explicative variables of the phenomenon of violence: the majority of economic indicators have registered improvement while the intensity of conflicts has risen in an impressive manner in most of the country´s regions, especially since the mid-seventies and at an even more accelerated pace in the 1980´s.

The above suggests that although it is true that situations of poverty and low standards of living persist in large parts of the population as a result of incomplete economic development, it has likewise been established, as will be seen later on, that standards of living in both rural and urban zones have improved in a significant manner, particularly during the last decade. This suggests a weakening of the "structural" causes of poverty, which have traditionally been considered as one of the fundamental origins of the phenomenon of violence. If it is also considered, as is true in the worst cases, that these structural-type limitations have persisted in the last few decades, their relation to the intensification of conflict is not clear. The homicide rate has experienced such a sharp upswing in the present decade that it seems to be explained by factors outside the economic context,

since it does not coincide with a long-term deterioration in the overall principal social and economic indicators.

However, at the same time as progress is made on many social fronts, the behaviour of a series of other variables which also affect welfare, such as citizens' security, suggests that the country's development pattern has allowed for the emergence of certain problems which seriously worsen the quality of life of average citizens. First, the presence of the state, in the guise of the provision of public services, has not been homogenous in all regions of the country. Serious regional imbalances have been created, evidenced by the deficiency in the majority of social indicators in the coastal departments and some rural zones. The limitations of state resources and deficient institutional development have led to a great inefficiency in the provision of basic services such as health and education, and essential social services.

Second, the process of economic development did not automatically engender the adaptation of certain institutions to the new circumstances in which the country found itself. The growing crisis in the country's justice system has not only facilitated the accelerated rise in the crime and violence indexes but also the creation of new forms of violence as a consequence of the inability to prevent misdemeanors.

Although the growing incapacity of certain institutions to deal with the structural change which has taken place in our society, mostly created by economic development, serves to explain the repeated outbreaks of violence over time, they are not the only causes of its growth. It is therefore of crucial importance to refer to a particular phenomenon which since the end of the 1970's has become the country's principal cause of social and economic violence: drug trafficking.

Finally, it is important to make a brief mention of the relationship between welfare and growth. The increase in production has not necessarily meant an improvement in the welfare of society, as this is not directly affected by the production of goods. On the contrary, economic development and the new forms of the appropriation of lands generate serious effects such as the destruction of the environment. For a complete picture of social welfare we should subtract the costs of the depletion of certain natural resources and the spoiling of the environment from the indicators of consumption and output.

The behaviour of violence in Colombia

The statistics on violence per 100,000 inhabitants have been taken as a reference for the analysis of the evolution of violence for the period 1970-1987. Table VIII-1 verifies that the indexes of violence, measured as the number of homicides per year, have

TABLE VIII-1

C O L O M B I A
HOMICIDE RATE, 1970-1987

YEAR	NUMBER OF HOMICIDES		HOMICIDE RATE (FOR EACH 100,000 INH.)	
	(1)	GROWTH %	(2)	GROWTH %
1970-1975				
1975-1984				
1984-1987				

(1) Average homicides per year in the period.
(2) Homicides per 100,000 inhab. registered on average per year.
Source: Losada and Velez (1989) and author's calculations.

increased at an unchecked pace in the majority of the regions of the country, rising from 4,118 in 1973 to 14,288 in 1986. This violence has been accentuated since 1984, reaching an average annual increase during the period 1984-1987 of 20.5%, the highest in the last four decades[2]/. If the figures are analyzed on a monthly basis, it is observed that since 1982 there have been on average 800 homicides per month, although in absolute terms, each month exceeds the number of homicides for the same month in the past few years[3]/.

Although the tendency is clearly a growing one, it is worth analyzing its behaviour during different periods in greater detail. Graph VIII-1 permits the observation of four phases after 1955: an accelerated growth from the mid - fifties until 1958, then a rapid decrease until 1960, continuing on a decreasing trajectory until 1975, the year which registers the lowest levels (16.8 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants), after which there is a gradual rise until 1984, with an average annual increase of 6.7%. From that point on, the annual homicide rate shows an accelerated increase, rising from the levels of the 1950's (33 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants) to doubling in only four years, until attaining the highest figure in the last three decades, 62.8%. In 1989, the unchecked growth is

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2/ The statistical information corresponds to the archive of annual deaths of the DANE and is similar to the figures of the National Police. For greater detail on the methodology, see Losada R. (1989).

3/ See Coyuntura Social (1989).

GRAPH VIII-1

EVOLUTION OF THE HOMICIDE RATE
1955-1987

HOMICIDE
RATE
PER
100,000
INHABITANTS.

(va la gráfica)

Source: See text and Losada (1989).

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maintained, as is shown by the statistics from another source: in 1988, there were about 5,000 violent acts (armed assaults, kidnappings and assassinations, as much against political leaders as against functionaries and civilians), a figure which between January and June of 1989, had risen to more than 4,000[4]/.

Violence and economic development

In order to evaluate the present relationship between violence and economic development in the last thirty years, it is worth analyzing in detail the evolution of the two variables in the two different periods mentioned.

The behaviour of homicide rates registered between 1955 and 1960 seems more of a response to the country's sociopolitical situation at that time, than violence of a socio-economic nature. The growing evolution until 1958 clearly coincides with the wave of violence which engulfed the country in the early fifties, originating in part from the events of April 9, 1948, which triggered a series of violent reactions from the different sectors of society, reaching its fiercest peak during the last years of the

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4/ The statistical information corresponds to the years 1988 and 1989, from the report "General Statistics on Violence in Colombia, 1988-89", prepared by the Council for Reconciliation, Normalization and Rehabilitation.

Rojas Pinilla dictatorship[5]/ (this period is commonly referred to as "La Violencia"). However, the politics of pacification, the truce and the economic policies of the National Front, appear to have had a significant impact on the reduction in the number of deaths by homicide registered in the country after 1958 and particularly until 1960, a relationship which will explored in greater detail in the following section.

Socioeconomic violence

Within the conflicts of economic origin, the "absence (or presence) of the state" in the regions and the evolution of principal social indicators enters into consideration as one of the fundamental criteria for the evaluation of the correlation between economic development and the behaviour of the indexes of violence.

After the birth of the National Front and partly in response to the innumerable damages inflicted on thousands of citizens by "La Violencia", a scheme of social, economic and political reforms was put into place, supported internationally by the Alliance for Progress. The greater intervention of the state in social services, fortified by the creation of organizations such as the National

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5/ An account of the evolution of political conflicts during the 1950's and 1960's can be found in Sánchez and Peñaranda (1986) and in Once Ensayos sobre la Violencia (Eleven Essays on Violence) (1985).

Council for Economic and Social Policy (CONPES)[6]/ was evidenced by the expansion of public services, by the increase of public expenditure on education and health[7]/; the variation in the consumer price index went from 24.2% in 1947 and 17.3% in 1948, to 5.7% in 1960, a trend which was maintained during the sixties[8]/. In addition, income distribution ceased to deteriorate and the income of all social classes grew substantially[9]/. In the area of labour, the unions were strengthened by means of a new Labour Legislation [Ocampo, (1987)], which favoured collective negotiations and also an increase in wage levels in proportion to inflation, particularly in industry[10]/.

6/ The government income over national income, as a measure of government intervention in the economy, began to increase rising from 11% in 1950 until reaching a rate of 18.7% in 1979, see Kalmanovitz (1989).

7/ The National Front undertook an expansionist fiscal program funded by moneys from the Alliance for Progress. Additionally, the plebiscite of 1957 established for the first time that at least 10% of the national budget should be directed towards the funding of primary education. Central organizations responsible for the provision of public services were established. See Ocampo (1987).

8/ The levels of increase of the price index stood at about 7% over the decade, except in the years 1963, 1964 and 1967, according to information from the Revista del Banco de la República (Journal of the Central Bank).

9/ Distribution improved significantly from 1951 until 1964 and then remained constant until 1973. This means that the population benefited from economic growth. See Urrutia (1980).

10/ For more detail on the evolution of the unions and rural and industrial wages, see Perry (1986).

In addition, the preoccupation with agrarian problems gave rise in 1959 to the debate over the imperative need to redistribute lands, and culminated in the Agrarian Reform of 1961. At its beginning this legislation was of crucial importance for the reduction of rural conflicts, in that it was founded on a new concept of "overall agrarian reform which will combine the distribution of land with credit, technical assistence and irrigation, with the end objective of reducing the severe socio-economic pressures in the country's rural zones and of retaining a larger proportion of the population in the country" [Ocampo, (1987)][11/].

These factors, amongst others, helped to placate demonstrations of violence; the greater presence of the state and the progressive tendencies of some basic indicators coincided with the drastic reduction in the homicide rate between 1958 and 1960, as can be appreciated in table VIII-1, and later, with its gradual reduction until 1975.

Within this collection of ideas, a link can be found between the effects of economic development and the reduction of the indexes of violence which was maintained until the mid-seventies.

11/ However, some analysts agree that due to the political pressures which it provoked, the agrarian reform which was put into place had positive effects on the development of commercial agriculture but a negative impact on the rural people. For this reason, in the following decades the conflicts increased. See Fajardo (1986).

However, a doubt emerges as to the explicative value of economic factors for the phenomenon of violence in later periods, due to the growth tendency of the homicide rate after the mid - seventies, a period in which social indicators showed significant progress, favoured by the general well-being of the overall economy[12/].

In connection with the above argument and in agreement with the study of Losada (1989), the presence of the state, understood as the adequate provision of basic health and educational services and access to communication, shows practically no relation at all to the homicide rate over the last decade[13/]. In accordance with the produced results, it is worth pointing out, however, that even if the absence of the state appears to have lost influence as a determing variable of violence in the country over the last fifteen years, and particularly since the early 1980's, it is possible that the loss in the explicative power of economic development is more

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12/ The period from the mid-seventies until the early eighties was a boom time for the country's economy, see Ocampo (1987). Additionally, the social indicators for education, health, real wages and income distribution amongst others, presented in Coyuntura Social (1989), demonstrate a positive tendency in the last fifteen years.

13/ For this effect, the author utilized a multiple regression, after calculating the service indicators. It was found that the only relation with some grade of significance, although very slight, was that concerning road access and the percentage of dwellings without utilities as explicative variables in the homicide rates of the municipalities, see Losada (1989).

a result of the increase in total homicides from other causes, than of a reduction in the explicative power of this factor[14]/.

However, other analysts of the subject consider that a relation exists between violence and "quality of life" (without referring simply to poverty but to a mixture of economic as well as social factors which determine a specific way of life) particularly in the urban zones, arguing that the cities "have been radically segregated, to such an extreme, that entire zones are constituted by areas of absolute poverty, while opulence takes over the best lands, isolates itself, and is fed by unchecked speculation. In other words, quality of life has a central component in population consumption and the prolongation of life by means of institutional nutritional and health services, but also has a component in the quality of personal relations, the deterioration of which is reflected in the increases in delinquency rates"[15]/. This means that the absence of the state not only deprives certain groups of an adequate physical infrastructure, but also generates a feeling of vulnerability, of impermanence and of a lack of belonging, in relation to personal space and to society, a situation which creates a favorable enviroment for the development of conflict. Urban violence in the 1980's is however much more complex and

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[14]/ In fact, this analysis is only carried out for the 1980's. Additionally, the authors point out that the results are subject to revision given that the statistics and calculations appear to reveal problems and inexactitudes.

[15]/ Comission on Studies on Violence (1987), p.90.

diffuse; composed of very different interests, forms of organization and final objectives, which seem to originate less and less from causes of an economic nature. The growing intensification of conflict in the urban zones has been particularly in evidence in the large cities (Medellín, Bogotá, Cali and Barranquilla), whose share in total homicides nationwide for the period 1979-1986 was near 30%, according to information from DANE.

As to rural violence, the argument for the existence of a correlation between violence and poverty has been partially questioned in recent studies on the subject, which demonstrate that in the majority of cases, the most violent regions of the country between 1983 and 1988 are those characterized by a higher level of development. It has been verified that the zones of greatest conflict (table VIII-2) possess a developed commercial agricultural sector and a significant share in total national output [Bejarano, (1990)][16/]. The departments of Antioquia, the National Territories, Meta, Cauca, Caquetá, Córdoba, Santander and Cesar, those most integrated into the economic system in terms of markets and infrastructure, and with elevated levels of productivity, are simultaneously the zones which register the highest indexes of violence. As can be observed in graphs VIII-3A and VIII-3B, in

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16/ The same relation between the level of conflict and commercial agriculture is found in Moreno C., and Sarmiento L. (1989), who conducted an evaluation of the general impact of armed conflict and drug activity on agriculture and livestock production in Colombia for the period 1980-1988.

TABLE VIII-2

DEATHS RELATED
TO CONFLICTS OF A POLITICAL NATURE 1974-1987

YEAR	SHARE OF TOTAL HOMICIDES (1)	
	POLICE	EL TIEMPO
1974		
1975		
1976		
1977		
1978		
1979		
1980		
1981		
1982		
1983		
1984		
1985		
1986		
1987	N.I.	

AVERAGE ANNUAL INCREASE
OF POLITICAL HOMICIDES BY PERIODS

Y E A R S	POLICE	EL TIEMPO
1974-1984		
1984-1987		

N.I. No Information.
* Figure only includes police deaths. Other figures consider deaths of Armed Forces. See Losada and Velez, 1989. The figures for this table were taken from the two original reports from El Tiempo.

Source: Police: Revista Criminalidad, 1974, 1986.
El Tiempo: Oficial tables by El Tiempo.

GRAPH VIII-3A

INCREASE IN AGRICULTURAL COMMERCE
DEPARTMENTS WITH CONFLICT, 1983-1988

(va la gráfica)

Source: Cerec, commercial production.

GRAPH VIII-3B

SHARE OF AGRICULTURAL COMMERCE
IN NATIONAL TOTAL, 1983-1988

(va la gráfica)

Source: Sarmiento L. (1989), table 3 and author's calculations.

these departments an elevated share in commercial production or its significant growth coincide during the period 1983-1988.

In addition, these results are consistent with the findings of other studies [Reyes and Bejarano, (1989)], in that it is these departments which have registered the greatest numbers of confrontations, assaults and seizures of people in the 1980's, some characterized by guerilla activity, others by the prescence of drug trafficking or otherwise by the coexistence of both these types of activities in the most fertile regions[17/].

To summarize, the principal causes of the violence which has plagued the country over the last decade and more specifically since 1984, do not appear to be for the most part the results of the pattern of economic development (graph VIII-4). However, it can be confirmed that development has been incomplete and not very homogenous in that it has intensified the differences in the quality of life between regions and between the rural and urban zones. In this sense, it is clear that there are some phenomena which, as will be seen later, have over time reinforced the dynamics of conflict such as regional imbalances, the inadequacy of the provision of basic utilities, and the insufficient supply of social services. Additionally, and more relevantly, the deterioration of the country's justice system in the last few years

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17/ A very detailed description of the characteristics of the most violent zones in the country is found in Losada and Vélez (1989).

GRAPH VIII-4

EVOLUTION OF HOMICIDE RATE
AND SOCIAL EXPENDITURE

RA
TES

AND

(va la gráfica)

PER
CEN
TA
GES

HOMICIDE RATE
PER 100,000 INHAB.

SOCIAL EXPENDITURE
AS % OF TOTAL

Source: Losada (1989) and Coyuntura Social (1989).

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is a factor which has contributed to the new wave of violence and allowed for the generalization of new forms of expression as a consequence of the growing impunity. However, and closely related to the above, the factor which determined the growing tendencies in the indexes of violence and particularly the upswing in deaths since the mid-eighties seems to be narcotics trafficking .

Violence and regional imbalances

The land problem, the absence or the weak presence of the state in the rural zones and the isolation of rural inhabitants are some of the factors which have had the most forceful impact on the process of violence in the country [Ocampo, (1987)].

In Colombia there still exist zones which are marginalized in terms of the availability of services, as compared to others in which the state exercises a greater presence. The distribution of public services tends to accentuate the typical regional differentiation of the country's development between urban and rural zones and between the rural areas themselves. Due to their physical geographical conditions (soil quality, water supply) and economic conditions (location with regards to regional markets or the national market), certain zones have grown financially thanks to the investment they attract, a process which has been accompanied by endowments of public services. In contrast, those departments which lack these types of comparative advantages have

registered a low economic growth and a displacement of their labour force towards places which offer better opportunities [Commission on Studies on Violence, (1989)]. This factor, and the fact that state investments follow, in some cases, the tendencies of the capital, has widened the breach between the regions and the distribution of resources for an integrated social and economic development.

The majority of social indicators reveal inadequacies in the coastal and rural departments. Access to education in the countryside is substantially lower than in urban areas[18]/. In 1985, the departments of Atlántico, Bolívar, Cesar, Chocó, and Nariño and the National Territories, registered the lowest levels of access to both primary and secondary education. As to health indicators, measured as hospital availability in the different regions of the country, it is observed that in 1987, it was the departments of Sucre, Cesar, Córdoba and the Guajira which had the lowest hospital resources[19]/. Additionally, Córdoba, Chocó, Caquetá and Sucre are the regions with the lowest level of social security coverage, being at the same time the least industrialized zones and those with the greatest problems of poverty.

18/ While urban primary coverage for the national total in 1985 was 100.7, rural coverage was 81.5. But the most dramatic case is that of secondary education: While in urban areas it was 62.11, in the rural zones it reached only 6.76. See Coyuntura Social (1989), table 2, p.32.

19/ This refers to available hospital beds per 1,000 inhabitants and hospital performance. Coyuntura Social (1989), table 4, p.55.

However, these elements and poverty in general do not appear to have much influence on the indexes of violence, at least since the mid eighties: the Caribbean coast (except for the Guajira and the Gulf of Urabá) and the mountainous regions of Nariño, are considered to be the "most pacific or highly pacific regions" in that they register the lowest homicide rates [Losada, Vélez, (1989)], but are also the poorest regions, with low levels of public services. Incomplete economic development and conditions of poverty are factors which evidently generate a great discontent amongst the population. However, if the fact that these conditions of inequality have existed for three decades is taken into account, it is not obvious that the impressive growth in violence after 1984 is a direct result of the model of economic development.

Based on these ideas, it is presumed that it is other factors which have generated such a marked increase in displays of violence in the country within the last decade.

Socio-political violence

These types of contradictions are referred to because political motivations help to explain the trajectory of violence. Political conflicts basically originating from the struggle for power or from the desire for greater political participation have historically been expressed by means of confrontations between the army and insurgent groups (guerrillas) or other organized groups which have

been growing in size since the mid-sixties. Amongst these are the Armed Revolutionary Forces (FARC), of rural origins; the movement of April 19 (M-19) and the National Liberation Army (ELN) of urban origins; and the Popular Liberation Army (EPL)[20]/. The presence of these forces, based in rural areas, has constituted a source of political social pressure for the country over the past few decades.

However, the statistics suggest that homicide for political reasons[21]/ seems to have lost influence as a factor in the present violence; between 5% and 15% of officially reported homicides in Colombia have been attributed to conflicts of a political nature (table VIII-2)[22]/. Although they are not insignificant by any means, it is clear that the causes of homicides at the end of the last decade are due mostly to non-political reasons. From representing 5% of violent deaths, politically motivated homicides rose to 15.5% in 1985 and 10.5% in 1986, a tendency which is maintained in the next two years, during which 5,266 political homicides were registered (a high rate in any

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[20]/ For greater detail, see Once Ensayos sobre la Violencia, 1985.

[21]/ Areas covered by the statistics are those related to guerilla activity and response to it. Concretely, it refers to the victims of confrontation between the army and the police and subversive groups and between these and civilians; see Losada (1989).

[22]/ For the methodology of the calculations until 1986, see Losada, R. (1989).

case)[23]/. However, it must be remembered that 30% of these were concentrated in very specific regions: the guerrilla groups are basically located in the most dynamic rural areas (graph VIII-2) situated in the centre of the country, in the departments of Antioquia, Santander, Córdoba, Caquetá, Meta, Arauca and Cauca [Bejarano, (1990)].

Although political motivations are indispensable for the understanding of the dynamic history of violence, they do not suffice to explain the sharp increase in violence at the beginning of the eighties. Graph VIII-5 charts a similar trajectory of the rates of homicide and politically motivated deaths until the mid 1980's; after 1985, the share of political violence in the total begins to diminish, while total homicides increase in a significant fashion. There remain, therefore, two closely-linked alternative explanations: the crisis in justice and the influence of narcotics trafficking.

Drug trafficking and the growth in violence

Before continuing on to the specific subject of the cultivation and commercialization of coca and marijuana, it is important to point out another factor which generated earlier conflicts and to which

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23/ For the years 1988 and 1989, the statistics were taken from the Report prepared by the Council for Peace and Rehabilitation (Consejería para la Paz y la Rehabilitación).

GRAPH VIII-2

DEPARTMENTS WITH GREATEST CONFLICT
NUMBER OF KIDNAPPINGS 1982-1988

(viene la gráfica)

ANTIOQUIA CAQUETA CAUCA CESAR CORDOBA HUILA META SANTAND. ARAUCA CASANARE

Source: Sarmiento (1989) and Table VIII-2

GRAPH VIII-5

SHARE OF POLITICALLY
MOTIVATED HOMICIDES IN NATIONAL TOTAL

(va la gráfica)

SHARE OF POLITICAL
HOMICIDES IN NATIONAL TOTAL

HOMICIDE RATE
PER 100,000 INHAB.

Source: Losada (1989)

the present situation bears a strong relation. It is the exploitation of natural resources for profit and the illegal production and commercialization of certain products, such as in the case of the exploitation of the emerald mines[24/]. The characteristics of this "subculture of illegality" were taken advantage of by the cultivators of coca, and their present forms of operation are therefore fairly similar.

The profits generated by the coca business were ploughed back into the purchase of vast expanses of land, whether used for traditional expansive cattle-grazing or cultivated by small or medium-sized owner or tenant farmers[25/]. In this way, the presence of narcotics trafficking intensified the struggle for possession or defense of territories, one of the oldest conflicts in the country's history. In earlier decades, this had consisted in confrontations between peasants and agricultural firms, between firms which exploit natural resources and populations already residing there (settlers and ethnic minorities). Recently, the

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24/ In zones such as the Minero river basin, Muzo and Coscuez in the department of Boyacá.

25/ According to Kalmanovitz (1990), the greatest investments by the mafia have been concentrated on the acquisition of farms near the cities and in particular in zones characterized by rural discontent and guerrilla presence. The zones affected in the northern regions of the country extend from east to west, and towards the south in a roughly straight line along the Magdalena river to the regions of rural settlement. It also affects the middle Magdalena area, northeastern Antioquia, Córdoba, and the eastern plains (Llanos), amongst others.

confrontations have been between coca growers and settlers, traditional cattlemen and guerrilla groups[26/].

The imposition of drug trafficking and the violent reaction on the part of the "mafia cartels" have created a situation which has perhaps generated the greatest conflict and violence in the history of the nation. Equally, a new area of violent conflict has developed between the various drug merchants.

Within the new practices, "organized violence" stands out. Associated with narcotics trafficking, it has increased in the last decade thanks to the creation of special security forces or private armies, and the so-called "armed self-defense groups". The emanation of these organizations has led to the emergence of private forces equal to those of the government which boast a highly sophisticated and modern military infrastructure, made possible by the high profits generated by the cultivation, processing and selling of drugs, and at the same time linked to the consolidation of an arms market, which distributes to those who take part in the violence.

26/ This struggle has produced new ways of practising violence. It is evidenced by kidnappings and assassinations, in the organization of communities to defend and recover their territories, and in the creation of the recognized "armed self-defense groups", and private armies (paramilitaries), organizations which are used to maintain control over large extensions of land (narcotics dealers and large landowners), or by rural inhabitants to express discontent and defend their rights.

Briefly, the influx of profits from drug trafficking has incited the violence and corruption of certain sectors of Colombian society and has encouraged the development of criminal groups and individuals [such as the so-called "sicarios" (paid assassins)], who conduct their actions in an indiscriminate manner (against commercial enemies of drug traffickers, marginalized social groups, unions, parties and political leaders), giving rise to the so-called "dirty war" in which it is difficult to distinguish the protagonists or the causes of crimes, and which produces "a culture of violence".

The crisis in the justice system and violence

The increased violence in the country has been associated with a profound crisis in the administration of the penal justice system. The array of problems which confront the judicial system (particularly in reference to the penal system) lead to a lack of credibility, and more seriously, to the administration of private justice outside the margins of formal justice. There is a crisis in the legitimacy of justice, and in this sense, it has ceased to be a pillar of a just and pluralist democracy.

According to studies carried out on this subject by the SER Institute of Investigation, some of the main problems confronting the judicial system in Colombia are the low salary levels of judges and functionaries and inefficient organization. The problem is far

more complex than a mere lack of funds, but graph VIII-6 shows a descent in the share of the judicial branch in the national budget. Not only is the budget for the branch quite limited, but the branch also lacks control over its budget management, which can restrict the possibilities for modernization and development programs. But it is not clear that within the present organization, substantial increases in resources would decongest judicial offices or diminish corruption. Although efforts have been made to improve procedures in penal justice[27/], it is evident that a fundamental overhaul is needed in order to make justice more effective.

An indicator of the stagnation of the justice system is the congestion of cases in courthouses. Although the processing of cases has increased in the last few years, the difference between the number of cases which come to trial in the penal system in a year and those which are concluded in the same year is quite significant (about 30%). This congested situation is particularly severe in Bogotá, where the percentage of trials in penal courts concluded in the years 1986 and 1987 was 16.8%, and in the departments of Valle and Atlántico the percentage was about 25% (graphs VIII-7A and VIII-7B).

27/ Systemization has been introduced, with a fair amount of success, in some judicial courts, in the Tribunal of Bogotá and in the Juzgado Civil del Circuito de Bogotá (Civil Judges of the Bogotá Circuit). SER Institute of Investigation (1987).

GRAPH VIII-6

BUDGET FOR JUSTICE BRANCH
AS A PERCENTAGE OF THE GENERAL NATIONAL BUDGET

(va la gráfica)

Source: SER Institute of Investigation.

GRAPH VIII-7A

NUMBER OF CASES
WHICH COME TO SENTENCING STAGE VS CASES INITIATED

(va la gráfica)

CASES INITIATED

CASES CONCLUDED

Source: Coyuntura Social (1989)

GRAPH VIII-7B

ANNUAL EXCESS OF CRIMINAL CASES IN THE COURTHOUSES OF VARIOUS CITIES (1986-1987)

(va la gráfica)

CASES INITIATED CASES CONCLUDED

Source: Coyuntura Social

The explanation for the congestion of cases in law courts does not seem to be found in human resources: the number of magistrates and penal judges in the main towns of the principal judicial districts has increased over the last fifteen years[28]/. The problem, then, appears to originate from within the penal justice structure itself.

One last factor which should be stressed is the physical vulnerability, the lack of support and guarantees for the members of the judicial branch. The threats and physical attacks and assassinations against judges have been a growing phenomenon in the last few years, claiming a large number of victims.

Impunity in the justice system

This composition of elements, amongst others, has caused the crisis of justice and impunity; i.e. that the inability to administer justice in an efficient manner leads to a situation in which violent acts are left unpunished and so open the way for those concerned to administer their own personal justice by means of force or violence. Justice has ceased to represent the fundamental mechanism of the state and the citizenry for resolving conflict; the crisis of the judicial system has also allowed higher indexes

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28/ In the cities of Bogotá, Medellín, Cali and Barranquilla, both the absolute number of magistrates and judges and the rate per 100,000 inhabitants has grown from 1973 to 1988, see Coyuntura Social (1989), p.20.

of crime because crime is not sufficienty punished. The dissuasive effort of justice on a society depends on the punishments imposed on antisocial conduct, but much more on the probability of such conduct being tried and punished. The crisis in penal justice in Colombia has led to the probability of this last action being near zero.

Various ways of measuring impunity exist. Amongst those best suited to illustrating the problem are the gradual evolution of indictments commenced which come before a judge[29/], and second, an analysis of the relationship between crimes which terminate in arrest and prosecution, out of the total crimes committed in one year[30/].

It is possible to confirm, with regard to the crimes committed each year, that less than half (about 40%) result in prosecution and arrest. Of those trials initiated, which have been increasing since 1965 albeit with a decreasing tendency after 1985, as can be seen in table VIII-3, about 6% of cases actually come before a judge.

If a comparison is therefore made between the rising tendency of unaccountability since the mid-seventies, with the increase in

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29/ According to the justice statistics of the DANE.

30/ See Revista de Criminalidad (Magazine of Crime), National Police (1981-1985).

TABLE VIII-3

EVOLUTION OF NUMBER
OF CASES INITIATED AND JUDGED

YEAR	C A S E S		TRIALS BEGUN %
	INITIATED	JUDGED	
1965			
1972			
1976			
1980			
1984			
1985			
1986			
1987			

Source: DANE, Judicial Statistics.

the homicide rate (graph VIII-8), a positive correlation is observed. Within this context, impunity and the crisis of the justice system, linked to the presence of drug trafficking, are perhaps the elements which have led to the growing wave of violence unleashed in the early eighties.

It is interesting to note an aspect of great relevance: according to some, the crisis of the justice system and impunity are not only the responsibility of the deficiencies in the "formal" justice, i.e. that administered by judges. On the contrary, "social" justice, that is that which should be practiced by society, has also entered a state of crisis. Society also bears a responsibility, and it is one which has not yet been assumed, for individual interests now hold sway over the public interest[31]/.

This suggests that there are "objective" causes related to organizational problems and "subjective" causes which refer to the ethics of citizens as much as those of judges[32]/.

To summarize, impunity "over the last few decades has been converted into one of the critical factors which feed political instability, insecurity and violence. This should not be understood solely as the inability of the judicial branch to punish crimes...

31/ Declaration of José Alejandro Boniviento in the Forum for the Quest Against Impunity, in September 1988, under the auspices of the Presidential Council for Human Rights.

32/ Op. cit. Declaration of Guillermo Plazas Alcid.

GRAPH VIII-8

BEHAVIOUR OF IMPUNITY
AND EVOLUTION OF HOMICIDE RATE

(va la gráfica)

CRIMES UNPUNISHED (%)
HOMICIDE RATE (RATE/100,000 INHAB.)

Source: Commission on Studies on Violence (1987), table I-1 and author's calculations.

but as the expression of various social, political, economic and international processes, which surge forth, generating new forms of violence in such a way that the institutional and legal structures available are left far behind by the torrent of misdemeanours"[33]/.

The costs of development: The environment

Economic development has been associated with the transformation of the "ecosystem", meaning the social structures and their relation to nature. The typical forms of capitalist and socialist production have translated into new forms of the appropriation of nature and important changes in the social relations of the population. In this way, the predominant models of development have generated a profound external impact: the exploitation of nature has created severe ecological damage and the general deterioration of the environment.

The industrialization process characteristic of these models of development has been accompanied by a massive migration of the agricultural labour force towards urban employment, provoking an accelerated metropolitan expansion and an elevated growth and concentration of a significant percentage of population in the main cities. This urbanization and sub-urbanization has led to the ecological destruction of vast rural areas. The expansion of the

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[33]/ Ibidem. Declaration by President Virgilio Barco.

agricultural frontier has also generated deforestation and erosion problems, loss of water sources, and the disappearance of flora and fauna species. In addition, industrial development has elevated levels of air and water pollution and inadequate waste disposal, which carries serious negative consequences for the health conditions of the population.

Economic development in Colombia has likewise had all of these effects. As regards air pollution, it has been possible to prove, from various studies carried out on this subject, that the concentrations of contaminating particles (mostly associated with the use of combustibles such as diesel fuel, coal, fuel oil, crude oil, amongst others) exceed permissible limits for particles suspended in the air, which in its turn affects the health of the population[34/].

Equally, in the rural zones, demographic growth has translated into population migrations towards zones which are not easily adapted to agriculture (páramo -high Andean moor- and jungle), engendering processes of deforestation, improper use of lands and threats to the natural resources (water sources, soil, vegetable and animal species particular to those regions). Also, the

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34/ The Bogotá Secretary for Health conducted a study in 1987 on air pollution in Bogotá: 1983-1986. It was observed that the most polluted areas of the city were in the south. Towards the periphery, the pollution is less. A summary of the results is presented in Coyuntura Social (1989).

modernization and mechanization of agricultural production has been accompanied in some cases by the uses of additives such as fertilizers, pesticides and herbicides which have generated water pollution, ecological imbalances and health problems.

As regards the exploitation of natural resources, it is important to integrate into the economic analysis the distinction between renewable and non-renewable resources. That is, to evaluate to what extent the utilization of existing common resources translates into the loss of them. Equally, it is most important to evaluate the problems which generate these forms and levels of exploitation of available resources. In particular, it concerns the deterioration of resources such as soil, water, forests, fishing resources or the biological wealth of the country.

According to recent studies, land use in Colombia is inefficient. It is considered that 12.7% of the national territory is suitable for agriculture. However, only 42% of this is used, showing that great possibilities exist for the expansion of agriculture. On the other hand, lands suitable for cattle raising are equally underutilized; however, some of the agricultural zones are used for cattle, which suggests that a significant part of lands suitable for agriculture are covered with pasture.

Conversely, there does exist an intensive use of lands in certain relatively dry zones, a situation which in the long term

produces serious erosion and thus the loss of fertile soils. In brief, it can be asserted that an underutilization of certain lands exists at the same time as an over-intensive use of others, which translates into an inefficient use of lands and consequently, a deterioration of a significant number of zones.

Other natural resources, such as water, have been seriously affected by the behaviour of man within both the urban and rural ecosystems. Deforestation or the improper management of forests, for example, has a negative impact upon the moisture in the soil, and consequently upon the water supply which feeds other zones and is required for other activities. This is the case of the páramos, rich in this resource, which are used for activities to which they are unsuited, such as agriculture or cattle raising.

But more severe than the problem of the supply of water in Colombia is its pollution. It originates not only from industrial activities[35]/ and hydrocarbons[36]/, but also from the elevated use of chemicals in commercial agriculture which are highly toxic and non-biodegradable. Contamination destroys living species[37]/

35/ The principal concentrations of pollution are: The Special District of Bogotá, the Aburrá Valley, the Cali Yumbo area, Barranquilla, and the bay of Cartagena.

36/ It particularly affects the areas of Tumaco, Buenaventura, Coveñas, Cartagena and Santa Marta.

37/ In areas of the departments of Magdalena, Cauca, Cundinamarca, Nariño, rice -growing regions (eastern Llanos), cotton and banana zones (the Atlantic coast) and coffee zones.

and affects human health through the consumption of a resource which has been chemically, biologically and physically altered[38]/.

Evidently, the pollution of rivers (such as the Magdalena and the Bogotá rivers), and of marine areas as a consequence of waste disposal and an improper use of resources, are aspects which threaten human and animal life and reduce the natural resources which are needed for future generations[39]/.

Another improperly utilized resource is the forests. Economic development and in particular the need to acquire lands for agricultural production or for the survival of settlers, are responsible for the deforestation of Colombia by means of the burning and the felling of trees. However, in the case of settlers, the proportion of deforested areas which are actually used for agricultural and livestock production is relatively low. This suggests that the exploitation of this resource is highly injurious to the country, given that first, it does not help improve the

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38/ Additionally, the supply of water for human consumption and its treatment, are quite deficient. Out of the total inhabitants of the country, more than 20% have no water in the home; 10% have untreated water; and barely 70% enjoy drinkable water. The poor quality of water is most critical in the principal towns; see Coyuntura Social No.2, graph 2, p.75.

39/ This is the case of the Rosario Islands, where the marine diversity is tending to disappear more and more due to improper use of building materials in the islands and gasoline pollution.

welfare of the settler, and second, it generates a waste of wood which will lead to the scarcity of trees in future generations. Although some efforts have been made towards reforestation in Colombia, especially in the last few years, the hectares of protected reforested areas do not amount to more than 1%. of the total area which has been felled at the present time (Coyuntura Social, 1990).

Fishing resources are another affected resource, but more through water pollution than through overfishing. However, given that fishing is an important economic activity and in particular, constitutes part of the export sector, there are strong external pressures which lead to intensive exploitation in some zones, bringing with then in consequence a future deterioration of fish resources.

One last aspect which bears mentioning is the insufficient preservation of the richness and diversity of our country's animals and plants, as a consequence of poor use of existing natural resources. The problems of and the social pressures on the environment are some of the principal causes of the disappearance of the so-called "biodiversity" which characterizes the countries of the Thirld World, thus breaking the natural balance.

The problem, viewed from a long - term perspective, is very urgent, and even more so if it is considered that no general

concern for the environment exists in this country, and no effective mechanisms to encourage a better use of our resources have been developed. Until now, efforts have been partial and isolated.

Although the subject is a very broad one and it can only be roughly outlined here, a large part of the present ecological problem is that contamination carries no cost for those who pollute. Income generated by the farms on the páramo is not diminished by the social cost of destroying water supplies. Pollution will diminish only when those who contaminate or destroy ecological systems have to bear the social cost of their activities. In Colombia, no institutions or systems have yet been developed to make such charges effective.

The deterioration of the environment can also occurr in a completely man-made habitat. At the urban level, one high cost of development has been congestion. Housing demands have led to low investment in parks and green areas within cities, which worsens the quality of life for large sections of the population, and in particular, for children and young people.

An inadequate transport policy has also led to the unnecessary congestion of public roads, turning into an immense cost in terms of the welfare of the majority of the urban population. The traffic

chaos also generates expressions of violence through high levels of aggression and the non-observance of social norms.

Conclusions

It has usually been accepted that the phenomenon of violence in Colombia and its growth are a direct result of the economic pattern of development followed by the country. However, one way of measuring the relationship between the two variables consists in making a comparison between the tendencies of the indexes of violence (measured as homicide rates), the evolution of family income, and the presence of the state, i.e. the increase in social expenditure and the provision of public services. The correlation between these indicators permits a measure of the extent in which the increase of conflict in the country can be explained by purely economic factors.

Following the different tendencies observed in the trajectory of the indexes of violence in the last three decades, it was possible to find diverse explanations for the phenomenon and to calculate their relation to levels of economic development in terms of social indicators. During the period 1958-1960, a strong increase in violence was registered, due mostly to political motivations. Later on, from 1960 to 1975, the decrease in violence undoubtedly coincided with the improvement in economic conditions, with the greater presence and intervention of the state in the

provision of basic public services, and in the first attempts at social policy such as the Agrarian Reform and the increase in public expenditure on social programs. In this sense, it is therefore evident that during the period 1960-1975, there existed a correlation between economic progress and the resolution of conflicts.

However, despite the continued progress in social areas during the following years, the indexes of violence have increased since 1975, with a particularly sharp upturn since 1984. This suggests that the economic context has ceased to be the principal cause of the intensification of conflict. Although political factors continue to have some influence, it is phenomena such as narcotics trafficking and the inefficiency of the justice system which have determined the dramatic increase in violence since the early eighties.

Nevertheless, economic development has indeed had negative long-term side effects, in that it has been of an "incomplete" nature. The presence of the state has benefited some regions more than others, and has produced imbalances in the standard of living between regions and between urban and rural zones. Social investment has also lagged behind in zones of very rapid economic and demographic growth (such as in the case of Urabá).

Another cost of the pattern of development has been its inability to deal with the acute crisis faced by the Colombian justice system. The lack of modernization and the sluggishness of the justice system have translated into an incapacity of the system to prevent crimes. The country's judicial system has been left impotent by the intensification of violence, a situation which has given way to one of the most pressing problems: impunity.

Lastly, it is worth stressing again that the country's characteristic economic development has introduced important changes in the ecosystem and the way in which man takes possession of nature. These new forms of the appropriation and the exploitation of natural resources, and in some cases their improper use, have generated side effects for the population which include air and water pollution and the disappearance of the very resources which are vital to the survival of future generations. One of the greatest challenges for the country in the future will be the development of social processes and institutions to ensure that the costs of contamination and the moderated use of natural resources are internalized and charged to those who use those resources or benefit from economic activities with externalities.

Development has also created new problems, such as the excess of women in the cities and of men in the rural frontier zones. The dissolution of the traditional family has generated severe inconveniences in the lives of some family members, and has brought

about a situation of insecurity for those older than 65. In addition, the increase in divorce has created new economic and psychological difficulties for the children of broken families.

The quality of life has also deteriorated in a subtle way. The cities in 1950 were more pleasant and perhaps more beautiful than they are today. Although Colombian architecture is attractive in international terms, there are city zones which are aesthetically uninteresting.

Finally, it is worth pointing out that during the last forty years there has been more violence in Colombia than in many other countries. Even though this is not due primarily to economic factors, its reduction is a necessary condition for the improvement of national welfare.

The country's great challenge for the future is to enable its institutions to solve the inevitable conflicts of a society in a peaceful manner. All the indicators suggest that a reduction of violence will require profound changes in many institutions and reforms in the justice system. On the other hand, crime will not diminish until the amount of drug trafficking is largely reduced.

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NOTE: The text that appear underlined corresponds to italic printing in the book.

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97	Student demonstrations in 1954 and in 1990. The percentage of women increases.
99	Womens' workdays are longer and more difficult due to the lack of adequate services.
101	Women have been integrated into the work force.
117	Rural-urban migration is predominantly female.
122	Training and education improve womens' social and economic conditions.

Capítulo 6

131 Primary education in a squatters' settlement and in the countryside.

133 Schools in the Las Delicias district, Bogotá, 1960 and 1990.

135 Infrastructure, the great problem for education: A school in the Modelo del Norte district, Bogotá, 1953. A school in the Policarpa Salavarrieta district, Bogotá, 1990.

145 Children in rural areas must walk long distances to school.
Computers in primary and secondary education.

147 1967: Female presence becomes more usual in the universities.
By 1990 female enrollment equals male enrollment.

Capítulo 7

164 The informal economy grows in Bogotá, Plaza de San Victorino in the 1950's and in 1990.

167 The urban transformation of the Northern highway of Bogotá, 1958 and 1990.

169 The calle 100 in Bogotá: at the end of the 1960's and in 1990.

Capítulo 8

181 A demonstration in support of Gaitán and a view of the devastated city after the ninth of April, 1948.


185 Handing over of arms.
Increasing piles of penal cases awaiting trial.

187 The deterioration in welfare has been noted in diverse areas.

198 A march after the assassination of Luis Carlos Galán. The M-19 surrenders its arms.

200 Many trees have been felled in the name of progress.
The polluting effect of industry.

202 The Santander park and the avenida Jimenez de Quesada in two different eras.



FEDESARROLLO

FUNDACION PARA LA EDUCACION SUPERIOR Y EL DESARROLLO

FEDESARROLLO es una entidad colombiana, sin ánimo de lucro dedicada a promover el adelanto científico y cultural y la educación superior, orientándolos hacia el desarrollo económico y social del país.

Para el cumplimiento de sus objetivos, adelantará directamente o con la colaboración de universidades y centros académicos, proyectos de investigación sobre problemas de interés nacional.

Entre los temas de investigación que han sido considerados de alta prioridad están la planeación económica y social, el diseño de una política industrial para Colombia, las implicaciones del crecimiento demográfico, el proceso de integración latinoamericana, el desarrollo urbano y la formulación de una política petrolera para el país.

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